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Turkey, a staunch US ally during the Cold War, experienced a transformation of 
its domestic and foreign policy in the last decade. It pursued a more independent foreign 
policy in the neighboring region, leading the critics to charge Turkey with abandoning the 
Western alliance and to question its commitment to strategic partnership with the United 
States and the EU. This dissertation uses a series of case studies on Turkey’s foreign 
policy in the Middle East and the Eurasia region to answer the question of whether the 
recent changes in Turkish foreign policy represent a fundamental reorientation of the 
country away from the Western alliance and to examine the dominant factors driving 
Turkish foreign policy during this period. The study concludes that Turkey’s foreign 
policy transformation in the last decade represents a significant change in the direction of 
autonomy, but not a fundamental reorientation of the country away from the West. The 
study also finds that while international factors played an important role in preparing the 
ground for Turkey’s foreign policy change, domestic factors, particularly Turkey’s 
economic interests, its new foreign policy elite and their vision, and Turkish public 
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CHAPTER	  1:	  INTRODUCTION 
 
Why Turkey?  
Turkey is the heir to the Ottoman Empire with territories that lie at the crossroad 
of Europe and Asia. It has control over the strategic straits in the Black Sea and the 
energy and transportation routes connecting the two continents. It is the corridor through 
which the energy reserves of the Caspian Sea flow to Europe, the other alternatives being 
Iran and Russia. It is a longstanding member of the major Western political and economic 
institutions. Since the mid-twentieth century, it has been a part of the Council of Europe, 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, and NATO, and it signed its 
first Association Agreement with the European Economic Community, precursor to the 
European Union (EU) in 1963. Turkey is the only country that is simultaneously a 
member of the G-20, NATO, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.  
Turkey’s global attraction stems not only from the geopolitical identity of Turkey 
at the crossroads of the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasian regions, but also 
from its cultural identity as a modern nation state with parliamentary democratic 
governance, secular constitutional structure, and mainly Muslim population.1 Home to 
nearly 78 million Muslims, Turkey is, with all its problems, the most advanced 
democracy in the Islamic world. As the Western world is fighting Islamic extremism 
around the world and the Arab Spring transformed many regimes in an unstable region, 
Turkey stands out as a model that has successfully blended Islam with democratic 
governance. With its involvement in conflicts from Iraq to Syria and from Georgia to 
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Azerbaijan, Turkey has been increasingly projecting its power outward and trying to 
claim its status as a regional power. Turkey’s foreign policy is not only of interest to 
comparative political scientists who analyze foreign policy change and drivers of those 
changes, but also to policymakers watching the recent changes in Turkish foreign policy 
in an increasingly volatile region.  
  There has been a recent upsurge of interest in the country because Turkey 
experienced a significant transformation in its domestic and foreign policy in the last 
fifteen years.2 Following chronic political instability and financial crises in 1994, 1998, 
and most severely in 2001, causing the Turkish Lira to plummet, inflation to go up to 80 
percent and Turkish banks to fail, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to 
power in 2002 with 34 percent of the vote, which gave it close to the two-thirds majority 
needed to change the constitution on its own. The AKP embraced many of the country’s 
Islamists, nationalists, Kurds, rural conservatives, Muslim sect members, and globalized 
liberals and continued to benefit from and contribute to a series of institutional, 
economic, socio-cultural changes in the country, which in turn was reflected in 
significant foreign policy changes since 2002. 
Institutional changes: Turkish foreign policy used to be the product of two sets of 
actors: state elite and governing elite. The state elite, which consists of the career military 
and the civilian bureaucracy dominated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has been the 
staunch defender of the Kemalist secular ideology. The governing elite, which tended to 
be more representative of different values of Turkish society, including Kemalism, 
Islamism, and Turkish nationalism, had less influence on foreign policy. Thanks to 
Turkey’s history of unstable coalition governments and corruption scandals, a majority of 
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the public trusted the military more than the governing elite in defending the secular 
republic. The constitutional courts and the presidency have also checked the power of any 
parliamentary majority to uphold the secular values.3  
After the AKP came to power, the relationship between the state and governing 
elite became less imbalanced than in the past. The AKP governing elite emerged from the 
election institutionally strong with a parliamentary majority hovering around two-thirds 
mark and making constitutional reforms a possibility. The electoral mandate and the 
ensuing political stability allowed the AKP to pass the constitutional reforms that reined 
in the dominant role of the military, expanded the civil rights of citizens and minorities, 
and enacted economic reforms that further liberalized the Turkish economy with the aim 
of meeting the EU criteria for membership. For example, Turkey’s mixed civilian-
military state security courts were abolished and amendments to the anti-terror law made 
it more difficult to prosecute citizens based on speech alone. The AKP-dominated 
parliament amended Articles 76 and 78 of the constitution, making it more difficult to 
ban political parties and politicians from the political arena. Military representatives were 
removed from Turkey’s Council of Higher Education and High Audio-Visual Board 
established after the military coup of 1980. The reforms expanded the scope of individual 
freedoms by granting some rights to its citizens who have Kurdish origin, such as 
broadcasting in Kurdish and learning Kurdish through the private institutions that teach 
Kurdish language. 
As a result, Turkey became more representative than it was a decade ago with the 
declining role of the military in the political system in favor of the civilians. The 
reduction in the influence of the military and the traditional bureaucracy in foreign 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
4	  
policy-making led to changes in definition of national security and threat perceptions as 
well as the kind of tools used in foreign policy.4 As the military lost its privileged role on 
foreign affairs, its hard power and security-focused approach was replaced by a more 
pragmatic and liberal approach that prioritizes economic interests and soft power. 5 
At the same time, a more conservative, religious, and nationalist elite, reflecting 
the new generation of Turks who grew up questioning the top-down secularism and 
modernization imposed since the birth of the Republic, replaced the secular elite that had 
shaped Turkish foreign policy since then. The new elite has a more positive attitude 
toward Turkey’s Ottoman past and to a lesser extent the Turkic world and feels uneasy 
with Turkey’s unconditional support for the Western policies pursued since the Second 
World War. The AKP leadership did not view closer Middle Eastern relations as 
dichotomous or detrimental to Turkey’s Western orientation at home or abroad as had 
been trumpeted under the military rule in the 1980s. The new Turkish leaders 
deemphasized the Islamic threat in the region and pursued an approach that takes 
advantage of the shared religion and heritage to boost economic opportunities.  
Furthermore, the core leadership of the AKP comes from a political tradition that 
glorifies the Ottoman past as well as historical and cultural ties with the Islamic world. 
They favor reestablishing ties and rebuilding trust that were broken by years of neglect, 
enmity, and mutual mistrust. The AKP elites’ background also demonstrates that they are 
at ease in their dealings with their Middle Eastern counterparts. Erdogan graduated from 
a religious vocational high school, Gul worked at the Islamic Development Bank in Saudi 
Arabia between 1983-1991, and Davutoglu worked as a professor at the International 
Islamic University of Malaysia from 1990 to 1993. Favoring a more moderate version of 
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secularism at home and a more activist policy in foreign affairs, Ankara, under the AKP 
leadership, began to exert more “soft power” in the Middle East and the Eurasia region, 
emphasizing closer cooperation, greater economic interdependence and conflict 
mediation.6 
The new elite was able to sell its vision because its vision reflected the changing 
attitude of a broad segment of the Turkish public, whose opinion on such issues began to 
matter more during this period thanks to the institutional changes. For example, the 
Turkish people opposed both Gulf Wars in 1991 and in 2003 but their weak voice in 1991 
could not overcome the strong commitment by the executive to the war whereas their 
opposition in 2003, which was stronger based on the lessons learned from the first Gulf 
War, played a major role in preventing the country from fully participating in the US-led 
War on Iraq. Turkey’s vibrant urban middle class, increasingly supported by relatively 
free press and social media, became more vocal and increasingly more active in foreign 
policy as well as in domestic policy. Pursuing a foreign policy that is not totally 
commensurate with the wishes of the people became a liability in the ballot box.7 Turkish 
people increasingly began to call upon their country to act and not merely watch the 
events on the world stage and they are increasingly willing to protest, as exemplified by 
the mass protests against the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and against annihilation of a 
natural park in Istanbul in 2013. 
  Economic changes: Economic liberalization measures and the export-led growth 
strategy implemented since the 1980s heightened the importance of economic 
considerations in foreign policy. In order to support Turkey’s flourishing export sector, 
which drives its economic growth, one of the aims of Turkish foreign policy during this 
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period became opening up new markets for the growing Turkish businesses.8 The AKP 
came to power with a claim of representing the groups who were outside the political, 
economic, and cultural elite that had dominated Turkey since the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic. The small-scale family businesses in Anatolia who were export-
oriented, well adapted for flexible production patterns, and profited from the increased 
role of economics in foreign policymaking, emerged as a new cadre of businessmen, 
called the “Anatolian Tigers.” Considering that these Anatolian Tigers constitute the core 
of the AKP constituency, further liberalizing the economy and creating new markets in 
which the export-oriented Anatolian firms could do business became important foreign 
policy goals.  
  Catering to this growing, economically oriented electorate, the AKP pursued a 
liberal economic policy and became a business-friendly party. A combination of reforms, 
IMF discipline, and the AKP’s overall management of the economy under stable political 
conditions have produced a significant economic transformation during this period. In 
2012, Erdogan proudly claimed at a World Economic Forum in Istanbul that the Turkish 
economy grew at an annual rate averaging 5.3 percent in the past 10 years, faster than any 
country in the OECD in the late 2000s. The country’s GDP increased from $196 billion 
in 2001 to $813 billion in 2014 in nominal US dollar terms, making Turkey one of the 
world’s top twenty economies and raising its ambition to join the top ten economies 
within the next ten years. Its average national income per capita increased from around 
$3000 to $10,500 during this period. Foreign investment also increased from $30 billion 
in 2001 to $160 billion in 2014 while its total foreign trade increased from $72 billion to 
$400 billion. At the same time, inflation declined from 55 percent in 2001 to 9 percent in 
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2014 and the general government gross debt decreased from 77 percent of GDP to 33 
percent.  
  Socio-cultural changes: Turkish leaders could not easily ignore the positive public 
sentiment supporting closer relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors, especially if 
these sentiments are espoused by powerful commercial interests. As a result of the 
institutional reforms, a new set of interest groups, which had previously had no say in 
Turkish foreign policy, were empowered. Civil society groups—in particular, business 
associations such as the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK), the Turkish 
Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD), and the Confederation of 
Businessmen, and Industrialists (TUSKON)—actively lobby the government on foreign 
policy questions. MUSIAD has played an active role in the party since its establishment; 
many MUSIAD members have joined the AKP to complete the organization of the local 
offices of the party in Anatolian cities.9 The organization’s influence stems from a shared 
worldview with the party and overlapping informal personal networks; as the MUSIAD 
supports the AKP, so did the policies of the AKP to continue to generate support from the 
organization’s members during the election.  
  The EU also contributed to the process of increasing NGO influence on foreign 
policy issues by giving funds to NGO-prepared projects and supporting the wider 
democratization project in Turkey. Key civil society organizations representing the newly 
emerging conservative bourgeoisie, which is the main component of the government’s 
electoral support base at the grassroots level, emerged as central actors in Turkey’s 
foreign policy initiatives, with the aim of exploring new market opportunities and 
creating business partnership networks for their own clientele.10 These business 
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associations have also actively participated in trade negotiations and in the promotion of 
other contacts with their Middle Eastern and European counterparts. TUKSON with its 
33,260 membership and MUSIAD with its 5,200 members have been actively pursuing 
international business by organizing foreign conferences, delegations, and exchanges. 
The business community began to organize the AKP’s state visits and many businessmen 
accompanied state leaders at their official visits.  
  Institutionally, these business associations can affect Turkish foreign policy in 
two ways.11 First, they create platforms for interaction with the state by bringing together 
business community members and policymakers in large-scale international business 
events or trade summits, and by facilitating business participation in state leaders’ official 
visits, thereby creating opportunities for direct contacts with policymakers. Then 
President Gul carried out 70 visits during his first three years in office attended by a total 
of 2,670 businessmen, and they created a business volume of around $20 billion. Second, 
these business associations, especially the DEIK, are represented in the Joint Economic 
Commission meetings, which are held on a bilateral inter-governmental basis with 
foreign countries, and the associations directly contribute to policy formulation as the two 
countries negotiate a road map for the future of their economic relations and formulate 
their policies.12 The business associations’ mobilization behind the policies formulated by 
the state serves to provide greater legitimacy for the policies in question and help to 
create concrete results in the form of higher trade and investment figures.  
  As a result of these changes at the institutional, economic, and socio-cultural level 
as well as at the systemic level, Turkish foreign policy experienced significant changes.  
Turkey’s international environment and its relative power position have changed 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
9	  
dramatically starting in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, which had posed an existential threat to Turkey’s autonomy. The end of 
the Cold War also created a maneuvering space for Turkish foreign policy in the Middle 
East and Eurasia. As Turkey became stronger politically and economically into the 
2000s, Turkish officials have gained the self-confidence to break out of their traditionally 
passive foreign policy framework and began to pursue their security and economic 
interests more independently and assertively. 
  Ankara’s more proactive, assertive, and multidimensional foreign policy during 
this period marks a significant change from its previous policy of non-interference and 
uni-dimensional foreign policy. Turkey launched many initiatives to improve relations 
with its former adversaries through high-level diplomatic visits and increased economic 
engagement during this period. It institutionalized the gains in improved relations by 
signing various agreements from military cooperation to free trade agreements. In the 
process, Turkey also aimed to contribute to peace and stability in the Middle East and 
Eurasia by working to resolve existing conflicts, increasing the stakes for instability 
through greater economic interdependence, and by actively participating in efforts to 
counter terrorism in these regions.  
  Why this dissertation?  
  The Republic of Turkey since its birth in 1923 anchored itself firmly in the 
Western establishment. Following the principles of its founder Ataturk, Turkey embraced 
the West and reformed itself to become a part of the Western civilization. During the 
Cold War era, Turkish foreign policy was aimed at warding off the Soviet threat, 
protecting the Turkish interests vis-à-vis Greece and Cyprus, strengthening ties with the 
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United States and NATO, furthering Turkey’s integration with Western Europe, and 
defending against terrorism supported by neighbors like Syria, Iraq and Iran.  
  Turkey followed a very passive and reactive foreign policy in international affairs 
with the exception of Turkish forces’ intervention in Cyprus in 1974, but it supported the 
US foreign policy initiatives almost unconditionally during this period and the US 
supported Turkey as a Western bulwark against the Soviet Union. The 1947 Truman 
Doctrine provided for large amounts of US financial assistance to Turkey to fight the 
communists and Turkey sent some 25,000 troops to fight alongside the US forces under 
the auspices of the UN in the Korean War.13 It became an active member of NATO and 
closely cooperated with the US and other NATO members in the area of missile defense. 
Turkey’s assistance was critical to the Gulf War in 1991 and it sent around 1,700 troops 
to Afghanistan to head the Kabul Regional Command and its Incirlik Air Base is critical 
to support military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Turkey was also the first Muslim 
country to recognize a critical US ally, Israel. Turkey became a great friend of Israel in 
the non-friendly Middle East and Tel Aviv became a major arms supplier to Ankara.  
In the last decade or so, however, Turkey ceased to follow a uni-dimensional 
foreign policy defined through the lens of the NATO alliance and the US interests. It 
began to assert itself more aggressively and pursued a proactive and more multi-
dimensional foreign policy that was sometimes at odds with the Western interests. 
Turkey surprised the US in 2003 by voting not to allow Washington to open a northern 
front to invade Iraq from the Turkish territory. In 2006, Ankara hosted a high-ranking 
delegation of Hamas, designated as a terrorist organization by the US and Israel. In 2009, 
then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan walked out of a live conference in Davos in 
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protest to its longtime ally Israel’s policies in Gaza, making the headlines in the Middle 
Eastern media. Ankara downgraded diplomatic relations with Israel in 2010 when the 
Israeli forces raided a flotilla led by a Turkish non-governmental organization heading 
toward Gaza in defiance of sanctions, killing 9 Turks aboard. Also in 2010, Turkey, then 
a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), shocked the 
West by voting against sanctions punishing Iran for its nuclear program.  
Ankara’s unusual assertiveness has led critics to charge Turkey with turning its 
back on the West and moving toward the East, questioning Turkey’s new orientation and 
its ongoing commitment to strategic partnership with the United States and the EU. A 
debate over “who lost Turkey” and questioning Turkey’s reliability as a NATO ally 
flourished in the media and policy circles. Some claimed that Turkey’s recent foreign 
policy with a greater regional engagement with the Middle East constitutes a form of 
“neo-Ottomanism” that gives primacy to religious-based cultural affinities in expanding 
its sphere of influence in the region.14 These critics argued that Ankara’s increased 
activism in the Middle East and Prime Minister Erdogan’s popularity in the Arab streets 
as the champion of the Palestinian cause raise concerns about the party’s Islamic past.  
These arguments led some in the policy circles to charge that the religiously-
oriented AKP, which was formed from the remnants of the Islamist Welfare Party, 
gravitated Turkey toward the Islamic world away from its western anchor. Turkish Prime 
Minister’s critique of Israel’s military intervention in Gaza and Ankara’s intention to play 
a mediator role in the Iran’s nuclear problem compounded such criticisms.15 Gareth 
Jenkins suggested that the AKP constitutes a form of political Islam; while apparently 
running West, it in fact aims to head East, and in doing so, it employs an authoritarian 
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and conservative governance, which has increased fear, insecurity and social polarization 
in Turkey.16 The heavy crackdown of the protests in 2013 exacerbated such fears. Soner 
Cagaptay from the Near East Institute charged the AKP with being an “Islamist party,” 
viewing “the world as composed of religious blocks,” and working on “anti-Western, 
anti-US and anti-Israeli initiatives.”17 US policymakers wondered what course Turkey is 
likely to take in the future and whether it will remain committed to its Western alliance, 
which was the main question asked in a 2010 hearing organized by the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs. 
The Western media has naturally picked sensational stories to highlight Turkey’s 
actions that are seemingly contradictory to the Western interests without a deeper 
exploration of the driving forces behind those actions. The frequently expressed view was 
that the West had lost Turkey and that Ankara had joined the non-liberal club, which 
includes China, Iran, and Russia. The academic and the policy world brought some 
nuances to this view, but mostly treated the subject through a descriptive or historical 
narrative without a systemic analysis.  
This study aims to unpack some of the assumptions about Turkey’s new 
orientation and challenge the frequently held view that Turkey has fundamentally shifted 
its foreign policy away from the West. What kind of foreign policy doctrine Turkey 
adheres to, and whether Ankara is abandoning the Western alliance, interests, and values 
and reorienting itself to the East is the main research question of this study. It attempts to 
answer the fundamental question of whither Turkey, a strategically important ally 
aspiring to be a regional power in an unstable region. In the process, it aims to shed light 
on Turkey’s motives, or the factors driving its foreign policy, which will have important 
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policy implications. The study’s analysis of the driving factors of foreign policy change 
at the domestic and international levels of analyses also hopes to contribute to the 
literature on foreign policy change in middle-power countries and to the literature on the 
determinants of Turkish foreign policy. 
How will this study be conducted?  
In order to examine Turkey’s foreign policy behavior in depth, this study uses the 
case study method and analyzes Turkish foreign policy in two different regions where 
Turkey has been the most active and added new dimension to its existing foreign policy, 
namely the Middle East and the Eurasia region. Each case study will include within-case 
analysis of several countries and areas in that region: Iran, Iraq, Syria and Israel in the 
case of Middle East, and Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus in the Eurasia region.  
To systemically analyze the factors affecting Ankara’s foreign policy actions and 
assess whether this change is a fundamental reorientation of its foreign policy, this study 
uses the congruence method of hypothesis testing. It entails establishing two hypotheses, 
determining the value of predicted policy changes for each hypothesis, and then 
comparing the observed value of policy changes with the earlier predictions. If the actual 
policy outcome is consistent with the predictions, then the possibility of a causal 
relationship is strengthened. The study uses the congruence method, combined with 
before and after analyses, as a methodology to examine the evidence supporting the two 
hypotheses. In the process, it analyzes which factors are dominant in Turkey’s foreign 
policy behavior.  
Each case study begins by laying out the two hypotheses, the predictions based on 
these hypotheses, and the parameters used in these predictions. It then provides a brief 
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overview of Turkey’s foreign policy in that region. Each mini case starts with a historical 
analysis of Turkish foreign policy before 2002 and then it presents the evidence for the 
predictions of each hypothesis. Each case concludes with a summary of the findings and 
analysis and an overall conclusion, following the completion of the mini cases, presents 
the results of individual cases by identifying the common threads within an analytic 
framework.  
Hypothesis A, which reflects the frequently-expressed view, states that the recent 
changes in Turkish foreign policy stemming from international and domestic level factors 
indicate a fundamental reorientation of Ankara’s foreign policy away from the US and 
the EU in favor of a completely autonomous regional power that would try to limit the 
Western influence in the Middle East and Eurasia.  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely oppose or confound the policies of its NATO 
allies, specifically the US and the EU, in the Middle East and Eurasia and take a stance 
systematically at odds with the Western interests. 
Prediction 2: Turkey would not share its Western allies’ vision for the Middle 
East and Eurasia and its foreign policy initiatives in the region would exceed the bounds 
of what the US, the EU, and its other NATO partners consider acceptable.  
Prediction 3: Turkey would orient its trade towards non-Western trading blocs 
that try to limit the influence of the West in the region and it would reject or give up its 
pursuit of EU membership. 
Hypothesis B, which is my argument, states that the recent changes in Turkish 
foreign policy resulting from international and domestic level factors demonstrate that 
while there is a significant change in the direction of autonomy, Turkey’s foreign policy 
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in the Middle East and Eurasia does not represent a fundamental shift away from the 
West.  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely support or conform to the policies of its 
NATO allies, specifically the US and the EU, in the Middle East and Eurasia. 
Prediction 2: Turkey would share its Western allies’ vision for the Middle East 
and the Eurasia region and its foreign policy initiatives in the region would be acceptable 
to the US, the EU, and its other NATO partners. 
Prediction 3: Turkey’s bilateral trade would increase with the Middle Eastern and 
Eurasian countries as well as with the Western countries. Turkey would seek greater 
integration with the Middle Eastern and Eurasian countries but it would also pursue EU 
membership and closer economic ties with the US. 
 Data for this study mainly come from official documents, government sources, 
industry reports, and media sources. The case study uses evidence from the firsthand 
account of events in speeches, interviews, and official government documents regarding 
policymakers’ intentions and reactions. This is complemented by analytic and descriptive 
accounts of what has actually happened in Turkish foreign policy in the last decade, 
which are found in secondary sources such as books, academic journals, and media 
reports. The empirical evidence for the case study comes from two main sources. The 
quantitative data on trade, investment, and economic growth figures are mainly pulled 
from the government agencies, industry, and media reporting. They are presented in 
graphs and constitute important evidence for the economic reasons behind certain policy 
actions. The qualitative data, such as public opinion surveys, are drawn from official 
websites and policy papers. These survey results are useful in measuring public opinion 
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and analyzing its impact on foreign policy actions. 
Because the thrust of the case study relies on Turkey’s foreign policy actions, 
which are mostly reported in the media and policy articles, this study invested most of its 
efforts in obtaining and analyzing the events data. Unlike content analysis, which only 
focuses on the automatic repetition of certain words to assess the importance of an event 
or idea, I built a detailed chronological timeline of Turkish foreign policy from 1923 till 
present. Mining through the data for Turkish foreign policy actions, as reported in the 
open sources, I carefully recorded significant, relevant, and time-sensitive events in a 
timeline. That allowed me to make comparisons among relevant policy actions and 
analyze the correlation among various events with an attention to specific timing and 
sequence. Having a long list of all the government actions in one place also allowed me 
to analyze whether an event would provide support for the predominant or alternative 
hypothesis without ignoring the evidence that run counter to my argument.  
The proposed dissertation first provides an overview of Turkey’s foreign policy 
from the founding of the Republic in 1923 until 2000 in Chapter 2 to prepare the reader 
with the literature on Turkey’s historical background. The Chapter 3 on theoretical 
framework introduces the literature on foreign policy change, on domestic and 
international level of analyses drawn from international relations theory, and on Turkish 
foreign policy. In Chapter 4, the case study on the Middle East is presented. It examines 
Turkish foreign policy in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Israel. The Chapter 5 presents the case 
study on Eurasia. It analyzes Turkey’s foreign policy in Russia, Central Asia, and the 
Caucasus. Finally, the Chapter 6 summarizes the results of the case studies, provides an 
analysis of the dominant factors driving Turkish foreign policy in these regions, and 
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draws policy implications for the West and for others that are trying to understand the 
future direction of Turkey’s foreign policy. The implications also provide opportunities 
for the West to influence Turkey’s foreign policy behavior and offer useful analysis to 
ease our understanding of foreign policy behavior of other countries at similar levels of 
development with similar level of influence.  
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CHAPTER	  2:	  HISTORY	  OF	  TURKISH	  FOREIGN	  POLICY	  (1923-­‐2000)	  
	  
2.1.	  The	  Early	  Republican	  Years	  Between	  Two	  World	  Wars	  (1923-­‐1945)	  
 
The year 1923 marks the birth of the Turkish Republic from the remnants of the 
Ottoman Empire. When the Ottomans came out of the First World War on the side of the 
losers, the thirty-sixth and last of the Ottoman sultans Mehmet VI Vahdettin had to sign 
but never ratified or implemented the infamous Treaty of Sevres in 1920, which 
stipulated the following: Greece would receive the remaining portion of the Empire’s 
European territory as well as Izmir and its hinterland in western Anatolia. Turks would 
abandon all Arab lands. An independent Armenian republic in the east and an 
autonomous Kurdish region in the southeast would be formed. France, Italy, and Britain 
could carve out “spheres of influence” from the remaining Anatolian heartland. 
Capitulations—the rights and privileges given to the Christians that were abolished 
during the war—would be restored and the Straits would be demilitarized and placed 
under international control. Turks were only allowed to keep a small part of desolate 
central Anatolia, under various restrictions. The impact of the Sevres Treaty, known as 
the “Sevres syndrome” haunted the Turkish memory for the coming years and even today 
justifies some suspicions about the Western powers’ ambition to split up Turkey.  
As the six-centuries-old empire that had led the Islamic world and controlled 
much of the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean disintegrated, the Nationalists 
organized around Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the father of the Turks, refused to accept the 
Sevres Treaty and fought the War of Independence to oust the foreigners from Anatolia 
and overturn the terms of the treaty.18 The fierce national struggle for independence 
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forced the Western Allies to accept the Ankara government led by Ataturk with the 
signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, which recognized the territory and sovereignty of 
Turkey. The Turkish Republic officially declared its independence on 29 October 1923. 
The new Turkey was a small nation-state and a parliamentary democracy, founded not on 
expansionist principles but on maintaining the existing status quo. It sought to break with 
the Ottoman past and disown its legacy, but it also inherited an experienced bureaucracy 
and an educated official class from the empire. This elite group of administrators, under 
Ataturk’s guidance and within the one-party authoritarian regime led by the Republican 
People’s Party (CHP), formed the foundation of Turkey’s modernizing elite. This elite 
dominated the political scene and imposed radical changes from the top.19 Ataturk twice 
attempted to allow opposition, but when the new parties, including the Progressive 
Republican Party founded in 1924, threatened his own authority, they were closed down.  
The period between the end of WWI and WWII was marked by a realist foreign 
policy. Even though Russia had become the archenemy of the Ottomans since the 17th 
century because of Russia’s expansionist policies and the course of conflict over the past 
four centuries—World War I was the last of the thirteen Russo-Turkish wars—which had 
generated mutual distrust, relations with the Soviet Union were good during this period. 
Russia supplied political and material support to Turkey and signed the Treaty of 
Neutrality and Non-aggression of 1925 with Turkey. Turkey tried to maintain its 
neutrality during the Second World War while remaining suspicious of the Soviets.20 
Even though the Turks fought the Greeks, who had territorial claims on the Turkish lands 
during its Independence War, they pursued détente with Greece and relations were 
relatively stable during this period.  
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Ataturk never accepted the idea of a “mandate” or a “protectorate,” but he was not 
against alliances or making political and military agreements with other countries. He 
played a leading role in the establishment of the Balkan Pact.21 While arguing for realism, 
Ataturk denounced both pan-Islamism (unity of all Muslims) and pan-Turkism (unity of 
all Turkic-origin peoples) as inappropriate goals. He tried to break away from the Islamic 
past by abolishing the caliphate in 1923 and declaring Turkey a secular Republic. By 
choosing a democratic system of government and dismissing the idea of an Islam-
protector nation, the new Turkish state wanted to build peaceful relations with western 
Christian countries. Ataturk also spearheaded mandatory social reforms, forbidding the 
fez, veil, and attires connected to Islam in favor of Western hats and suits, abolishing the 
Islamic law, and adopting the Swiss civil code and the Italian penal code. He replaced the 
Arabic script with Latin alphabet and launched a literacy campaign around the country. 
For the next several decades, Turkey followed Ataturk’s advice, “peace at home, 
peace abroad,” which advocates strengthening territorial integrity at home and avoiding 
adventurism abroad. That led to a more isolationist policy. Because of foreign 
interventions, privileges granted to foreigners, and the capitulations, the Ottoman Empire 
to a large extent had lost its independence in its last years. Hence, after the War of 
Independence, Ataturk’s main concern in the country’s foreign policy was complete 
independence by which he meant “complete economic, financial, judicial, military, 
cultural independence and freedom in all matters.”22 He wanted to preserve the national 
territory encompassed by the armistice line of 1918 and to renounce any other territorial 
claims. Satisfied with its new borders and territory settled by the Treaty of Lausanne, 
Turkey did not want military adventurism. Turkey also ensured peace with the Western 
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powers by renouncing its claims on Mosul and Western Thrace.   
While strictly guarding its independence, Turkey gradually tried to reestablish its 
links to the Western world and become a part of the Western civilization, which Ataturk 
believed was superior.23 Despite the fact that Turkey had fought against the western 
powers during the First World War and the War of Independence, it adopted a Western 
orientation and the secular western culture. A prominent Turkey scholar, Mustafa Aydin 
argued that the western modernization began after a series of Ottoman defeats at the 
hands of the western powers and that most Ottoman and Turkish modernizers did agree 
upon one basic assumption that “there is no second civilization; civilization means 
European civilization and it must be imported with both its roses and thorns.24”  
The Kemalist principles naturally guided Turkey’s western orientation in foreign 
policy. His ideological guidance, derived from his political principles—Republicanism, 
Nationalism, Secularism, Populism, Statism, and Reformism—were written into the 
Constitution in 1937. Republicanism represents popular sovereignty, freedom and 
equality before the law and constituted a doctrinal barrier against a return to the Sultanate 
and the Caliphate. Nationalism constitutes the meaning of Turkish-nation state in place of 
Ottomanist or Pan-Turanist ambitions. Ataturk had the task of introducing people who 
were attached to a religion or a dynasty to the idea of nationhood. He realistically chose 
to base Turkish nationalism on a common citizenship instead of “ethnicity.” Secularism 
is more than the separation of religion and the state; it is the embrace of democracy over 
theocracy, covering all aspects of political, social and cultural life. Populism holds up the 
equality of citizens and denies the existence of social classes in Turkish society. Statism 
forms the basis of Turkey’s path of economic development, and Reformism is an 
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evolutionary ideal and aims to protect the results of the Turkish reforms from 
counterrevolutions. 
Although the pre-war Turkish Republic had adopted the Western institutions and 
values for modernization and economic development, it refrained from any action that 
would make it dependent on Western powers, militarily or economically, during the 
interwar period. As a result, Turkish foreign policy, while neutral, was independent in 
nature, and maintained its principle of non-interference. It signed the Sadabad Pact in 
1937 with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan to adhere to the noninterference principle and 
suppressed any subversive movement or communist infiltration associated with ethnic 
minority demands. It signed pact with the UK and France promising to protect each other 
in case of a Mediterranean War unless it obliged Turkey into an armed conflict with 
Russia.  
Heavily reliant on German trade in the pre-war years, Ankara could not afford to 
break its ties with Berlin either. In 1941, it signed a Friendship and Non-aggression 
Treaty with Germany to balance its diplomatic links with the main belligerent parties, 
which Turkish diplomats called “active neutrality.”25 At the Cairo Summit in 1943, 
Turkish President Inonu met with the allied leaders and reluctantly agreed in principle to 
enter the Second World War with a joint plan of action and provision of further military 
equipment to buy time. Under pressure, Ankara broke off diplomatic relations with Berlin 
and entered the war on 21 February 1945 as a symbolic gesture by which time the 
conflict was virtually over.26  
 
2.2.	  Coups	  and	  Turmoil	  in	  Turkish	  Politics	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	  (1945-­‐1980)	  
	   	   	  




This period began with the end of the Second World War and beginning of a 
multiparty democracy in Turkish politics, but it quickly turned disorderly with the start of 
the Cold War and the three military coups, followed by turbulence in domestic politics 
between the left and the right as well as with the rise of Islamism, nationalism, and ethnic 
movements. The nature of the international system changed from balance of power to 
bipolar structure during this period, which made it unrealistic for a middle-range power 
like Turkey to maintain neutrality. At Yalta in 1945, Stalin expressed his desire to take 
control of the Turkish Straits, openly stating “it was impossible to accept a situation in 
which Turkey has a hand on Russia’s throat.”27 The Soviet Union sent a note on 7 June 
1945, demanding the placement of the Soviet bases on the Straits and territorial 
adjustments in the Soviet-Turkish border as the price for renewing the Treaty of 
Friendship and Non-aggression of 1925. The Soviet Union also helped the short-lived 
Kurdish republic of Mahabad to be formed in Iran and gave asylum to its leader Masoud 
Barzani.28  
Consequently, Turkey came out of its isolationist shell and closely aligned itself 
with the West against the Soviet threat. Great Britain’s declaration in March 1946 that its 
1939 Treaty of Alliance with Turkey was still in force, obliging it to help Ankara in the 
event of aggression calmed Turkey’s fears. Turkey felt further relief with the arrival of 
the battleship Missouri carrying the remains of Turkish Ambassador Munir Ertegun who 
had died in Washington during the War, because Ankara perceived it as a sign of the US 
readiness to protect Turkey.29 Under the Truman Doctrine, which promised to support 
free people who were resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
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pressures, Turkey was essential for the preservation of order in the Middle East; 
American aid began to flow to Turkey in 1947.30  
In 1946, the Americans and the British backed Turkey in its rejection of the 
Soviet demands and the US announced its intention to maintain a permanent naval 
presence in the Mediterranean.31 The US also pledged military assistance through the 
Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan for reconstruction in Europe promised more 
funds. The US was not only the leader of the Western democracies but it was also the 
only country capable of helping Turkey financially at that time. Turkey became an active 
participant of Western alliances. It was one of the founding members of the Organization 
for European Economic Conference in 1948, which became OECD in 1961. It became a 
member of the Council of Europe, applied for an associate status in the European 
Economic Community (EC) in 1959 and initialed an Association Agreement (AA) as a 
first step to EC membership four years later. In 1952, it was admitted to the NATO 
together with Greece and the Article 5 was extended to cover armed attacks on the 
territory of Turkey, providing security guarantees that Ankara needed. Ankara and 
Washington also signed a bilateral agreement in 1959, stipulating that the US would 
come to Turkey’s aid in the event of “direct or indirect” aggression.32   
As the Turkish-Western alliance became stronger, Turkey began to defend the 
Western, especially American, interests in the Middle East. It sided with the US in the 
Suez Crisis in 1956. When the US-Syrian crisis was heating up, Turkey massed troops on 
the border with Syria in 1957 in reaction to a potential seizure of power by the 
Communist party. Ankara allowed the US to use the Incirlik air base during the Lebanese 
Crisis and to deploy Jupiter missiles on Turkish soil. When the Iraqi monarchy, with 
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which Ankara signed a treaty of cooperation and mutual assistance in 1955, was 
overthrown by coup, Turkey called for a Western military intervention in Iraq to restore 
the monarchy. Turkey also sent 25,000 troops to fight alongside the US soldiers under the 
UN auspices.  
Turkey’s western-dependent foreign policy came at the expense of its relations 
with the Arab countries and the Third World in general, however. The historical legacy of 
the Ottoman ruler and Ataturk’s pro-secular reforms had already generated Arab 
resentment towards the Turks. The unsettled question of Hatay province—Syria was 
forced by France to cede it to Turkey—was still a matter of tension between Turkey and 
Syria. Turkey initially opposed the partition of Palestine, but changed her stance and 
became the first Muslim country to recognize Israel in 1949.33  
Turkey’s efforts in 1951 to establish the Middle East Defense Organization failed 
but it took the lead in 1955 to create the Baghdad Pact, a short-lived, US-backed attempt 
to bring every nation in the region into an alliance against the Soviet Union. Iran, Iraq, 
Pakistan and the UK joined, but many Arab countries, especially Egypt, strongly opposed 
it.34 By 1958, Turkey had signed a secret accord with Israel and Iran, joining forces 
against the Arabs. Ankara also took France’s side in opposing Algerian independence.35 
Turkey’s western orientation during this period raised the Arab mistrust of Turkey as 
Ankara was regarded as a pawn of the West. Egyptian President Nasser publicly declared 
Turkey persona non grata in the Arab world.36 Turkey’s defense of the Eastern alliance at 
the Bandung Conference, with harsh attacks on the non-alignment, socialism and 
communism, led to its further isolation from the Third world.37  
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Turkey’s Western alignment was strongly supported by the Democrats that came 
to power in Turkey’s first free and multiparty elections. The Democrat Party leader 
Adnan Menderes, who won all the elections between 1950 and 1960, effectively ended 
Ataturk’s Republican Party’s twenty-seven years of monopoly on governmental 
policymaking and moved away from Ataturk’s cautious foreign policy, edging closer to 
the US. After the early successes of his liberal economic policy, his ambitious pursuit of 
uncoordinated development policies caused Turkey’s economy to deteriorate after 1953, 
and the government faced bankruptcy with increasing foreign trade deficit.38 Turkey 
accepted a stabilization program coordinated by the US, Germany, the UK, the European 
Payments Union, and the IMF. The consortium rescheduled Turkey’s debts and provided 
an aid package of $359 million.  
Prime Minister Menderes’ liberal reforms aimed at pleasing the pious Muslim 
constituency such as bringing back religious imam hatip schools and fasting month of 
Ramadan faced swift criticism from the intellectuals in the universities, the elites in the 
bureaucracy, and most importantly from the military which considers itself a staunch 
defender of the secular Republic. As the political repression led to violent student 
demonstrations, the military stepped in imposing the first coup of the Turkish Republic 
on 27 May 1960, which resulted in the execution of the Prime Minister Menderes and 
two of his ministers. The military’s attempt to restore democracy with the 1965 elections, 
brought to power the new Justice Party, the successor of the Democrat Party—cancelling 
the effect of the 1960 coup—and an openly socialist party for the first time in its history.  
The close relations with the West, especially with the US, did not last long. The 
Turkish-American friendship, which began with the Truman Doctrine and flourished in 
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the 1950s, began to cool down during the 1960s and deteriorated in the 1970s. The 1960s 
brought a period of détente with some slowdown in the superpower rivalry and increased 
the role for the secondary states in world politics with the “Group of 77” on the economic 
stage and the “Non-aligned countries” on the political stage as the representatives of the 
Third World countries. Turkey’s unstable coalitions and military coups resulted in a less 
coherent foreign policy and created a wedge between Turkey and the West. Disappointed 
with the West’s reaction to its foreign policy during the 1960s and 1970s, especially on 
the Cyprus issue, Turkey began to pursue a more independent foreign policy; it had 
détente with the eastern bloc and engaged in rapprochement efforts with the Third World 
through the non-aligned movement.  
The 1964 Cyprus crisis marked a turning point in Turkish-American relations; it 
also forced the Turkish leaders to realize that their unqualified pro-western alignment left 
it isolated in the world. Turkey had a historical opposition to Cyprus’ union with Greece 
and it became a matter of national pride. Turkey resisted the Greek control of Cyprus 
since the 1950s fearing that it would create a security threat to Ankara. There was also an 
emotional need to protect the Turkish community on the island against the Greek 
majority. Therefore, when the government of Archbishop Makarios moved in December 
1963 to subvert the constitutional provisions of the original settlement to accrue more 
power to the dominant Greek community and ethnic consolidation of the territory, 
accompanied by attacks on the Turkish Cypriot minority, violent clashes erupted between 
the two communities in Cyprus.39 Ankara initially sought the NATO’s support but the 
NATO countries were reluctant to interfere with the disagreement between the two 
members of the alliance. Turkey had expected American support and probably 
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mistakenly assumed that Ankara was relatively more important to the US than Athens.40 
Frustrated by the United States and NATO’s neutrality on Cyprus and faced with 
public outcry at home, Prime Minister Ismet Inonu informed allies that Turkey had 
decided on a unilateral intervention. The US response, the Johnson letter of 1964, 
shocked the Turkish public when it was leaked to the press. It warned Ankara that if a 
Turkish military intervention precipitated the Soviet involvement, the US would not feel 
obliged to uphold its NATO commitment to come to Turkey’s defense and ruled out the 
use of US military equipment for a Turkish intervention.41 The famous letter, which 
would haunt Turkish memory until this day, made Turkey realize that its national 
interests were no longer identical to those of the US or the Western alliances and it began 
to re-examine its foreign relations vis-à-vis the West, especially the US.42 It also 
provoked an anti-American backlash in the form of demonstrations in August 1964 and 
made a lasting impact on the Turkish-US relations.43 The bilateral relations were further 
strained with the Cuban missile deal when the US removed the Jupiter missiles from 
Turkey in exchange for the Soviet missiles in Cuba without consulting the Turkish 
government. It also made Turkey to realize that it could become a target for a Soviet 
nuclear attack because of the US bases in Turkey.4445 
In the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis, several factors, including Ankara’s desire for 
the Soviet economic assistance, growing anti-American sentiment, and the Soviet 
Union’s abandonment of its harsh policy towards Ankara moved Turkey closer to the 
Soviet Union.46 It helped that in 1953, three months after Stalin’s death, the Soviet 
government renounced its territorial claims on Turkey’s eastern provinces and its desire 
to control the Straits.47 Turkey’s attempt to secure Moscow’s support for its position on 
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Cyprus extended the visits between Turkey and the Soviet Union, increased bilateral 
trade, and led to the start of the Soviet aid program for Turkey.48  
At the same time, Turkey attempted to improve its relations with the non-aligned 
countries, especially those in the Middle East. The lack of the Third World support in the 
UN for the Turkish position on Cyprus was a stark reminder to Turkey that its policy 
toward the non-aligned nations, particularly the Middle East, had isolated it from the rest 
of the world. Turkey’s position on the Arab-Israeli War was one of guarded neutrality to 
avoid upsetting the US, the Soviet Union, and the Arab nations. It voted in the UN for the 
Yugoslav resolution calling for Israel’s withdrawal from the captured Arab territories but 
abstained on the Soviet resolution that labeled Israel an aggressor.49 Turkey also joined 
Iran and Pakistan in the creation of the Regional Cooperation for Development, an 
economic and cultural agreement parallel to the Central Treaty Organization. In 1973, 
Turkey denied the US the use of American bases in Turkey to resupply the Israeli forces 
during the Arab-Israeli war, while allowing the Russian planes to use its airspace to 
support the Syrians.50  
Although Turkey’s multi-faceted foreign policy and restrained position in the 
Cyprus crisis paid off, Turkey’s internal conflicts resulted in inactivity in the foreign 
policy area. After the 1960 coup, the military junta introduced a more liberal Constitution 
and the new system of proportional representation that allowed smaller parties to enter 
the parliament made it increasingly difficult for a single party to obtain a majority, 
resulting in a series of weak and ineffective coalition governments. The new system also 
created a plural society with the protection of fundamental rights, preparing the ground 
for people’s movements such as the socialist movement that advocated closer ties with 
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the non-aligned and communist countries and ran an anti-American campaign throughout 
the country.51 Other smaller parties supporting nationalistic and religious ideas also 
emerged in the free atmosphere of this period.  
What began in the late 1960s as peaceful student demonstrations against poor 
social and educational conditions grew radical, became polarized between the right and 
the left, and turned into bloody armed clashes in the 1970s. While the leftists were anti-
imperialists and attacked Turkey’s alliance with the West, the rightists were strongly anti-
Communist and opposed the Soviet imperialism. The chaos triggered a second military 
“coup by memorandum” in 1971 when the military sent a message to Prime Minister 
Suleyman Demirel on 12 March for his cabinet to resign and imposed martial law. 
Dealing with increasing instability generated by political violence and terrorism, Turkish 
Government went back to isolation on the international front and pursued a passive 
foreign policy. 
Against this background, another Cyprus crisis erupted in 1974, which not only 
intensified the animosity between Greece and Turkey, but also badly damaged the 
Turkish-American relations. Emboldened by the Turkish restraints and the US policy in 
the prior Cyprus crisis, the Greek junta staged a coup against Cypriot President Makarios 
in 1974. Turkey’s new Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, who came to power advocating a 
more independent foreign policy to serve Turkish national interests, led Turkish forces to 
intervene and occupy part of the island. The US Congress, under pressure form the 
Greek-American community, imposed an arms embargo on Turkey. In 1975, Turkish 
government suspended activities at all the American bases in Turkey except for those 
related to NATO. The embargo was partially lifted in late 1975 and fully lifted in the 
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summer of 1978.  
As the UN General Assembly vote on Cyprus showed 94 to 1 against Turkey with 
27 abstentions, Turkey realized that its efforts at improving relations with the Third 
World had failed miserably, leading Ankara to increase its efforts to expand relations 
with the non-aligned and Arab countries.52 It became a full member of the Organization 
of Islamic Cooperation in 1976. Economic factors also contributed to Turkey’s desire to 
expand its relations to with the Soviet Union and the oil-rich Arabs. The first Turkey-Iraq 
oil pipeline was constructed in 1976. Although Turkey achieved high economic growth 
rate in the 1970s, averaging 7 to 8 percent annually, it was without any significant 
increase in exports and was financed by heavy foreign loans. Furthermore, economic 
recession in Europe, the global energy crisis of the mid-1970s, and a dramatic rise in 
military expenditure following the 1974 Cyprus crisis, as a result of the US arms 
embargo and the arms race with Greece, negatively affected Turkey’s economy.53  
By the end of the 1970s, thirteen weak coalition governments had swapped power 
and the political instability increased with more than 5,240 fatalities and delayed socio-
economic development.54 As a weakened Turkey was trying to adjust to its neighborhood 
with the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran, 
Turkish generals did not tolerate the big march led by the leader of the pro-Islamic 
coalition party, Necmettin Erbakan, calling for the imposition of Islamic Sharia law. On 
12 September 1980, Turkish military, led by Chief of Staff General Kenan Evren, 
removed the elected government citing the non-functioning of the state.55  
	   	   	  




2.3.	  Return	  to	  Democracy	  and	  Reforms	  in	  Turkey	  and	  the	  End	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  
(1980-­‐2000)	  
	  
When the three-year military rule formally handed power over to civilians in 
December 1983, a period of multiparty democracy took on hold with the rise of an 
influential Turkish statesman Turgut Ozal, who was behind Turkey’s economic reforms 
and opening to the West. However, the prolonged governance by the military dictatorship 
and the transitional democracy thereafter limited Turkey’s options in the foreign policy 
arena. The end of the Cold War ended the game Turkey had played for 45 years in 
conducting its foreign policy and created a new game with unknown rules. It challenged 
Turkey’s traditional policy of isolationism from regional conflicts and reduced Turkey’s 
value as the West’s bastion against the Soviet threat. Turkey realized it no longer could 
entrust its security to NATO membership and the US nuclear umbrella and had to focus 
on its domestic and regional problems instead. Major domestic and international events 
during this period will be examined below. 
Political and Security Issues: The 1982 constitution, prepared by the military 
regime, strengthened the executive within the state and favored the president against the 
cabinet, paving the way for Prime Minister and later President Turgut Ozal to consolidate 
power and impose his vision. This planted the seeds of potential clashes between the 
opinions of the executive and the General Staff in a country where the military played a 
larger role in determining the country’s national interest. The struggle between the 
secular establishment and the elected Islamist government reached its peak in February 
1997; the generals dictated their terms to curb the rise of political Islam, including the 
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closure of religious schools, tighter control of religious foundations, and dismissal of civil 
servants suspected of Islamist sympathies.  
In an indirect military intervention, also known as the soft coup, prime minister 
resigned and the coalition government broke off. The Islamist Welfare Party was 
dissolved for its anti-secular policies by the Constitutional Court in 1998 and its 
successor Virtue Party was also closed down in 2001. Under the dominance of the 
military, all channels of public expression were suppressed and the role of public opinion 
in foreign policymaking was minimal. The PKK-led insurgency by 1989 began to 
threaten the stability of the Turkish state, and the country suffered from high casualties 
and the punitive economic cost of the insurgency.56 Between 1984 and 1999, the internal 
struggle killed 40,000 people and consumed in military expenditures alone, an estimated 
$120 billion, nearly the equivalent of Turkey’s average annual GDP during this period.57 
In March 1995, Turkish military launched one of the largest military operations in its 
history involving 35,000 troops to destroy the camps of the PKK and bases in northern 
Iraq. This intervention was decided mainly by the military based on national security 
concerns and did not involve any debate in public or the parliament or any consultations 
with the international community.58  
Economic Issues: Prime Minister Ozal, influenced by the American ideas during 
his tenure as a World Bank official in 1971 to 1973, introduced a liberal economic order 
in the 1980s and eased foreign trade and investment, resulting in economic growth. 
However, the 1990s experienced a turbulent period of political instability with weak and 
ineffective coalition governments combined with crises in Turkish economy. It began 
with large labor unrest in 1991, a massive financial crisis and recession in 1994, and a 
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banking crisis in 2000-2001. A devastating earthquake in 1999 reduced the GDP by 6.1 
percent that year. Between 1992 and 2000, Turkey had suffered average annual inflation 
of over 80 percent. Turkey’s banking system collapsed in 2000, the value of the Turkish 
lira fell by half, and the Turkish economy shrank by 9.4 percent in 2001, creating massive 
unemployment and loss of confidence in the economy.59 Despite the breakdown of 
almost all of the previous stand-by programs for Turkey, the IMF stepped in with an 
emergency $16 billion loan in February 2001 and the veteran World Bank official Kemal 
Dervis was brought in as the Minister of the Economy to restructure Turkey’s failed 
financial system.60  
Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East: With the end of the Cold War, the 
threat from the Soviet Union was replaced by threats from Syria, Iran, and Iraq.61 The 
instability and insecurity reigning within Turkey and its immediate neighborhood 
culminated in a national security-centered understanding of foreign policy following the 
period of liberalization.62 The military establishment and the MFA, which perceived 
threats to Turkey’s territorial integrity and unity from Turkey’s neighborhood, including 
northern Iraq, Iran, and Syria, dominated the foreign Policymaking. Lack of a clear 
division of borders with the Arab world following the First World War was an important 
source of conflict; Mosul and Kirkuk’s incorporation into British-mandated Iraq, rather 
than to Turkey, and Turkey’s France-sanctioned-take-over of Hatay or Alexandretta were 
sensitive topics. Turkey’s $32 billion worth South-East Anatolian Project (GAP) built 
during the Iran-Iraq war to harness the headwaters of the Tigris-Euphrates river system 
brought enormous economic benefits to Turkey. However, it was a source of tension with 
Turkey’s Arab rivals, especially with Syria and Iraq, which depend on the water from 
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Turkey for their agricultural production in the downstream.  
The Turkish-Iranian relations were also tumultuous despite the maintenance of 
good relations during the era of Reza Shah and Ataturk. Turkey’s wariness towards Iran 
after the Islamic Revolution, which threatens Turkey’s secular order, turned into a rivalry 
for trade and influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia after 1991. Iran accused Turkey 
of harboring opposition groups such as the Mujahedin-e Khalq and Turkey accused Iran 
of supporting Turkish Kurd rebels.63 Relations with the Middle Eastern countries were 
also strained due to the Turkish military’s close relations with Israel; Ankara drew strong 
criticism at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation meeting in Tehran in 1997.64 
The brief tenure of the Islamist-led coalition government between 1996 and 1997 
witnessed an attempt by the Islamist Welfare Party to establish closer ties with the 
Islamic world. Then Prime Minister Erbakan visited the Islamic countries in Asia, made 
an Africa tour, and launched the idea of D-8 composed of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Turkey also increased economic cooperation with 
the Islamic countries during this period; it signed a $23 billion natural gas deal with Iran. 
The party’s foreign policy initiatives did not alter Turkey’s pro-Western foreign policy 
orientation however; it was during this time that a historic security agreement was signed 
with Israel.65 The peace making between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel 
during the 1990s gave room for Turkey to publicly improve its relations with Israel. 
Turkish military signed a military training co-operation accord with Israel in February 
1996 and concluded a $1 billion deal with the Israeli Aircraft Industries to upgrade the 54 
F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers in 1997.66 President Demirel visited Israel in March 1996, 
first ever by a Turkish president, and signed a free trade treaty with Israel.67 
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Foreign Policy Towards Eurasia: As the century-old security threat to Turkey 
disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it also created a vacuum where the 
new threats and risks emerged on Turkey’s borders. Regional conflicts in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo in the Balkans and the conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Chechnya and Abkhazia in the Caucasus awakened Turkey to the danger of involvement 
in such conflicts with no immediate threats to its borders. Ankara maintained a neutral 
policy of non-intervention and inactivity to remain on good terms with both sides.68 The 
newly independent Turkic states opened a new front where Turkey could strive for 
influence and economic benefits. Turkey was the first country to recognize and open an 
embassy in Central Asia. The leaders of Turkey and the Turkic countries of Central 
Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan—first came together at 
the World Economic Forum in Davos in February 1992, and Turkey proposed the 
formation of a trading group, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation in the same year.  
However, as then Prime Minister Ozal began to unveil his vision of a free trade 
zone and increase diplomatic ties and economic interdependence with the region, the 
Central Asian countries—having just been freed from a superpower—had doubts about 
falling under the tutelage of another power. The Turkish-Russian ties cautiously 
increased towards the end of the 1990s, mainly through closer economic cooperation. 
Bilateral trade rose from $0.4 million in 1986 to $1.9 billion in 1990,69 and Turkey 
concluded a new deal with Gazprom to raise gas exports through the existing pipeline by 
a further 8 billion cum (bcm) by the year 2002, followed by the $20 billion Blue Stream 
accord following the visit of the Russian prime minister.70 
Foreign Policy Towards Europe: Turkish protectionism in the 1970s, Prime 
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Minister Ecevit’s suspension of the institutional arrangements under the Association 
Agreement in 1978, and the 1980 coup resulted in a freeze in bilateral diplomatic 
relations. The European Community-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee was 
suspended in 1980 in protest against the coup and only reconvened in 1989. Greece’s 
accession to the then European Community (EC) in 1980 resulted in the blocking of 
various economic assistance packages. Despite the tense diplomatic and political 
relations, commercial relations were largely unaffected.71 Turkish exports to Europe took 
off as the economy became more export-oriented with Turkey jumping from the 40th to 
the 18th place in terms of the EC’s imports from the world between 1980 and 1990. As 
the Turkish economy grew, European exports to Turkey also grew with Turkey rising 
from the 27th to the 12th place in terms of the EC’s exports to the world during the same 
period.72 Ankara applied for membership in the EC in 1987 and signed the Customs 
Union (CU) with its successor, the EU, in 1995. As a result of the CU, imports from the 
EU rose by 35 percent to $22.7 billion in the first year of the CU alone, raising Turkey’s 
status to the 7th place in the EU’s list of most valuable export markets.73 In 1991, nearly 
59 percent of all tourists in Turkey were from the EU countries.  
However, when the EU decided not to include Turkey on a list of candidates for 
EU membership at its Luxembourg summit while giving the green light for full accession 
to the Eastern European countries—former members of the rival Communist faction—
Turkey felt deep resentment. Turkey’s Kurdish policy and problems with Cyprus further 
strained the relations with the EU. Turkey’s relations with Greece deteriorated with the 
declaration of independence by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in December 
1983 and escalated to almost an open military conflict over the Aegean continental shelf 
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in 1987. Ozal reacted fast to defuse the crisis and met with the Greek prime minister—the 
first visit to Athens by a Turkish prime minister in 46 years—where the two leaders 
agreed not to threaten each other with war, set up a hotline, hold annual meetings, and 
develop bilateral ties on cultural affairs, tourism, trade and investment.74 A year later, 
however, the two countries began bickering over the old issues of Cyprus and territorial 
rights in the Aegean Sea and came close to a military confrontation in 1996. Ankara used 
the threats of military action against Athens until both sides engineered a great 
normalization after 1999.75 The EU finally granted Turkey the candidate status in 
December 1999, upgrading the Turkish-EU relations and providing a new impetus to 
political reforms. 
Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the US: The Ozal governments in late 1980s and 
early 1990s followed a policy of maintaining close relations with the United States as the 
undisputed leader of the world; strategic cooperation between the two countries reached 
its peak during the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Turkish Prime Minister Ozal unequivocally 
supported the US position despite facing confrontation from his ministers and even from 
the generals. He swiftly closed the two oil pipelines traversing Turkey from Iraq and 
allowed the Allied warplanes to bomb targets from the NATO airbase at Incirlik, but the 
institutional opposition prevented him from opening a land front.7677  
The Iraq-Kuwait crisis left the majority of the Turks with disappointment and 
resentment because of the creation of a safe haven for the Kurdish terrorists in the 
northeastern Iraq and of the economic costs of the crisis. According to Turks, the cost 
included supporting 450,000 Kurdish refugees in Turkey and over $35 billion in lost 
economic revenues to sanctions. These experiences would remain in Turkish memory ten 
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years later when the US made new promises to compensate Turkey for the costs of 
another war in Iraq.  
During this period, despite the emergence of instability in the Balkans, which 
highlighted the need for a strong security organization, there were continuous debates 
about the usefulness or even existence of NATO, which Turkey regarded as an 
institutional anchor that kept Turkey strategically a part of the West.78 Morton 
Abramowitz, the US Ambassador to Turkey during the Gulf crisis, declared, “the 
imperatives that once drove US-Turkish relations such as the NATO, bases, and military 
assistance are rapidly disappearing.” In 1992, the US reduced its 10,000 military 
servicemen in Turkey by half and replaced military grants with loans at commercial 
rates.79 As Turkey continued to give its unequivocal support for the US and the NATO 
initiatives in the Middle East, Eurasia, and Europe, Ankara increasingly felt that its value 
in the eyes of the West was diminishing and its interests were not fully accounted for. 
2.4.	  Conclusion	  
	  
When the Turkish Republic was born out of the remnants of the Ottoman Empire, 
it sought to focus on internal political and economic development and maintain an 
isolationist, non-interventionist, and neutral foreign policy. It adopted the Western 
institutions and values, renounced its Islamic heritage and its historical ties to the former 
Ottoman territories, and made peace with its historic enemy, the Soviet Union. However, 
to the chagrin of Ataturk, it was unable to achieve peace neither at home nor abroad. As a 
result of top-down modernization, suppression of Turkic, Islamic as well as Kurdish 
identities, and of the military-dominated, authoritarian structure of the state institutions, 
internal conflicts often flared up in tandem with the international events. Turkey had 
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four military coups, including one soft coup, hanged an elected, popular prime minister, 
experienced severe economic crises and political violence between the left and the right, 
and saw the rise of Islamism, nationalism, and ethnic movements.  
During the Cold War, Turkey came out of its isolationist shell and closely aligned 
itself with the West against the Soviet threat, but became disappointed with the West’s 
reaction to its foreign policy during the 1960s and 1970s following its military 
intervention in Cyprus. The economic liberalization and more active involvement in the 
world affairs in the 1980s were followed by political instability, rising Kurdish 
insurgency, and economic crises in late 1990s, and the military-dominated elite 
maintained a defensive security-dominated foreign policy.  
Ankara fully embraced the Western framework with its active participation in the 
NATO, adoption of the Customs Union with Europe, defense of the Western interests at 
the expense of its relations with the other non-aligned countries in the world, including 
the Middle East. However, its relations with the West, the US in particular, also had its 
ups and downs. The Turkish-US relations were strained by the Johnson letter and the US 
arms embargo following the Cyprus crisis, removal of the Jupiter missiles, and by 
Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia and the Middle East. Turkey resented Europe’s 
denial of EU membership to Turkey and its criticisms of Ankara’s human rights record, 
including its treatment of the Kurds, as well as the US Congress’ threats of recognizing 
the “Armenian Genocide.”  
Amid Turkey’s resentment towards the West, domestic problems stemming from 
the political instability and economic crises, and the diplomatic tensions with most of its 
neighbors in early 2000s, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul—former members of 
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the Islamist party that was closed down after the soft military coup in 1997—founded the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) promising change. In the historic 2002 elections, 
Turkish people completely swept the right-of-center political parties of the 1980s and 
1990s out of the parliament and brought to power the new AKP with a 34 percent of the 
vote. The Turks gave this newly formed party close to the two-thirds majority needed to 
change the constitution on its own, in the first single-party government in more than a 
decade and the first two-party parliament since the 1950s.  
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CHAPTER	  3:	  THEORETICAL	  FRAMEWORK	  
	  
This dissertation aims to answer two questions. First is to what extent does 
Turkey’s foreign policy transformation in the last decade represent a fundamental 
reorientation of the country away from the Western alliance? Second question is what are 
the dominant factors driving Turkish foreign policy during this period? To answer these 
questions, this chapter introduces the theoretical framework that serves as the foundation 
for the case studies in the subsequent chapters. In line with the two research questions, 
the first part of the literature review examines some of the major works in foreign policy 
change to help us analyze the scope and degree of the changes in Turkish foreign policy. 
It concludes by applying a framework to understand foreign policy change to Turkey’s 
foreign policy transformation in the last decade. The second part of the literature review 
attempts to create a framework to analyze the factors driving these changes by discussing 
international and domestic approaches and the theories that feed into these approaches. 
Finally, it presents the research methodology and the data for the study. 
3.1.	  Literature	  on	  Foreign	  Policy	  Change	  
 
 Studies in foreign policy change and realignment, which is the focus of this 
dissertation, began to flourish in the 1980s, and accelerated with the end of the Cold War 
and the subsequent political and economic developments in a multi-polar world. A 
prominent scholar of foreign policy analysis, James Rosenau argues, “political organism 
is always experiencing both continuities and change…in response to internal 
developments and external circumstances.”80 Rosenau contends that domestic and 
international developments can mutually reinforce each other and foreign policy shifts, 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
43	  
“when the developments at home give rise to new needs and wants with respect to their 
environment, or when developments abroad give rise to political threats to their essential 
structures.”  
Jerel Rosati defines change as “foreign policy phenomena that experience broad 
alteration, ranging from more modest shifts to major foreign policy restructuring.”81 He 
argues that the “interaction of the state, the society, and the global environment produces 
a dialectical process where governmental foreign policy evolves through different cycles 
or phases over time; from a period of stability in which continuity in policy tends to 
prevail to a period of transition.” For Rosati, the periods of transition may produce four 
major outcomes: intensification (strengthening of status quo), refinement (minor 
alterations), reform (moderate amendments in orientation of foreign policy) and 
restructuring (profound changes in foreign policy programs and orientation).  
In his seminal work, Why Nations Realign, Kalevi Holsti differentiates between 
incremental foreign policy change and restructuring; the latter occurs more abruptly and 
fundamentally than sporadic change.82 He identifies four major types of restructuring: 
isolation, self-reliance, dependence, and diversification. In his study of foreign policy 
change in 25 countries, he finds that the developed countries are less likely to restructure 
foreign policy because they are more satisfied with the existing patterns of relations. The 
periphery states, however, are more likely to reorient because they are not satisfied with 
the international distribution of power.  
 In terms of the analyzing the foreign policy change, Andriole et al. offers five 
levels of analysis to investigate foreign policy behavior in comparative analysis.83 It 
includes the individual, group, state, inter or multistate, and global or systemic levels of 
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analysis, emphasizing that a driver for foreign policy change could come from any of 
these levels. The authors also introduce five components of foreign policy behavior. The 
psychological component is related to the values, beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, and 
cognitions of relevant decision makers. The political component includes variables 
relating to the political performance of a state such as its constitutional structure, party 
competition, institutional and bureaucratic factors, interest group activities, and public 
opinion. The societal component includes a variety of economic factors, including 
economic performance and the rate of economic growth. The interstate component is 
related to external realities of a state such as bloc and alliance membership and interstate 
organizations. Finally, the global component consists of all international systemic factors 
which affect foreign policy behavior such as a state’s position in the interstate 
sociopolitical and physical environment, geographic position, systemic status rank, level 
of systemic conflict and international systemic power stratification pattern such as 
multipolarity or bipolarity. 
According to Gustavsson’s model of foreign policy change, change is driven by 
international and domestic developments.84 He defines international developments as 
“power relations and the traditional military aspects of national security,” and domestic 
factors as composed of political aspect which includes “support from voters, political 
parties and societal actors to uphold a certain foreign policy,” and of economic aspect 
which refers to “GDP growth, the rate of inflation and the level of unemployment in 
addition to institutional conditions influencing the relationship between the state and the 
parties of the labor market.” Gustavsson argues that foreign policymakers are constantly 
pulled among competing policy alternatives and their actions are socially constructed so 
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that the cyclical feedbacks in internal and external environment can have a significant 
impact on the decision-making process.  
 Ikenberry et al. proposes three major approaches in foreign policymaking in its 
examination of American economic foreign policy.85 First is the international or system-
centered approach in which international trade policies are shaped by norms enshrined in 
international regimes and by opportunities and limitations imposed by nation state’s 
relative position in global economy. It includes World Systems Theory, which explains 
foreign economic policy as function of the processes and contradictions within 
international capitalism, and Hegemonic Stability Theory which argues that a nation 
state’s position in the international economy shapes its foreign economic policy. This 
approach views government officials as responding to a particular set of opportunities 
and constraints that a nation’s position in international system creates at any moment in 
time.  
Their second approach, society-centered approach, views the government as a 
relatively passive actor responding to the interests of the groups or coalitions that 
dominate the struggle for influence within the policy arena. It contends that the domestic 
politics, not external forces, determine the policy decisions. This approach encompasses 
the Interest Group Theory, which draws on Pluralist theory and posits that policy is the 
outcome of a competitive struggle among affected groups for influence over policy 
decisions. The last approach, which they term as State-centered approach, emphasizes 
policy constraints imposed by institutional relationships within the government. 
According to this approach, foreign economic policy is highly constrained by domestic 
institutional relationships that have persisted over time and by the ability of state officials 
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to realize their objectives within the boundaries of both international and domestic 
constraints. Executive officials act as independent actors within these constraints to 
manipulate policy outcomes according to their personal preferences and perceptions of 
“national interest.”  
 In his insightful analysis of North American Free Trade Agreement, Frederick 
Mayer uses the common three-level taxonomy—international level analysis, domestic 
level analysis, and individual actors—proposed by Kenneth Waltz and adds three modes 
of politics—rational choice, institutional process, and symbolic response—which make 
assumptions about the nature of political behavior and processes.86 Rational choice posits 
that the behavior of actors in the system is determined by rational thinking. According to 
institutional process, preexisting institutions where politics, rules, norms, routines, and 
other institutions limit options for action and at least partially predetermine their selection 
determine the behavior of actors. Symbolic response emphasizes that the political 
behavior is rather a response to the way in which political circumstances are symbolically 
constructed so that symbols, including language, ideas, and narratives, affect not only 
what actors believe about the world and thus how they predict the consequences of 
action, but also how they value the actions available to them. 
 Kenneth Waltz in his influential book Man, the State, and War distinguishes three 
levels of causation for war, which he calls “images”: the individual, the state, and the 
international system.87 Joseph Nye argues that explanations at the level of the individual 
are not sufficient because it may blind us to the unintended consequences of individual 
acts caused by the larger systems in which individuals operate.88 The second level of 
analysis, the nature of the state or society, is the view from the inside out, explaining 
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outcomes by what is happening inside the states. The system level of analysis is 
explanation from the outside in, looking at the way the overall system constrains state 
action. 
Finally, Charles Hermann identifies a useful framework with four graduated 
levels to analyze foreign policy change.89 First is the shift in efforts and methods to 
achieve certain goals which he names adjustment changes. Second change is the program 
changes, which refer to qualitative changes in methodology and instruments of statecraft. 
Third is the redirection of goals and aspirations of the state’s foreign policy machinery 
which he calls problem/goal changes. Finally, the fourth change, international 
orientation change, is the most fundamental shift in foreign policy direction and it 
involves the redirection of the actor’s entire orientation toward world affairs.  
Altunisik and Martin apply Charles Hermann’s definition of four categories of 
change—the adjustment change, program change, goal change and international 
orientation change—to Turkey’s foreign policy.90 There clearly has been an adjustment 
change, referring to a change in the level of effort. Although Turkey was involved in the 
Middle East in the 1990s, their activities were largely limited to Turkey’s immediate 
neighbors, mostly tied to the Kurdish issue and focused on security relations. In 2000s, 
however, Turkey’s activism became region wide and went beyond security relations.91 
When Turkey began its economic liberalization in 1980s, there was an effort to improve 
trade and investment with the Middle East, which continued in the 1990s but the level of 
effort has significantly accelerated after the AKP came to power in the 2000s. Turkey’s 
involvement in the Middle East became more comprehensive, multi-faceted, and deep. 
Turkey’s AKP also went through a program change, referring to changes in 
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methods or means without any change in purposes. In the 2000s, Turkey mainly pursued 
its goals through diplomatic negotiation rather than military force. It focused on its soft 
power assets, emphasized engagement, promoted economic interdependence, and 
advanced its mediation role. This is in contrast to Turkish foreign policy in the region for 
most of the 1990s, which was highly securitized and relied on mostly military means—
balancing alliances, military threats and interventions. For example, the National Security 
Document stated in 1995 that the gravest threat to Turkish national security is 
“irredentism” and “religious fundamentalism” in clear reference to Syria and Iran. The 
military was able to build a secular alliance against these threat perceptions. 
It’s safe to argue that Turkey has also experienced a goal change. Unlike the 
1990s, the AKP policy moved from a deeper relationship with the region and clearly 
aimed for regional leadership. In the 2000s, Turkey’s relations with the Middle East went 
in line with the domestic needs. The promotion of economic relations with the Middle 
East served the domestic goal of consolidating Anatolian businesses, which played an 
important role in the rise of the AKP while an anti-Israeli rhetoric served to garner 
support domestically to further discredit the military, the sole supporter of the Turkish-
Israeli alignment in the1990s.  
As for the international reorientation in Turkish foreign policy, Turkey’s 
problematic relationship with and rhetoric about Israel and its cozying up to Iran led 
critics in the US and EU to claim that Turkey was shifting its axis, moving away from its 
traditional Western orientation to the East, namely the Middle Eastern and Islamic world. 
Whether Turkey really changed the direction of its foreign policy and reoriented itself 
towards the East is the main question of this dissertation.   
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3.2.	  Literature	  on	  Levels	  of	  Analyses	  To	  Explain	  Foreign	  Policy	  Change	  
	   	  
The second research question this dissertation attempts to answer involves the 
major factors driving Turkey’s foreign policy changes in the last decade. The impetus 
behind these policy changes provides a useful framework to understand Turkey’s actions 
in the past and project the future trajectory of Turkish foreign policy, which will have 
important policy implications. In order to place the analysis on the drivers of foreign 
policy change in a theoretical context and help us analyze the reasons for change, the 
following section will introduce the literature on international and domestic levels of 
analysis and the theoretical framework that underpins these approaches. 
3.2.1.	  International	  or	  Systemic	  Approach	  
	  
Building on Andriole et al., Ikenberry et al., Mayer and Waltz’s definition of 
international level of analysis, this approach views foreign policy actions through the lens 
of international structure, a state’s relative position in the distribution of power and 
interactions among states. States shift the course of foreign policy and adjust alliance 
patterns in line with shifting dynamics of external security. Theoretical underpinnings of 
the system-centered approach are drawn from the realist school of international politics. 
According to classical realism, state is the unit of analysis, and the first priority for a state 
is to ensure its survival in an anarchic, self-help system; states with more power, usually 
defined in military strategic terms, stand better a chance of surviving.92 
Neorealism, or structural realism, advanced by Waltz holds that the interaction of 
states can be explained by the distribution of power in the international system.93 It takes 
states with “whatever tradition, habits, objectives, desires and forms of government they 
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may have,” and “abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities.” Waltz 
argues that states respond according to their position in the international political 
structure, and forge alliances to ensure survival in an anarchic international system. 
Stephen Walt agrees that the perception of the external threat is the main incentive for the 
alliance-making strategies of states.94  
John Mearsheimer adds that states shift the course of foreign policy or alliance 
patterns when the nature, extent and direction of external threats undergo profound 
changes.95 According to Waltz, “states seek their own preservation and, at maximum, 
drive for universal domination,” and they “worry about their survival and the worry 
conditions their behavior.” Waltz later explains that despite changes constantly taking 
place in the relations of nations, the basic structure continues to be anarchic, and states 
strive to maintain their position in the system, each fending for itself with or without the 
cooperation of others.96 The anarchic nature of the international system suggests that the 
states strive to ensure their security and gain as much power as possible to maintain their 
relative security. Thus, the relative material power is conceived as the most important 
commodity of influence in an anarchic world, and security interests persistently 
determine states’ behavior. 
Schweller and Wohlforth in its evaluation of realism’s response to the end of the 
Cold War, establish the links between realism’s core assumptions and the specific 
theories and causal mechanisms that realist theories would expect to lie behind changes.97 
According to the authors, realism claims that the conflict groups are the key actors in 
world politics, power is the fundamental feature of international politics, the essential 
nature of international politics is conflictual, and the necessity and reason of the state 
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trump morality and ethics when these values conflict. The most basic realist proposition 
is that states recognize and respond to shifts in their relative power. That is, similarly 
placed units, despite variations in their internal qualities behave similarly and produce 
outcomes that fall within expected ranges. Thus, it’s not the power of the idea, as liberals 
and constructivists suggest, but rather the power behind the idea that explains its 
acceptance and apparent causal significance. Because realists see interests and ideas as a 
function of relative power, changes in relative power produce changes in interests. Robert 
Gilpin concurs: “As the power of a state increases, the relative cost of changing the 
system and of thereby achieving the state’s goal decreases.”98 
Legro and Moravcsik differentiate realism from other contending theories by also 
laying out realism’s core assumptions. They observe that the realists like E.H. Carr, Hans 
Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz sought to highlight the manipulation, accumulation and 
balancing power by sober unsentimental statesmen, focusing on the limits imposed on 
states by the international distribution of material sources, and viewed realism as the 
bulwark against claims about the autonomous influence of democracy, ideology, 
economic integration, law and institutions on world politics.  
First core assumption of the realists is the existence of a set of “conflict groups,” 
each organized as a unitary political actor that rationally pursues distinctive goals within 
an anarchic setting. The second realist assumption is that state preferences are fixed and 
uniformly conflictual. That assumption, realists claim, releases them from the 
“reductionist” temptation to seek the causes of state behavior in the messy process of 
domestic preference formation and from the “moralist” temptation to expect that ideas 
influence the material structure of world politics. The third and pivotal assumption is the 
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primacy of material capabilities. In other words, interstate bargaining outcomes reflect 
the relative cost of threats and inducements, which is directly proportional to the 
distribution of material resources.  
In contrast to theories that emphasize the role of issue-specific coordination, 
persuasive appeals to shared cultural norms or identities, relative preference intensity, 
international institutions or collective norms in shaping bargaining outcomes, realism 
stresses the ability of states, absent a common international sovereign to coerce or bribe 
their counterparts. According to the authors, Morgenthau and Waltz consistently dismiss 
ideals, domestic institutions, economic interests, psychology and other sources of state 
preferences.  
A brief survey of the literature on Turkish foreign policy reveals that the 
predominant interpretation of Turkish foreign policy has been within the realist mode, 
which viewed Turkish foreign policy as dominated by security concerns and constrained 
by international factors such as World War II, the Cold War and the formation of the 
European Union. It holds that Turkish foreign policy makers are concerned with Turkey’s 
survival, its national security, and territorial integrity, which is under constant threat from 
foreign powers. There is a wide body of literature on the impact of the altered balance of 
power and institutional changes resulting from the end of the Cold War. Sayari99 and 
Karaosmanoglu100 highlight such factors at a time when Turkish foreign policy was in its 
early stages of transformation. The current Foreign Minister of Turkey, Ahmet 
Davutoglu’s seminal work also references the importance of geopolitical factors, 
including the influence of Turkey’s strong historical and cultural connections to its 
neighbors.101  
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There is also a growing body of literature on the “Europeanization” process that 
has had an impact on Turkish foreign policy. Aydin and Acikmese employ the concept of 
“conditionality” and Europeanization to examine the impact of the EU’s “conditionality” 
principle and the need to meet certain criteria for EU membership on Turkey’s foreign 
policy transformation.102 Ziya Onis highlights the role of the EU in gradually 
transforming 1990s “coercive regional power” Turkey into a “benign power.”103 Mesut 
Ozcan104 and Burak Akcapar105 also stress the impact of Europeanization on Turkish 
foreign policy, with particular attention to the Middle East. 
Drawing from the literature on realism, this international approach looks at the 
international structure, a state’s relative position in the distribution of power and 
interactions among states to explain the transformation in Turkish foreign policy. 
Turkey’s international environment and Ankara’s relative power position have changed 
dramatically starting in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, which had posed an existential threat to Turkey’s autonomy. As Turkey 
became stronger and its neighbors got weaker, Turkish officials have gained the self-
confidence to break out of their traditionally passive foreign policy framework. Tripling 
of Turkey’s GDP in the last decade, raising its status to the 16th largest economy in the 
world and the fastest growing economy in the OECD, have contributed to Turkey’s 
increased confidence as an influential regional player.  
This approach claims international factors and realism determine Turkish foreign 
policy encouraging Turkey to increase power politics in its foreign policy behavior. The 
altered polarity of the international system and Turkey’s increased military and economic 
capabilities would allow Turkey to act more independently from the United States and its 
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Western allies. Because it does not face a Soviet threat with the end of the Cold War, 
Ankara would be less in need of NATO protection. As an economically powerful country 
with fewer security concerns, Turkey would not try hard to join the EU to avoid 
surrendering its sovereignty and transfer its national decision-making powers to a 
supranational organization. It would act more independently from its Western allies and 
refrain from multilateral institutions, weakening its relations with the US and Europe, but 
it would also continue to cooperate with its traditional Western allies against emerging 
security threats. In doing so, it would ignore domestic interests and moral considerations 
because survival and maintaining its power would be the priority in foreign 
policymaking.  
3.2.2.	  Domestic	  Dynamics	  Approach	  
	  
Domestic dynamics approach, on the other hand, places the determinants of 
states’ foreign policy behavior and international relations within the nation state. It holds 
that foreign policy change is driven by domestic political, economic, and social factors, 
and that the foreign policy outcome is determined by factors including the state structure, 
state-society relationship, state identity, domestic decision-making process, bureaucratic 
politics, internal power struggle, and ideological legitimization. 
The domestic-based approach has two theoretical dimensions, liberal and 
constructivist thoughts, which lie behind the domestic political, economic and ideological 
interests. Liberalism does not view states as unitary actors with national interest as 
neorealism does and explains the states’ foreign policy behavior on the basis of domestic 
factors, emphasizing societal ideas, interests, and institutions. According to Andrew 
Moravcsik, liberalism states that state- society relations—the relationship of states 
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to the domestic and transnational social context in which they are embedded—have a 
fundamental impact on state behavior in world politics.106 Liberal foreign policy analysis 
focuses on whether individual rights, domestic commercial interests, or complicated 
combination of both together with republican institutions and international perceptions 
shape foreign policy. He argues that liberal theory stresses the causal importance of state-
society relations as shaped by domestic institutions (i.e. democratic peace), by economic 
interdependence (i.e. endogenous tariff theory), and by ideas about national, political, and 
socioeconomic public goods provision (i.e. theories about the relationship between 
nationalism and conflict).  
Ann Marie Slaughter argues, “the fundamental actors in politics are members of 
domestic society, understood as individuals and privately constituted groups seeking to 
promote their independent interests.”107 According to Slaughter, liberalism analyzes 
“state behavior primarily as a function of the constraints placed on state actors by being 
embedded in domestic and transnational civil society,” and “all governments represent 
some segment of domestic society, whose interests are reflected in state policy.” Rosenau 
agrees that the foreign policies of developing countries are shaped by their “internal 
needs—by the needs of elites for identity and prestige, by the need of charismatic leaders 
to sustain their charisma, by the need of in-groups to divert attention away from domestic 
problems and thereby to placate their opposition.”108 
David Baldwin argues that neoliberalism, a variant of liberalism, has four 
subsets.109 First, ideational or sociological liberalism stresses the impact on state behavior 
of conflict and compatibility among collective social values or identities, and views 
configuration of domestic social identities and values as a basic determinant of state 
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preferences and of interstate conflict and cooperation. Second, commercial liberalism 
emphasizes the impact on state behavior of gains and losses to individuals and groups in 
society from transnational economic interchange, which create pressure on domestic 
governments to facilitate or block such exchanges through appropriate foreign economic 
and security policies. Third, republican liberalism stresses the impact on state behavior of 
varying forms of domestic representation and resulting incentives for social groups to 
engage in rent-seeking. It emphasizes the ways in which domestic institutions and 
practices aggregate social identities and economic interests, transforming them into state 
policy with the predicted policy being in favor of the governing coalition or powerful 
domestic groups. Finally, liberal institutionalism argues that the way toward peace and 
prosperity is to create integrated communities and supranational organizations, regimes 
and institutions that govern anarchic system and encourage cooperation and 
multilateralism. 
Hermann argues liberalism’s core assumption is that the rulers and their regime 
who make foreign policy decisions depend for their continuance on the support of certain 
constituencies.110 These are entities whose endorsement and compliance are necessary to 
legitimize and sustain the regime. They may be members of a ruling political party, the 
political clients in a client-patron system, a dominant religious or ethnic group, military 
officers, major landowners, interest groups and associations, or the leaders of key sectors 
of society. Changes in the policy preferences or in the dominant alignment of these 
constituencies or changes in the nature of the political system trigger changes in foreign 
policy. According to Hermann, domestic politics may affect foreign policy through 
several dynamics. First, issues become a centerpiece in the struggle for political power 
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where competing political leaders and their supporters use a foreign policy position to 
differentiate themselves from opponents. Second, the attitudes or beliefs of the dominant 
domestic constituents undergo a profound change. Third, a realignment occurs with the 
essential constituents of a regime or a revolution and other transformation of the political 
system takes place. Another source of foreign policy change that falls under this category 
is the bureaucratic decision making which holds the premise that contemporary foreign 
policy tends to be conducted by individuals in organizations so one must examine the 
bureaucratic conditions governing the policy process to understand foreign policy 
change. 
Constructivism, which is presented by some of its proponents as a theory separate 
from the mainstream realism and liberalism, falls under the domestic dynamics approach 
and provides the theoretical foundation for the second dimension of this approach by 
emphasizing the role of identities and ideological aspirations in driving foreign policy 
actions. Constructivist school holds that identity, rather than material capabilities or 
distribution of power in international system defines interests, and identity can be fueled 
by national history, cultures, norms, ideologies, and intersubjective interactions. 
Alexander Wendt agrees that intersubjectively constructed identities, norms, and 
aspirations define how individuals and states interpret the concepts of power and 
interest.111 He argues that “states do not have a ‘portfolio’ of interests that they carry 
around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of 
defining situations.” Thus, identity can explain anarchy and cooperation in international 
relations. He develops the concept of a “structure of identity and interest” and contends 
that “without assumptions about the structure of identities and interests in the system, 
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Waltz’s definition of structure cannot predict the content or dynamics of anarchy.” Wendt 
further challenges the core neorealist premise that anarchy forces states into recurrent 
security competitions, arguing that whether a system is conflictual or peaceful is a 
function not of anarchy and power, but of the shared culture created through discursive 
social practices.112 He convincingly makes the case that “anarchy is what states make of 
it,” and that spirals of hostility, arms racing, and war are not inevitable; if states fall into 
such conflicts, it is the result of their own social practices.  
While Waltz argues for extreme parsimony and focus only on structure, liberals 
and constructivists argue that Waltz’s concept of system explains very little.113 The 
structural explanation says little about why the bipolarity of alliances took 30 years to 
develop and does not allow for the possibly crucial role of leadership. Neorealism, which 
rests very heavily on the systemic level of analysis, says that states act similarly because 
of the international system. Nye disagrees, arguing that states are not black boxes and that 
domestic politics matter.114 Liberalism rests heavily on the proposition that states will act 
similarly if they have similar domestic societies. Nye explains that there are three strands 
of this liberal thinking: economic, social, and political. The political strand includes 
institutions and democracy. The economic strand focuses heavily on trade. Liberal 
economic argument says trade may not prevent war, but it does lead to changes in how 
states see their opportunities, which in turn may lead to a social structure that is less 
inclined to war. For example, they argue that realists do not pay enough attention to 
domestic politics and the way that Japan has changed as a result of economic 
opportunities.  
The social strand of liberalism argues that person-to-person contacts reduce 
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conflict by promoting understanding. Transnational society affects what people in a 
democracy want from their foreign policy. The social strand of liberalism emphasizes the 
role of institutions, which provide information and a framework that shapes expectations 
and reduce the effect of anarchy that the realists assume. For realists, a state’s position in 
the international system determines its national interests and predicts its foreign policies. 
Liberals and constructivists provide a richer account of how state preferences and 
national interests are formed. The definition of the national interests depends in large part 
on the type of domestic society and culture a state has. For example, a domestic society 
that values economic welfare and places heavy emphasis on trade, or that views wars 
against other democracies as illegitimate, defines its national interests very differently 
from a despotic state that is similarly positioned in the international system.  
 The end of the Cold War ended the reign of realism and accelerated the turn 
toward cultural, sociological and domestic approaches to the study of world politics. 
Many studies of foreign policy analysis emphasized the domestic structures and politics 
shaping the foreign policy of states. Mesquita and Lalman explore whether states go to 
war because external pressures have weighed so heavily upon them as to give them little 
or no choice if they wish to survive or because domestic political factors have led states 
to aggression.115 They conclude, “a perspective attentive to the domestic origins of 
foreign policy demands gives a richer and empirically more reliable representation of 
foreign affairs than a realist emphasis.”  
Jack Snyder provides an account of overexpansion of the major great powers 
since the nineteenth century and argues that domestic pressures often outweigh 
international ones, especially in the calculations of national leaders of great powers.116 To 
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understand why overexpansion occurs, he argues that we need to understand the 
dynamics of policy formation within the nation-state, and especially the role of 
competing interest groups within various political structures. According to Snyder, self-
serving imperialist groups “hijack the state” and pervert national policy in the pursuit of 
their private interests, thus, interest groups, including big corporations, the ruling class 
and the military, benefit from imperial, militarist and expansionist policies.  
John Owen argues that in democratic countries where citizens have leverage over 
foreign policy decision-making, political leaders are less likely to take an action that 
deceives the public.117 According to Owen, in liberal democratic countries, public 
opinion considers all other “liberal democratic” countries legitimate, thus, these countries 
solve their conflicts through negotiations because of the pressure from the public opinion. 
He concludes liberal ideology and domestic democratic institutions shape foreign policy, 
and thus domestic politics is the most important determinant of foreign behavior.  
Ruggie outlines constructivist empirical studies documenting the impact of 
principled beliefs on patterns of international outcomes.118 His study includes 
decolonization, international support for termination of apartheid, growing significance 
of human rights, role of multilateral norms in stabilizing the consequence of rapid 
international change, increasingly non-discriminatory humanitarian interventions, and 
emergence of weapons taboos, among other subjects.  
In his examination of Turkish foreign policy and identity, Umut Uzer highlights 
three important factors explaining the motives behind foreign policy outcomes.119 First 
factor is ideas. He argues that social construction of ideational factors and their respective 
influence on state behavior are key explanatory variables. Primarily shared ideas rather 
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than material forces determine structures and construct state identities and interests. 
Second factor is identity. Defined as a “sense of self,” identity denotes the creation of 
statehood and nationhood emanating from particular ideologies within that identity. 
Norms are the third factor and they determine the proper behavior of states by either 
directly constituting state identity or by influencing the policy outcomes of existing state 
identities.  
Uzer argues that norms, such as racial equality in Germany and anti-militarism in 
Japan, offer predictive power as they draw the framework of what is right and what is 
wrong. He adds, norms do not determine foreign policies of various states but rather limit 
the number of policies that can be chosen. The cultural dimension of Turkish foreign 
policy has to take into account the Islamic or ethnic solidarity toward Muslims, Turks and 
other ethnic groups that live inside and outside the boundaries of Turkey. This, however, 
is balanced by Turkey’s Western orientation, which entails not only a preference for 
Western states in its foreign policy but also a view of the Western world with its 
democracy and lifestyle as something to be emulated and internalized. 
Brent Sasley, in his examination of Turkish foreign policy in Central Asia through 
the constructivist lens, argues that Turkish foreign policy is best explained by a reference 
to its identity, and offers three main competing national identities in Turkey that have 
prescribed the parameters within which domestic and foreign policy is made.120 First is 
the Western-oriented identity, called Kemalism, which has been the dominant paradigm 
since the birth of the Republic in 1923 until the end of the Cold War. This identity, based 
on Ataturk’s wholesale acceptance of Western civilization blended with Turkish 
nationalism, is sacredly upheld by the security establishment, including the military, 
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National Security Council, and at that time the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Kemalist 
ideology presents Ataturk’s motto, “peace at home, peace abroad,” as the guiding 
principle of Turkish foreign policy. Adventurism, often labeled as Enver Pashaism with 
reference to the leader of Turkey—who as one of the leaders of the Young Turk 
government trekked to Central Asia to participate in the Basmachi Revolt against the 
Soviet Union in the early 1920s—is always condemned by the Kemalist cadres. Because 
Enver Pasha is perceived to be responsible for the Ottoman Empire’s entry into the First 
World War and hence its dissolution, the Kemalists label an activist foreign policy as 
adventurism with disastrous consequences.121  
The second one is the Turkic-identity, sometimes called Pan-Turkism, which 
emphasizes Turkey’s Turkic roots stretching over the Eurasia region as far as to the 
northwestern China. Pan-Turkism, Sasley argues, was born in the twilight era of the 
Ottoman Empire when the Ottoman intellectuals wanted to strengthen the Turkish core to 
stanch the empire’s decline. After the establishment of the Turkish republic, pan-
Turkism, adopted by the right and the nationalists, competed with Kemalism but their 
desire to form a union of Turkic states never gained traction with the majority of Turks. 
The third one is Turkey’s Muslim identity, sometimes incorrectly referred to as pan-
Islamism, also goes back to the Ottoman Empire’s historic role as the leader of the 
Islamic world through caliphate, which Ataturk abolished. Turkey’s Muslim identity 
became more prominent in several game-changing elections in Turkish history, but it has 
always been suppressed by the secular establishment through coups or other means 
because the military was concerned about preventing a Turkish Muslim identity from 
becoming the framework for Turkish politics.122 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
63	  
A growing number of studies began to examine the transformation of Turkish 
foreign policy through the lens of domestic political and economic developments since 
the 2000s. The rise of the AKP to power is seen as an important factor impacting Turkish 
foreign policy.123 There seems to be consensus in the literature that it would be an 
exaggeration to claim that there is an “Islamization” of Turkish foreign policy under the 
AKP. Mustafa Aydin argues that the Islamist considerations are more likely to be used as 
a cover rather than as an actual motivation behind foreign policy preferences.124 Cerit-
Mazlum and Dogan highlight the impact of democratization, coupled with the growing 
role of civil society and interest groups on Turkish foreign policy.125  
Bahar Rumelili shows the role of civil society in supporting growing cooperation 
between Greece and Turkey.126 William Hale provides a survey of Turkey’s expanding 
commercial and trade relations in the 1980s,127 and Sencer Ayata examines how 
economic liberalization helped create a new business class influencing government 
policies.128 Onis and Yilmaz underline the importance of economic factors, in particular 
trade, on the improvements in Greek-Turkish relations.129 Aydin, in his survey of Turkish 
foreign policy, highlights how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as early as in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, began to pay more attention to economic considerations.130  
There is also an increasing academic interest in examining the transformation of 
Turkish foreign policy from the perspective of ideational factors, attributing the changes 
to a reformulation of how the Turkish state defines its own identity.131132 Altunisik and 
Tur133 and Aras and Polat134 also explain the transformation in Turkish foreign policy 
toward Iran and Syria through the lens of constructivist factors. Foreign Minister 
Davutoglu’s famous book Strategic Depth argues that besides geopolitical advantages, 
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Turkey also enjoys strong historical and cultural connections to the surrounding region. 
His ideas depicting Turkey as a central country and developing a “zero problem policy” 
with neighboring countries have become closely associated with the transformation of 
Turkish foreign policy. Aydin surveys Turkish foreign policy, examining a range of 
factors falling into different approaches, and argues that constructivist factors are 
increasingly shaping Turkish foreign policy in the twenty-first century.135  
  According to this domestic dynamics approach, domestic factors—more 
politically active and economically oriented Turkish public, and the changing dynamics 
in the domestic institutions, actors, and ideologies—are dominant in driving the changes 
in Turkish foreign policy behavior. In contrast to realist framework, liberalism and 
constructivism capture the state level of analysis, which focuses on the domestic 
dynamics within a state and domestic institutional relationships, and the society-centered 
analysis, which views domestic politics, interests groups, and influential actors as the 
determinants of policy outcomes.136 
There has been a major transformation in Turkey’s internal political and 
economic dynamics during this period. After experiencing three military coups in 1960, 
1971 and 1980, and one soft coup in 1997, and suffering from years of unstable and weak 
coalition governments, Turkish public finally gave one party—the AKP—the power to 
form a government without the need of a coalition. This provided stability and efficiency 
that allowed the AKP to pass the Constitutional reforms that reined in the role of the 
military and expanded the civil rights required by the EU membership as well as 
economic reforms that further liberalized Turkey’s economy. As a result, many argue that 
Turkey has become more democratic137 and free-market oriented.  
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The AKP was lauded for bringing more civilian control over the military and for 
increasing the participation of its citizens in the democratic processes to bring Turkey in 
line with the EU’s democratic standards. It is worth noting that the AKP was criticized in 
recent years for taking controversial steps constraining the freedom of expression, for 
using heavy police force to clamp on the demonstrations of 2013, and for backsliding 
Turkey’s democratization project, especially following a domestic conflict with a 
religious figure. This internal political crisis will remain outside the scope of this study.  
Turkish public opinion does count in Turkey’s foreign policy today, if not directly 
in the policy-making process, through its influence on the decision makers. A foreign 
policy that is not commensurate with the wishes of the people might lead to punishment 
in the ballot box by the voters.138 Turkey’s vibrant urban middle class, increasingly 
supported by free press and social media, has become more vocal and increasingly more 
active in foreign policy as well as in domestic policy, evidenced by their increasing 
willingness to protest. Turkish people want to see their country to act and not merely 
watch the events on the world stage. Around 95 percent of the Turkish public opposed the 
US invasion in 2003, and Turks almost universally share the government’s view that 
Israeli-Palestinian stalemate has persisted too long and that what is happening to the 
Palestinians is unfair. The percentage of those in Turkey who say Turkey should act in 
close cooperation with the countries of the Middle East on international matters doubled 
from 10 percent in 2009 to 20 percent in 2010, according to the opinion polls conducted 
by the German Marshall Fund in Washington.  
The AKP’s trio of powerful decision-makers—Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah 
Gul and Ahmet Davutoglu—who have rotated their responsibilities as the president, 
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prime minister, and foreign minister among themselves, has proved to be the strongest 
proponents of activism in foreign policy to raise Turkey’s status as a stable, prosperous, 
and influential regional player. Erdogan, former Mayor of Istanbul under the Islamist 
Welfare Party, long-time prime minister and current president, was one of the younger 
generation of politicians that advocated for a more moderate political view and formed 
the AKP in 2001 with his friends, including Gul.139 Gul, former foreign minister, prime 
minister, and president, has broad international experience, having lived in both the UK 
and Saudi Arabia and works in tandem with the government party to which he had been 
affiliated.140  
Davutoglu, Erdogan’s chief foreign policy advisor before his appointment as 
foreign minister in 2009, and current prime minister is a respected academic and the 
visionary figure behind Turkey’s strategic vision and policy of “zero problems with 
neighbors.” His strategic thinking has liberal elements such as soft power, conflict 
resolution, and promotion of economic interdepdence.141 In his book Strategic Depth, he 
argues that Turkey possesses “strategic depth” due to its history and geographic position 
and it should not be content with a regional role in the Balkans or the Middle East 
because it is a central power. In Davutoglu’s view, Turkey as a Middle Eastern, Balkan, 
Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country, can 
simultaneously exercise influence in all these regions and claim a global strategic role. 
He advocates Turkey taking a proactive policy commensurate to its historic and 
geographic depth. 
Turkey’s economic liberalization that began in the 1980s and accelerated since 
the 2000s, provided opportunities for the previously-dormant Anatolian Turks to come to 
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the urban centers of commerce. This movement led to the emergence of a new cadre of 
businessmen, called the “Anatolian tigers,” that are export-oriented and have profited 
from the increased role of economics in foreign policymaking. Considering that these 
Anatolian tigers constitute the core of the AKP constituency, liberalizing the economy 
and creating new markets in which the export-oriented Turkish firms could do business 
have become important foreign policy goals.142 This reverses the famous axiom “trade 
following flag” to “flag following trade” since the new growth of investment and export 
markets are not in the traditional Western market but in the Middle East and Eurasia. 
Onis explains that key civil society organizations representing the newly 
emerging conservative bourgeoisie, which is the main component of the government’s 
electoral support base at the grassroots level, including the Turkish Union of Chambers 
and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) and The Islamic Association of Independent 
Businessmen (MUSIAD), emerged as central actors in Turkey’s foreign policy initiatives, 
with the aim of exploring new market opportunities and creating business partnership 
networks for their own clientele.143 The rising middle class, which is more conservative 
and concerned with domestic economy and Turkey’s status in the world, resented the past 
dominance of the secular military and the Western-oriented Turkish elite, and supported 
causes that will allow them to continue their business ventures abroad. Their staunch 
support for the AKP assured the party’s continuous success in the subsequent elections. 
3.3.	  Dissertation’s	  Analytical	  Framework	  
	  
 The literature on foreign policy change and the levels of analyses to explain 
foreign policy change provides the theoretical background to frame the two hypotheses 
that help us answer the overarching question of whether Turkey is abandoning 
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its Western orientation. The analytical framework on the international and domestic 
approaches allows us to form our predictions and analyze the reasons for an observed 
foreign policy action. 
Hypothesis A states that the recent changes in Turkish foreign policy stemming 
from international and domestic level factors indicate a fundamental reorientation of 
Ankara’s foreign policy away from the US and the EU in favor of a completely 
autonomous regional power that would try to limit the Western influence in the Middle 
East and Eurasia.  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely oppose or confound the policies of its NATO 
allies, specifically the US and the EU, in the Middle East and Eurasia and take a stance 
systematically at odds with the Western interests. 
Prediction 2: Turkey would not share its Western allies’ vision for the Middle 
East and Eurasia and its foreign policy initiatives in the region would exceed the bounds 
of what the US, the EU, and its other NATO partners consider acceptable.  
Prediction 3: Turkey would orient its trade towards non-Western trading blocs 
that try to limit the influence of the West and it would reject or give up its pursuit of EU 
membership. 
Hypothesis B, which is my argument, states that recent changes in Turkish foreign 
policy resulting from international and domestic level factors demonstrate that while 
there is a significant change in the direction of autonomy, Turkey’s foreign policy in the 
Middle East and Eurasia does not represent a fundamental shift away from the West.  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely support or conform to the policies of its 
NATO allies, specifically the US and the EU, in the Middle East and Eurasia. 
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Prediction 2: Turkey would share its Western allies’ vision for the Middle East 
and the Eurasia region and its foreign policy initiatives in the region would be acceptable 
to the US, the EU, and its other NATO partners. 
Prediction 3: Turkey’s bilateral trade would increase with the Middle Eastern and 
Eurasian countries as well as with the Western countries. Turkey would seek greater 
integration with the Middle Eastern and Eurasian countries but it would also pursue EU 
membership and closer economic ties with the US. 
3.4.	  Research	  Methodology	  
	  
The main purpose of this dissertation is to explore the causes of the recent 
changes in Turkish foreign policy and determine whether these changes mean Turkey’s 
departure from the Western framework. In order to test the two hypotheses and analyze 
the reasons for these foreign policy changes, I will conduct case studies in two regional 
areas, Middle East and Eurasia. In each region, I will examine Turkey’s foreign policy 
behavior towards several countries—Iran, Iraq, Syria and Israel in the Middle East, and 
Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus in Eurasia—and analyze Turkey’s actions vis-à-
vis the interests of the Western powers, mainly the EU and the US. 
The case study method allows the researcher to thoroughly examine the 
international and domestic environment by looking at each case in depth. Case studies are 
useful in explaining a political phenomenon by taking a hypothesis and testing it against 
real life events. George and Bennett suggest the within-case method of causal 
interpretation, which includes congruence method, can function as an alternative to 
controlled comparison in scientific research.144 Controlled experiments in international 
politics do not exist because it is impossible to hold other factors constant 
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while looking at the one factor that changes. It involves many variables and changes 
occurring at the same time and these events have too many causes, but as analysts we still 
want to sort out causes to analyze the patterns and trends and to understand which ones 
are stronger than others. 
As explained by George and Bennett, the congruence method forms the basic 
methodological foundation of this study. It essentially entails establishing the value of 
independent and dependent variables in the case at hand and comparing the observed 
value of dependent variable with earlier predictions given the observed independent 
variables. If the outcome of the dependent variable is consistent with the predictions, then 
the possibility of a causal relationship is strengthened. In order to assess the possible 
causal significance of congruity in a case, the researcher should ask first, if the 
consistency is spurious or of possible causal significance; and second if the independent 
variable is a necessary condition for the outcome of the dependent variable, and how 
much explanatory or predictive power it has. 
The study uses the congruence method, combined with before and after analyses, 
as a methodology to analyze the evidence. It entails establishing two hypotheses, 
determining the value of predicted policy changes for each hypothesis, and then 
comparing the observed value of policy changes with the earlier predictions. If the actual 
Turkish foreign policy behavior is consistent with the predicted policy action identified in 
either hypothesis, it would provide support for a causal interpretation. Thus, the degree of 
consistency between the predictions of the hypotheses and the observed values of Turkish 
foreign policy behavior can be regarded as the most important indication of its 
explanatory power. In the process, it analyzes which factors are dominant in Turkey’s 
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foreign policy behavior.  
Each case study begins by laying out the hypothesis A and hypothesis B, the 
predictions based on these hypotheses and the parameters for these predictions. It then 
provides a brief overview of Turkey’s foreign policy in that region. Each mini case starts 
with a historical analysis of Turkish foreign policy before 2002 and then it presents the 
evidence for the predictions of each hypothesis. Each case concludes with a summary of 
the findings and analysis and an overall conclusion, following the completion of the mini 
cases, presents the results of individual cases by identifying the common threads within 
an analytic framework.  
3.5.	  Data	  
	  
Data for this study mainly come from official documents, government sources, 
industry reports, and media sources. The case study will use evidence from the firsthand 
account of events in speeches, interviews, and official government documents regarding 
policymakers’ intentions and reactions. This is complemented by analytic and descriptive 
accounts of what has actually happened in Turkish foreign policy in the last decade, 
which are found in secondary sources such as books, academic journals, and media 
reports. The empirical evidence for the case study comes from two main sources. The 
quantitative data on trade, investment, and economic growth figures are mainly pulled 
from the government agencies, industry, and media reporting. They are presented in 
graphs and constitute important evidence for the economic reasons behind certain policy 
actions. The qualitative data, such as public opinion surveys, are drawn from official 
websites and policy papers. These survey results are useful in measuring public opinion 
and analyzing its impact on foreign policy actions. 
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Because the thrust of the case study relies on Turkey’s foreign policy actions, 
which are mostly reported in the media and policy articles, this study invested most of its 
efforts in obtaining and analyzing the events data. Unlike content analysis, which only 
focuses on the automatic repetition of certain words to assess the importance of an event 
or idea, I built a detailed chronological timeline of Turkish foreign policy from 1923 till 
present. Mining through the data for Turkish foreign policy actions, as reported in the 
open sources, I carefully stored significant, relevant, and time-sensitive events in a 
timeline. That allowed me to make comparisons among relevant policy actions and 
analyze the correlation among various events with an attention to specific timing and 
sequence. Having a long list of all the government actions in one place also allowed me 
to analyze whether an event would provide support for the predominant or alternative 
hypothesis without ignoring the evidence that run counter to my argument.  
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CHAPTER	  4:	  TURKISH	  FOREIGN	  POLICY	  IN	  THE	  MIDDLE	  EAST	  
 
This dissertation aims to answer the question of whether the recent transformation 
in Turkish foreign policy is a fundamental reorientation of the country towards the East 
and abandoning of the Western alliance. In order to answer this question, the study 
examines the changes in Turkish foreign policy and analyzes the factors driving these 
changes using international and domestic levels of analyses and the framework of realism 
and liberalism introduced in the previous chapter. This chapter conducts a series of case 
studies and uses the congruence method of hypothesis testing to examine Turkey’s 
foreign policy in the Middle East. It assesses whether Turkey’s policy in Iran, Iraq, Syria 
and Israel—the countries toward which Turkey exhibited significant foreign policy 
changes—demonstrates a shift away from Ankara’s anchorage in the Western 
framework.  
The first section lays out the two hypotheses for the case study and the next 
section provides an overview of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East through a brief 
readout of Turkey’s foreign policy in the region before and after 2002. Then it conducts 
four mini cases on Turkish foreign policy towards Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Israel. Each case 
begins with a brief recount of Turkey’s foreign policy towards this region before 2002. It 
then analyzes the available evidence against the predictions of the two hypotheses. 
Finally, it concludes by summarizing the findings on whether Turkey’s foreign policy 
transformation is a fundamental reorientation of the country and by identifying those 
factors that are dominant in driving Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
74	  
4.1.	  THE	  CASE	  STUDY	  FRAMEWORK	  
 
Hypothesis A: It states that the recent changes in Turkish foreign policy stemming 
from international and domestic level factors indicate a fundamental reorientation of 
Ankara’s foreign policy away from the US and the EU in favor of a completely 
autonomous regional power that would try to limit the Western influence in the Middle 
East.  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely oppose or confound the policies of its NATO 
allies, specifically the US and the EU, in the Middle East and take a stance systematically 
at odds with the Western interests. 
Prediction 2: Turkey would not share its Western allies’ vision for the Middle 
East and Eurasia and its foreign policy initiatives in the region would exceed the bounds 
of what the US, the EU, and its other NATO partners consider acceptable.  
Prediction 3: Turkey would orient its trade towards non-Western trading blocs 
that try to limit the influence of the West in the region and it would reject or give up its 
pursuit of EU membership. 
Hypothesis B: It states that recent changes in Turkish foreign policy resulting 
from international and domestic level factors demonstrate that while there is a significant 
change in the direction of autonomy, Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East and 
Eurasia does not represent a fundamental shift away from the West.  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely support or conform to the policies of its 
NATO allies, specifically the US and the EU, in the Middle East. 
Prediction 2: Turkey would share its Western allies’ vision for the Middle East 
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and its foreign policy initiatives in the region would be acceptable to the US, the EU, and 
its other NATO partners. 
Prediction 3: Turkey’s bilateral trade would increase with both the Middle East 
and the West. Turkey would seek greater integration with the Middle Eastern countries 
but it would also pursue EU membership and closer economic ties with the US. 
 Parameters for the Predictions: Before Turkey’s foreign policy actions are 
examined under these predictions, it’s useful to define the parameters for the West’s 
broader expectations from Turkey. The US, the EU, and other NATO partners expect or 
prefer a Turkey that closely supports and cooperates with the Western policies and 
interests in the region. They want Turkey to refrain from destabilizing actions in the 
Middle East, support Western counterterrorism efforts, and contribute to regional 
stability, economic development, good governance, rule of law, and promotion of 
democratic and secular values. The EU also expects Turkey to continue the 
democratization process and launch liberal political and economic reforms to meet the 
EU membership criteria. 
 Specifically, Turkey’s pursuit of closer economic relations with unfriendly 
regimes in the region is at least acceptable to the Western countries, but entering into 
military alliances or forming deeper security ties with these countries is unacceptable to 
both the US and the EU. The US and the EU want Turkey to uphold international norms 
and rule of law when it comes to dealing with the regional problems and expect Turkey to 
join efforts to eliminate terrorism in the region. The US and the EU policies toward 
specific countries may differ from each other and their policies may change depending on 
the specific timeframe during the last fifteen years, but I will attempt to highlight basic 
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expectations and acceptable behavior towards the countries examined in the case studies. 
 On Iran, the West wants a stable and peaceful Iran and expects Ankara to treat 
Tehran cautiously. Specifically, the US expects Turkey to support its policy of preventing 
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Increased trade and investment ties with Iran are 
somewhat acceptable while enhancing military ties would raise eyebrows. The EU is 
more lenient toward increasing economic ties between Turkey and Iran and finds 
Turkey’s diplomatic rapprochement with Iran more acceptable. The EU also supports 
policies that would allow Turkey to facilitate Iranian energy resources to be exported to 
Europe.  
 On Iraq, the US expected Turkey to refrain from forging closer ties to Iraq and 
join efforts to remove Saddam before the Iraq war while the major EU countries expected 
Turkey to join efforts at a diplomatic solution to avert a war. In the aftermath of the war, 
the US and the EU expect Turkey to contribute to reconstruction, political reconciliation 
and economic development efforts and support the functioning of the Iraqi government. 
Following the rise of ISIS threat, the US and the EU expect Turkey to cooperate closely 
with the Western security forces to eliminate the terrorist threat. Turkey’s support for the 
extremist forces in the region and destabilizing actions in Iraq would be unacceptable to 
the West. 
 On Syria, before the Arab Spring-inspired protests and the ensuing violence, the 
US expected Turkey to refrain from entering into a military alliance with Syria against 
the Western interests in the region. The EU probably found Ankara’s efforts at improving 
diplomatic and economic relations with Damascus acceptable. Following Assad’s use of 
force against his people and the escalation of violence, the US and the EU expected 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
77	  
Turkey to support the Western efforts to hasten Assad’s fall. Turkey’s increased trade ties 
with Syria were somewhat acceptable to the West but close military ties while the 
violence continued would exceed the Western limits; both the US and the EU expected 
Turkey to cease its ties with Syria after the violence. They found Turkey’s obstinate 
insistence on removing Assad from power before Ankara could fully support the fight 
against the ISIS frustrating but workable, however, any overt Turkish support for the 
extremist forces, which would derail the Western efforts at fighting terrorism in the 
region, would be unacceptable to the West. 
 On Israel, the US desires Turkey to stay on good terms with Israel to realize 
cooperation with its two close allies in the Middle East. While Turkey’s refusal to 
improve diplomatic relations with Israel until Tel Aviv apologizes and compensates for 
the killing of nine Turks in 2010 appears to be understood by the US given President 
Obama’s efforts to broker an Israeli apology, Washington probably expects Ankara to 
restore political, diplomatic, and security relations with Israel to garner support for US 
policies in the region. The EU is less rigid when it comes to maintaining an open 
dialogue with Hamas or deteriorating security ties with Israel, and more accepting of 
Turkey’s emotional support for the Palestinians. Any potential military alliance Ankara 
could forge against the Western ally in the region would exacerbate the regional 
instability and jeopardize the US and the EU’s goals in the region.   
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4.2.	  OVERVIEW	  OF	  FOREIGN	  POLICY	  CHANGE	  IN	  THE	  MIDDLE	  EAST	  
	  
Turkey’s policy in the Middle East was marked by decades of mutual mistrust and 
tension since the birth of the Republic. Ankara has maintained its inward-looking and 
defensive policy approach towards international relations and remained mostly cautious 
towards the region until the1970s and 1980s. The Kemalist elite in Turkey perceived the 
Middle East as a backward zone of conflict and preferred to deal with it only when it 
threatened Turkey’s national security. Likewise, the Arab public saw the Kemalist 
revolution in Turkey as a denial of the country’s Islamic heritage.145  
During the Cold War, the Western, mostly the US, foreign and security policy 
approach towards the region shaped Turkey’s policy regarding the Middle East and the 
Arab nationalist currents grew suspicious and resentful of Turkey’s role as a pro-Western 
bastion.146 Following Ankara’s tense relations with the West in response to Turkey’s 
intervention into northern Cyprus in the 1970s, Turkey attempted to seek closer relations 
with its neighbors in the region for a brief period, but by large, Turkish Republic stuck to 
its Kemalist policy of non-entanglement. When Turkey did get involved—including its 
decision to join the Western coalition against Saddam in the first Gulf War, its use of 
military threats to compel Syria to renounce support for the PKK, and its sparring with 
Iran over Tehran’s support for the PKK—its involvement was controversial and led to a 
deterioration in its relations with the Middle Eastern neighbors. Turkey’s exports to the 
Middle East dropped from 27 percent of total exports in 1987 to 14 percent in 1993 and 
the imports dropped from 19 to 11 percent during the same period.147  
After the end of the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy remained in line with that 
of the US and major European powers. Especially in the 1990s, the Turkish political and 
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military elite considered the Middle East as a source of threat and the defense 
establishment— exercising its influence through the National Security Council—became 
more prominent in the formulation of Turkey’s policies vis-à-vis the Middle East. The 
National Security Policy Document of 1992 listed Syria, Iraq, and Iran as Turkey’s main 
sources of threat following Kurdish separatism.148 Feeling increasingly encircled by 
“hostile” neighbors, Turkey securitized its foreign policy in the 1990s and saw the 
developments in world politics through this lens. As a result, Ankara avoided close 
diplomatic and economic ties with its Middle Eastern neighbors and actively supported 
the activities of the NATO, its chief security partnership. Although Turkey had some 
involvement in the Middle East during the 1990s—it had a stint of warmer relations with 
the Arab countries under the Islamist-led coalition government—its activities were 
largely limited to Turkey’s immediate neighbors and mainly tied to the Kurdish issue.  
Following the AKP’s rise to power in 2002, Ankara broadened its long-atrophied 
relations with Muslim and non-Muslim neighbors in the Middle East through its active 
diplomatic and economic involvement. It became increasingly willing to serve as an 
intermediary in crises between the United States and the Middle East and among the 
Middle Eastern countries. Turkey’s deepening political ties to the region, marked by 
increasing diplomatic visits, political agreements, and commercial activities, significantly 
raised its clout in the region, reversing decades of hostility and mistrust towards Ankara 
at least in the eyes of the Arab public.  
The Arab states in 2004 helped elect the first Turk to the office of Secretary 
General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The Arab League was among 
those organizations and states that made diplomatic representations to Brussels in support 
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of Ankara’s EU case.149 In 2006, Erdogan became the first prime minister to address an 
Arab League Summit, which granted Turkey the “permanent guest” status. Around 
seventy-five percent of the people surveyed in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi 
Arabia and Syria in 2009 viewed Turkey as a “model for the synthesis of Islam and 
democracy.”150 Also in 2009, the Arab states joined a host of Asian, African, and 
Western nations in supporting Turkey’s successful bid for a rotating seat on the UNSC.  
Economic liberalization measures and the export-led growth strategy, 
implemented since the 1980s, have heightened the importance of economic 
considerations in foreign policy. As a result, a major Turkish foreign policy goal during 
this period was opening up new markets in support of the growing Turkish businesses. 
Turkey’s phenomenal economic growth in the last decade helped Ankara increase its ties 
with its neighbors and build economic interdependence with formerly hostile countries 
like Iran, Iraq, and Syria. In turn, growing Turkish economic interests in its Middle 
Eastern neighbors have raised Turkey’s stakes in a peaceful and stable region, reinforcing 
Turkish foreign policy objectives to promote peace and regional integration in the Middle 
East.151  
As a result, the volume of trade between Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbors 
has sharply increased (see figure 1). During the 1990s, Turkish exports to the Middle 
Eastern countries rarely exceeded $3 billion per year and remained stable, but after 2002, 
the volume of Turkish exports experienced a strong and sustained growth, reaching $60 
billion in 2008 but falling back to $47 billion in 2013. Even though Turkey ran a trade 
deficit with the Western world, exacerbating its current account deficit, it enjoyed a trade 
surplus with the Middle East. Between 1954 and 1999, the total number of Middle 
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Eastern companies in Turkey amounted to only 842 but this number was 438 in the year 
2006 alone. The percentage of industrial goods that created complementarities with the 
Middle Eastern countries increased and new industrial centers in Anatolia began to eye 
new markets in the Middle East.152 Thanks to the liberal visa policy and economic 
opportunities, people-to-people exchanges significantly increased during this period 
through touristic visits, establishment of Turkish civil society groups in the Middle East, 
and cultural exchanges through education and Turkish satellite television programs.  
The following hypothesis testing section will examine Turkey’s foreign policy 
after the AKP came to power to assess whether its foreign policy in Iran, Iraq, Syria and 
Israel—the countries toward which Turkey exhibited significant foreign policy 
changes—demonstrates a shift away from Ankara’s place in the Western framework. 
Figure 1: Turkey’s Total Trade (Exports plus Imports) with the Middle Eastern 
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Turkey has historically seen its Shia neighbor to the east as an imperial and 
religious rival. The Ottomans were historically the defenders of the Sunni Islam against 
the Shia Iranians. Even though Ataturk’s Turkey became a secular and Western model for 
Iran’s Pahlavi dynasty during the first half of the twentieth century—during which the 
two sides enjoyed good relations—bilateral ties sharply deteriorated with the Islamic 
revolution in 1979.154 When the Supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini emphasized 
spreading the Islamic revolution to Turkey, the historic rivalry reemerged between 
secular Turkey and Islamic Iran.155 Turkey maintained its non-involvement policy during 
the Iran-Iraq War and even had a stint of improved relations with Iran under Turkey’s 
Islamist-led coalition government of 1996-1997. It was during this time that Turkey 
signed a $23 billion deal for the delivery of natural gas from Iran to Turkey and took a 
leadership role in the establishment of the Developing-8 (D-8), a Muslim version of G8, 
which included Iran.156  
During most of the 1990s, however, the Turkish military was concerned that 
Tehran tolerated the PKK’s (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) terroristic activities inside Iran 
and offered a safe haven for the militants that the Turkish security forces were 
pursuing;157 therefore, bilateral relations were tense and marked by one crisis after 
another. In 1994 and again in 1999, Turkish fighter planes struck PKK camps in Iran, 
reportedly hitting Iranian border villages.158 In April 1996, the two sides exchanged 
accusations of espionage and support for terrorism. In July of the same year, the 
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PKK mounted an attack on a Turkish military post on the Iranian border and the Turkish 
president visited the border and harshly criticized Iran.159 In January 1997, Turkey 
accused Iran of supplying the PKK with heavy weapons, including Katyusha rockets.160  
Turkey’s heightened concerns over the rise of political Islam added to a growing 
sensitivity toward alleged Iranian attempts to “export” the Islamic revolution. Diplomatic 
relations were ruptured for a time in 1997 when the Iranian ambassador to Turkey called 
for the adoption of the Islamist Sharia system in Turkey at a Jerusalem Day speech in 
Ankara. The Turkish military responded to this incident, known as the Baqeri incident, by 
sending in tanks, arresting the Islamist Welfare Party mayor, expelling the Iranian 
ambassador, and removing Turkey’s Islamist Prime Minister from his post in a soft coup.  
Also, in December 1997, then President Demirel left the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation’s (OIC) summit in Tehran early, when his Iranian hosts tried to censure 
Turkey for its close relations with Israel. In 1999, Demirel called Turkey’s Virtue Party 
parliamentarian, head-scarved Merve Kavakci an acting agent provocateur in the service 
of Iran. Turkey and Iran also took opposing positions on the Armenia-Azeri conflict over 
Nagorno-Karabakh and Iran accused Turkey of inciting separatism among its Azeri 
minority as well as harboring the Mujahideen al-Kalq, a violent opponent to the Iranian 
regime.161 During these tumultuous years in bilateral relations, Turkey has often pursued 
a policy in close collaboration or consultation with the West, and Iran resented Turkey’s 
role as a close ally of Washington and Tel Aviv. 
Turkish foreign policy towards Iran after the AKP came to power will be 
examined below. 
Hypothesis A: It states that the recent changes in Turkish foreign policy 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
84	  
stemming from international and domestic level factors indicate a fundamental 
reorientation of Ankara’s foreign policy away from the US and the EU in favor of a 
completely autonomous regional power that would try to limit the Western influence in 
the Middle East.  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely oppose or confound the policies of its 
NATO allies, specifically the US and the EU, in Iran and take a stance 
systematically at odds with the Western interests. 
Evidence: 
International factors such as the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the 
Soviet Union, which posed an existential threat to Turkey, ushered in a new thinking in 
Ankara that Turkey no longer needed protection from the Western security umbrella, 
namely the NATO. A series of domestic political and economic events and rhetoric from 
the Turkish leadership in the 2000s seemed to suggest that Turkey indeed was warming 
up to Iran in opposition to the policies held by the US and to a lesser extent the EU. 
Turkey maintained close political ties to Iran through high-level diplomatic visits despite 
the Western attempts to isolate Iran, complicating the Western efforts to stop Iran from 
building nuclear weapons.  
In 2002, Turkey’s president visited Iran and called for new priorities in building 
economic relations between Ankara and Tehran shortly after President Bush declared 
Iran as a part of the “axis of evil.”162 In August 2008, Turkey was the first NATO 
member to formally invite Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. In the same month, 
Erdogan gave a speech at the Brookings Institution in Washington, calling for total 
nuclear disarmament and arguing that the countries that ask Iran to drop nuclear weapons 
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should get rid of their own nuclear arsenal.163 In late 2009, Ankara abstained from an 
International Atomic Agency sanctions resolution against Iran. In an interview with BBC 
in March 2010, Erdogan characterized the accusations that Iran was developing nuclear 
weapons as rumors.  
Turkish Iranian rapprochement culminated in June 2010 when Turkey, together 
with Brazil as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, voted against the 
harsher UN sanctions against Iran.164 Then Foreign Minister Davutoglu publicly called 
the sanctions “baseless, entirely provocative and biased,”165 while the deputy prime 
minister in 2010 declared that Turkish banks and companies were free to trade with 
Iran.166 Furthermore, Erdogan met with the Iranian leaders in 2012 amid speculations of a 
possible strike by the Israeli and the US forces on the Iranian nuclear facilities. 
Prediction 2: Turkey would not share its Western allies’ vision for Iran and 
its foreign policy initiatives in Iran would exceed the bounds of what the US, the EU, 
and its other NATO partners consider acceptable.  
During the AKP’s tenure, Turkish policymakers embarked many foreign policy 
initiatives that would deepen bilateral relations and move Ankara closer to Tehran. 
Turkey and Iran solidified their bilateral security ties by signing security cooperation 
agreements in 2004 and 2008, and the two countries signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU), agreeing to cooperate in air, land, and sea transportation. In 2006, 
Iran’s ambassador in Ankara has called for Turkey, Iran, and Syria to adopt a joint 
position on the Kurdish issues, lest “the US carve pieces from us for a Kurdish state.”167 
In June 2008, Turkey and Iran undertook a coordinated air strike in the Kandil Mountains 
against the PKK and its affiliates.168169  
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In June 2009, Turkey recognized Ahmedinejad’s reelection despite fraud claims 
and then Turkish President Gul visited Tehran on a day when a Green movement protest 
was scheduled. In October of that year, Erdogan claimed the Iranian leader was his friend 
and close ally, and asserted that he shared a common vision of the region with Iran.170 
Erdogan’s January 2014 visit to Iran, establishment of the Turkish-Iranian High Level 
Cooperation Council during his visit, and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s June 2014 
visit to Turkey—the first of its kind since 1996—further strengthened the bilateral 
relations between the two countries.  
Turkey would almost certainly not participate in or even facilitate an Israeli or US 
attack on Iran unless Tehran’s actions became truly threatening to Ankara.171 Turks fear 
that American military action against its neighbor, especially after the Iraq war and the 
turmoil in Syria, will further destabilize the region. To some in Ankara, Iran cooperates 
closely against the PKK militants while Washington is reluctant to take action against the 
PKK in support of Turkish interests.172  
Prediction 3: Turkey would orient its trade towards non-Western trading 
blocs that try to limit the influence of the West in the region and it would reject or 
give up its pursuit of EU membership. 
Evidence: 
Turkey’s rising economic status—as the world’s 16th largest economy and one of 
the fastest growing economies in the OECD—increased its confidence in pursuing 
autonomous foreign economic policy without being constrained by the EU. At the same 
time the economic crises engulfing the EU made the EU membership less attractive, 
Turkey resented the EU’s decision to admit countries like Bulgaria that are poorer than 
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Turkey while rejecting Turkey. 
In 2007, Turkish Foreign Trade Minister announced that Turkey would sign 
preferential trade agreements with eighteen Islamic countries, including Iran. In 2010, 
Erdogan floated the idea of a free trade agreement with Iran stating, “Why can’t we 
establish unobstructed trade mechanism with Iran as we did before with the EU?”173174 
When Turkey lifted visa requirements with Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iran for the 
creation of a “Samgen,” replicating the Schengen visa-free zone of the EU, Davutoglu 
said, “we are lifting borders that were artificially laid and becoming the people of one 
hinterland. We are turning economic cooperation into an economic unity.”175  
During Erdogan’s January 2014 visit to Tehran, both sides concluded negotiations 
to enact a preferential trade agreement to reduce tariff barriers between the two 
countries.176 This reciprocal tariff cuts agreement or preferential trade agreement falls 
short of a free trade regime and despite the tariff reduction deal, the sanctions imposed on 
Iran over its nuclear program remain a major obstacle to increasing bilateral trade. 
Furthermore, any attempt to grant preferential trade status to Iran could create problems 
for Turkey in its relations with the EU because all of Turkey’s tariff barriers with third 
parties must be harmonized with those of the EU under the terms of Turkey’s 1995 
Customs Union agreement with the EU. 
Despite US opposition, the Turkish government reiterated its determination to go 
ahead with major investments in the Iranian energy sector.177 Turkey and Iran cooperate 
closely in the energy field; Iran is Turkey’s top oil importer. In 2007, Turkey and Iran 
announced plans for a strategic alliance based on a joint venture in the field of energy 
despite US pressure on Turkey to shun Iran. They agreed to seal two new energy deals, 
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one allowing the Turkish Petroleum Corporation to explore for oil and natural gas in Iran 
and another for the transfer of gas from Turkmenistan to Turkey and on to Europe via a 
pipeline that passes through Iran, although these plans have not been carried out in the 
wake of the international sanctions.178 During the visit of the Iranian president to Turkey 
in 2008 after a disputed election, which angered Washington, Turkey and Iran made an 
agreement to transport 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Iranian and Turkmen gas into 
Turkey and the EU.  
Hypothesis B: It states that recent changes in Turkish foreign policy resulting 
from international and domestic level factors demonstrate that while there is a significant 
change in the direction of autonomy, Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East does not 
represent a fundamental shift away from the West.  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely support or conform to the policies of its 
NATO allies, specifically the US and the EU, in Iran. 
Evidence: 
Turkey has never advocated that Iran should acquire nuclear bombs nor supported 
Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, hence, Ankara’s Iranian policy at the fundamental level does 
not run counter to the Western policy. At the tactical level, however, Ankara’s method of 
dealing with the Iranian nuclear problem—which favors diplomatic solution and opposes 
economic sanctions or military action to protect Turkish security and economic 
interests—diverges from that of Washington and Tel Aviv. Despite Erdogan’s occasional, 
erratic, and populist rhetoric, Ankara has publicly and repeatedly called for Tehran’s need 
to satisfy international concerns over its nuclear developments.179 Erdogan openly stated 
his government’s position on Iran: “Turkey officially recognizes the right of Iran, a 
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member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to develop nuclear 
technology, provided that it remains on a peaceful track and allows for the application of 
full-scope safeguard inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in a 
way that would lend the utmost confidence to the international community about its 
intentions.” 180 Furthermore, Turkey would not welcome any major gain in prestige by 
Iran, even if Tehran is highly unlikely to use the nuclear weapons against Turkey, 
because Ankara still sees Iran as a rival for regional influence despite seeking closer 
diplomatic and economic ties with Tehran. In fact, if the Turkish-Iranian relations 
experience fallout, Turkey’s NATO membership would provide a security umbrella to 
Turkey against a potential Iranian attack.181  
Turkish officials have reservations about imposing economic and other kinds of 
sanctions against Iran by the UNSC or by individual countries because these sanctions 
severely hurt Iran’s neighbors and key economic partners, which include Turkey. The 
Gulf War experience and the UN sanctions imposed on Iraq taught Turkey how 
detrimental they could be for its economy and for regional stability.182 Any military 
attack or economic sanctions would hurt Turkey’s own citizens who live near Iran and 
whose livelihood depends on cross-border trade. That is why the Turkish officials argue 
that the best way to prevent Iran from seeking nuclear weapons is to address the 
underlying sources of insecurity that might induce Tehran to seek the weapons. Turkish 
leaders have urged the US and other allies to offer Iran security pledges in return for 
reciprocal Iranian guarantees that Tehran will not use its nuclear activities for military 
purposes.183  
Davutoglu emphasized that Ankara-based policy would exhaust all means of 
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diplomacy in order to mediate between the regimes and the people.184 To that end, 
Turkey actively promoted and expressed support for the ongoing nuclear talks between 
Iran and the West. Turkey’s position also reveals the divergent views between Brussels 
and Washington because Ankara is more likely to follow the EU line than the US line on 
how to handle Iran’s nuclear problem.185 The troika meetings between Turkey, the EU, 
and Iran contributed to the harmonization of Turkish-EU policies on Iran’s nuclear 
program.186 The EU’s twin-track strategy on Iran’s nuclear program—seeking to 
maintain a dialogue with Tehran while not excluding future UN sanctions—is similar to 
Turkey’s approach.187 Turkey also sought to facilitate P5+1 talks even though then 
President Gul’s shuttle diplomacy between the principal actors, Condoleezza Rice, Javier 
Solana, Mohammed el Baradei, and Ali Larijani proved futile in the end.188  
Turkey’s “no” vote in the UNSC should be viewed from Ankara’s perspective 
within that context. Prior to the vote, Turkish and Brazilian leaders had made significant 
efforts on a deal—that was originally proposed by the US—to persuade their Iranian 
counterparts to agree to swap their low-enriched uranium with enriched rods for a 
medical research reactor through an exchange that would take place in Turkey. When 
their efforts, which the pundits assessed to be unexpectedly successful,189 were sidelined 
by the UNSC decision to impose new sanctions against Iran, Ankara, together with 
Brazil, displayed its anger by voting against the sanctions, causing tension with 
Washington. Deputy Chairman of the AKP Omer Celik said, “some people have 
mischaracterized our vote against further sanctions as Turkey siding with Iran against the 
US, but in truth it revealed that we are pursuing common objectives in different ways.” 
He further argued, “we prefer diplomacy and negotiations with Iran because sanctions 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
91	  
don’t work,” and “if we don’t keep talks between the West and Iran going, instability will 
once again unfold throughout the Middle East region, from Iraq to Lebanon.”190  
When the UN sanctions were imposed despite Ankara’s efforts to prevent it, 
Turkey accepted that it would abide by the UN sanctions though it sought some 
exceptions to the more sweeping restrictions imposed on Tehran by the US and the EU. 
Then President Gul expressed Turkey’s mood at that time: “If the demand is for Turkey 
not to have any trade, any economic relations with Iran, it would be unfair to Turkey.”191 
Despite opposing the sanctions for economic reasons, however, Turkey nevertheless 
complied with the majority of them; sanctions were a primary factor for delaying the 
implementation of a $23 billion energy agreement Ankara signed with Tehran in 1996.192 
More importantly, in November 2010, several months after the “no” vote, Turkey 
approved the deployment of the anti-missile radar system in its territory at NATO Lisbon 
Summit, a move that the Iranians vehemently opposed but Washington considered an 
important component of European security.193 According to a prominent Turkey scholar, 
Graham Fuller, Turkey, an elected member of the IAEA board, will almost surely side 
with the international consensus when forced to choose sides, whatever that will be, but 
not necessarily with the US or Israeli position, given Ankara’s strong preference for 
internationally-sanctioned options on other issues.194  
Even though the international media hastily interpreted Turkey’s “no” vote as a 
non-permanent member of the UNSC as Turkey abandoning the West, the vote has not 
paralyzed the Turkish-American relations. In October 2010, four months after the vote, 
the US and Turkey launched a cabinet-level economic commission, the Framework for 
Strategic Economic and Commercial Cooperation and the Turkey-US Business 
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Council.195 President Obama and Prime Minister Erdogan had a “frank” conversation on 
the bilateral relationship in June 2011 in Canada. In December of that year, Vice 
President Biden reinforced Washington’s interest in increasing economic ties with 
Turkey when he traveled to Istanbul for the Global Entrepreneurship Summit that Turkey 
hosted.196  
Prediction 2: Turkey would share its Western allies’ vision for Iran and its 
foreign policy initiatives in the region would be acceptable to the US, the EU, and its 
other NATO partners. 
Evidence: 
Turkey has certainly pursued more independent foreign policy initiatives in the 
region after the AKP came to power, raising eyebrows in the West. It took a less security-
oriented approach to Iran by pursuing political, economic, and cultural cooperation. The 
mutual trust between the Turks and the Iranians increased under the AKP, which had no 
ideological problems with the Shiism. The AKP made major efforts to improve ties with 
Iran as a part of its policies to eliminate problems with neighbors and pursued 
multidimensional and proactive foreign policy to achieve regional stability and economic 
interdependence.197 Turkey’s vision for a stable and peaceful Iran that cannot threaten its 
neighbors with nuclear capability, which would then contribute to regional peace and 
economic integration, is in line with the interests of the US and the EU. 
Changes in Turkey’s political leadership and foreign policymaking institutions 
enabled Ankara to pursue closer diplomatic and economic ties with Iran compared with 
the previous governments that saw Iran as a fundamental security threat. Turkey’s new 
foreign policy mechanism gave more voice to the elected, civilian leaders and to the 
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public opinion. Turkish foreign policy used to be the product of the state elite and the 
governing elite. The state elite, which consisted of the career military and the civilian 
bureaucracy dominated by the MFA, was the guardian of the Kemalist ideology. The 
governing elite, which tended to be more representative of the values of Turkey’s societal 
peripheries, including Kemalism, Islamism, and Turkish nationalism, had less influence 
on foreign policy, particularly during Turkey’s history of unstable coalition governments. 
Since November 2002, however, the AKP governing elite emerged from the 
election institutionally strong with its majority close to the two-thirds mark, making 
constitutional reforms a possibility. Its formation of a single party government promised 
greater coherence in the office and stability in the country. As a part of the requirements 
for the EU membership, the AKP carried out legal and institutional reforms to limit the 
role of the military in the political sphere and the balance of forces transformed in favor 
of the civilian government. In contrast, Turkish military is far more hawkish about Iran 
than Turkey’s civilian officials. The old Kemalist worldview still tends to project the 
source of domestic problems, such as the resurgence of Islam in Turkey, on foreign 
enemies and Iran symbolizes the “Islamic threat.”198 As late as the 1990s, the Turkish 
military used its strategic rapprochement with Israel as a strategic card to play against 
Iran as needed. 
The Turkish public opinion supported the AKP’s pursuit of closer economic ties 
with Iran and the government’s policy on Iran tracked closely with the general mood in 
public. In a June 2003 poll on a possible US-Iranian confrontation, 55 percent of Turks 
stated that they would prefer to remain neutral on the matter. While just under 24 percent 
actually favored siding with Iran, less than 17 percent wanted to side with the US.199 The 
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Turkish vote against sanctions on Iran at the UNSC is not so surprising considering that 
only around 48 percent of the Turks were concerned about Iran acquiring nuclear 
weapons in 2010, according to the Transatlantic Survey by the German Marshall Fund. 
This is in sharp contrast with the US respondents at 86 percent and the EU at 79 percent. 
The intensity of concern is also substantial as 49 percent of the EU respondents and 69 
percent of the Americans were very concerned about Iran having nuclear weapons. In 
Turkey, only 18 percent were very concerned and 36 percent of Turks were not at all 
concerned. 
Although Turkey viewed the prospect of Iranian nuclear weapons negatively, this 
issue was not a top priority—when compared to the Kurdish issue—within the Turkish 
public at the time, even for the Turkish military.200 Turkish people disapproved coercive 
measures against Iran and displayed higher levels of acceptance for the prospect of a 
nuclear Iran. When presented with multiple options for dealing with Iran’s nuclear 
program in 2010, around 25 percent of the Turkish respondents were willing to accept 
that Iran could acquire nuclear weapons while only 6 percent of EU respondents and 4 
percent in the United States were willing to do so. Considering Turkey has extensive 
economic ties with Iran, it is not surprising that support for economic sanctions on Iran 
was fairly low in Turkey at 24 percent, compared to American support at 40 percent.  
Another major motivation for Ankara’s pursuit of closer diplomatic and economic 
relations with Iran is its economic interests. In 2014, Erdoğan traveled to Iran with his 
ministers for economy, energy and development in the hope of pursuing lucrative 
contracts in the aftermath of easing of sanctions against Iran.201Ankara views the 
potential opening of Iran to the West as a strategic opportunity to reduce the impact of 
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Turkey's own economic challenges, which threaten to reduce the AKP's grip on power in 
an election year. Declining bilateral trade due to sanctions is a major reason why Turkey 
has been active in the P5+1 talks, hoping a nuclear negotiation that would ease economic 
sanctions on Iran would allow tariffs to fall and trade to flow normally again between the 
two countries.202  
Amid the tense situation in Yemen because of Iran’s support of the Shia groups, 
which raised tension with Turkey, Erdogan visited Tehran in April 2015 to lower the 
price Turkey pays for the 10 bcm of natural gas it purchases annually from Iran, 
reportedly to ask for a 25 percent reduction.203204 Turkey has even taken Iran to 
international arbitration over the pricing of natural gas, complaining that Iran charges 25-
30 percent more than other suppliers. Turkey pays $490 for 1,000 cubic meters of Iranian 
gas, a price said to be $155 and $55 more than what it pays for the Azeri and Russian gas, 
respectively.205 
As Turkish-American relations improved because of the unity of vision for the 
region, the Turkish-Iranian ties began to deteriorate in recent years, especially after the 
Arab Spring. The AKP has encouraged the new Arab regimes to follow Turkey’s secular 
model, whereas the Iranian government would want to expand the interests of the Shia 
population.206 Turkey and Iran came head to head over their policies in Syria, Iraq, and 
Yemen where Turkey was irked by Iran’s support of the Shia Muslims, exacerbating 
sectarian conflicts and instability. In April 2015, Erdogan declared “Iran and the terrorist 
groups must withdraw from Yemen,” drawing a blunt response from Iranian Foreign 
Minister, who stated “it would be better if those who have created irreparable damages 
with their strategic blunders and lofty politics would adopt responsible policies.”207208  
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Turkish public opinion is also beginning to sway away from Iran. According to 
the Transatlantic Survey conducted by the German Marshall fund, when asked about 
Iran’s nuclear program in 2013, 12 percent of the Turks, down from 25 percent in 2010, 
said Turkey should accept that Iran could acquire nuclear weapons and 6 percent of the 
Turks, up from 3 percent in 2010, said Turkey should take military action against Iran. 
There is no significant change in the public opinion of the US or the EU during those 
years. 
Prediction 3: Turkey’s bilateral trade would increase with both Iran and the 
Western countries. Turkey would seek greater integration with Iran but it would 
also pursue EU membership and closer economic ties with the US. 
Evidence: 
Turkey’s economic ties with Iran increased commensurate with the increase in the 
overall trade thanks to Turkey’s booming economy in the last decade. With a trade 
volume of $22 billion in 2012—from around $1 billion in 2002—Iran was Turkey’s 
fourth-largest trading partner (Figure 2).209 There are several reasons for Turkey’s 
increased economic cooperation with Iran. First, Turkey is heavily dependent on Iranian 
oil and gas for its energy needs, which are estimated to rise further to satisfy Ankara’s 
growing industrialization. Iran is Turkey’s largest energy supplier in the Middle East and 
the second largest in the world after Russia. Ankara imported 51 percent of its oil from 
Iran in 2011 thought it went down to 35 percent in 2012. It imported 21 percent of its 
natural gas from Iran in 2011 though it also went down to 18 percent in 2012 (see figure 
3).210	  As a result, the share of the Middle East in Turkey’s overall trade increased 
between 2002 and 2013, causing some decrease in the EU and the US share, but this 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
97	  
increase, similar to that of Russia, is mainly due to the rising energy imports from Iran 
and Iraq (see figure 4).  
Figure 2: Turkey’s Total Trade (Exports + Imports) with Iran since 1998211 
 
Figure 3: Turkey’s Main Trade Partners in 2002 and 2013212 
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which include some of the world’s largest consumers of energy. Within the last decade, 
Turkish electricity demand has increased by 63 percent and power sector accounted for 
48 percent of natural gas consumption in 2011. Turkey’s energy use will continue to 
grow at an annual growth rate of around 4.5 percent from 2015 to 2030, approximately 
doubling over the next decade.  
Figure 4: Turkey’s 2012 Crude Oil Supply Mix213 
 
 
Secondly, Turkish businesses and interest groups played a crucial role in the 
expansion of economic ties between Ankara and Tehran. The AKP came to power with a 
claim of representing the groups who were outside the political, economic, and cultural 
elite that had dominated Turkey since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. The 
small-scale family businesses in Anatolia, who were dynamic, well-adapted for flexible 
production patterns, and able to compete in international markets, emerged as a new 
cadre of businessmen, called the “Anatolian Tigers.” Considering that these Anatolian 
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foreign policymaking—constitute the core of the AKP constituency, it became an 
important foreign policy goal for the AKP to liberalize and create new markets. The Vice 
President of the Middle East-Africa-Gulf region committee of the Turkish Business 
Council expressed these sentiments in a 2012 interview, “What’s changed in the last ten 
years is that the government in Turkey is now thinking from a business perspective; it is 
changing its politics to comply with the interests of Turkish companies.”214 Some 
scholars began to call the AKP “the party of the rising devout bourgeoisie.” Then Foreign 
Minister Davutoglu acknowledged in a 2011 interview that the business community in 
Turkey has become “one of the driving forces of foreign policy.”215   
With the victory of the AKP in 2002, a new set of interest groups, which had 
previously had no say in Turkish foreign policy, were empowered. Business associations, 
such as the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK), the Turkish 
Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) and the Confederation of 
Businessmen, and Industrialists (TUSKON), now actively lobby the government on 
foreign policy questions. The Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association 
(MUSIAD) has played an active role in the party since its establishment; many MUSIAD 
members have joined the AKP to complete the organization of the local offices of the 
party in Anatolian cities.216 During a business meeting in 2010 chaired by Erdogan and 
Iranian Vice President Reza Rahimi and attended by more than a hundred business 
leaders from both countries, the two countries pledged to triple bilateral trade and even 
floated the idea of a free trade agreement. This was possible mainly because of the active 
lobbying of the Turkey-Iran Business Group, which has been seeking to advance the 
interests of Turkish businesses and has contributed to Turkey’s outreach policy towards 
	   	   	  




Business interests and lobby groups generally emphasize greater trade and 
investment regardless of the direction. Thus, while exploring new markets in the East, 
Turkey’s interest groups also strongly supported maintaining their longstanding ties to its 
traditional economic partners, the EU countries. Even the conservative MUSIAD argued 
for Turkey’s accession to the EU in search of a democratic anchor to guarantee freedom 
for political activity. Muslim businessmen have also acknowledged that they function in 
an economy that is increasingly geared to external markets and specifically to Europe 
because they recognize that EU membership could stimulate foreign investments and 
thereby increase the overall level of economic prosperity in the country.  
These businessmen also developed a new kind of relationship with the European 
countries; they collect the savings of tens of thousands of Turkish immigrants in Europe 
and invest these in joint ventures in Turkey.217 Especially earlier in its terms, the AKP 
chose the EU as a top policy priority to win the support of the Euro-enthusiast business 
community and widen its scope of action in domestic politics by ensuring civilian control 
over the military. The government is aware that only a buoyant economy will maintain 
the government’s popular support and the single most powerful group of support for the 
party, the Islamic bourgeoisie, is enthusiastic about developing economic relations with 
the Western world, upon which the majority of Turkey’s economic performance depends.  
Turkey’s trade with the EU—Ankara’s largest trading partner with whom Ankara 
has a Customs Union—also increased from $48 billion in 2002 to $169 billion in 2013 
despite the 2008-09 financial crises and the Eurozone crisis of 2012, which represent the 
only dips in the bilateral trade during this period (see Figure 5). There is no evidence 
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suggesting that Turkey intends to give up its pursuit of EU membership or reduce 
economic ties with the US to increase economic cooperation with Iran despite the stalled 
EU membership process in the second half of the 2000s.  
While Turkey was working on expanding its Customs Union with the EU and 
seeking a free trade agreement with the US during the first three quarters of 2014, the 
bilateral trade with Iran declined to $10 billion. The declining trade was mainly because 
of the high tariffs each country implemented on the other despite a preferential trade 
agreement of 2014 that was supposed to boost trade. Around 85 percent of Turkey’s 
import from Iran is oil and gas, which constitute around 60 percent of total bilateral trade 
volume and Turkey exports a variety of products, including stones, plastic and wood 
products. 218 Furthermore, while Turkey’s trade with the EU and the US are on an upward 
trajectory, bilateral trade with Iran is on a downward trajectory because the political 
problems in the region. 
Figure 5: Turkey’s Total Trade (Exports + Imports) with Iran in Comparison to its 
Total Trade with EU and US219 
	   	   	  




Turkey’s energy deals with Iran suit the EU’s interests even though they are 
opposed by Washington, a point of divergence between the two pillars of the Western 
alliance. Turkey pledged $2 billion for marketing and transporting Iranian natural gas and 
it is also planning to facilitate the export of Iranian oil via pipelines to Europe. In April 
2015, Iranian Foreign Minister said Iran could serve as a reliable and steady partner for 
the European community in terms of natural gas needs. “Iran is on par with Russia, 
enjoys all the needed resources to provide gas to Europe,” he said.220 The EU strongly 
favors the import of Iranian energy to avoid excessive reliance on the Russian energy 
sources, an effort that could gain in importance following the Ukraine crisis, but 
Washington and Israel have opposed these moves.   
Conclusion: 
The preponderance of the evidence shows that Turkey’s recent rapprochement 
with Iran does not indicate a fundamental reorientation away from the Western alliance 
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policies largely conform to the policies of the West, namely the US and the EU to a 
greater extent. The interests of Ankara and Washington may seem at odds at times—
bilateral relations have never been perfectly smooth in the past—but the differences 
between the United States and Turkey regarding Iran’s nuclear program are largely over 
tactics, not strategic goals. Given its dependence on the Iranian energy and Iran’s ability 
to step up its support for the PKK, Turkey has a strong stake in preventing relations with 
Iran from deteriorating too badly. Thus, Ankara will seek to retain a degree of flexibility 
regarding its policy toward Iran and may be hesitant to support some U.S. initiatives, 
which Ankara deems, conflict with broader Turkish national interests vis-à-vis Iran.221 
Because Ankara does not view Tehran as a major threat, it opposes any military 
intervention by outside powers, including the US and Israel, in its neighborhood.222  
The evidence in the case study demonstrates that the Turkish-Iranian relations are 
not fundamentally strong. Turkey fears that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons could 
lead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Despite the government’s desire to 
maintain good relations with Iran for its economic and security interests, Turkey and Iran 
continue to be rivals, rather than close partners. The two states have fundamentally 
different political ideologies and different national and strategic interests. They have a 
different vision for the region unlike the relationship between Ankara and Washington or 
Brussels. Ankara and Tehran are on the opposing sides on major conflicts and bilateral 
tension is bound to erupt from time to time. Assad’s downfall would be a serious strategic 
blow to Iran and could result in the growth of Turkey’s influence. The sectarian conflict 
between the Shia and the Sunni has drawn Turkey and Iran into the Iraqi conflict as well 
as in Yemen on opposite sides.  
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The case study evidence demonstrates that the driving factors in Turkey’s pursuit 
of closer relations with Iran include maintaining a stable regional environment and its 
bilateral trade with Iran, particularly the flow of vital energy supplies.223 A political 
leadership, which is more comfortable with embracing Iran than the previous military 
establishment, and a public—including active business groups—which does not view 
Iran as a security threat and supports closer economic and cultural ties with a fellow 
Muslim country, have contributed to the expansion of Turkey’s relationship with Iran. 
 
  
	   	   	  






Turkish-Iraqi relations have been marked by tension over the Kurdish militants 
threatening Turkey’s security interests and scarce water resources. The Kurdish political 
entity in northern Iraq was considered one of the top threats against Turkey’s national 
unity because it was considered a direct extension of the PKK problem inside Turkey. 
Ankara’s Iraq policy has been a dilemma between its desire to obtain energy resources 
from Iraq and its security interests to root out the PKK havens across the border.224 In 
1977, Turkey launched the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) to meet its hydroelectric 
and irrigation needs by constructing more than twenty dams on the Tigris and Euphrates 
rivers, hurting downstream Iraq and causing a rupture in its relations with Baghdad.  
During the 1991 Gulf War, Turkish Government firmly allied with the US-led 
forces by securing its southeastern border with Iraq and served as a base from which the 
allied attacks were launched into the country. In April 1991, the Kurdish refugee crisis 
sparked by the war forced Ankara to reckon with the Kurdish “safe haven” in northern 
Iraq. After the Iraq War, the PKK militants continued to commit more attacks against the 
Turkish military and security forces from the mountainous Iraqi border, and the Turkish 
armed forces undertook a brief military incursion into northern Iraq in the spring of 1997. 
Turkey also suspended trade and energy relations with Iraq for the better part of two 
decades. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein criticized Turkey’s policy of permitting the US 
and British planes to use the Incirlik air base to strike Iraqi targets and reportedly allowed 
the PKK in 1998 to open an office in Baghdad.225 Iraq even threatened to attack Turkey 
in 1999 if Ankara continued to allow the US and Britain to use its territory to bomb 
	   	   	  




Hypothesis A: It states that the recent changes in Turkish foreign policy 
stemming from international and domestic level factors indicate a fundamental 
reorientation of Ankara’s foreign policy away from the US and the EU in favor of a 
completely autonomous regional power that would try to limit the Western influence in 
the Middle East.  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely oppose or confound the policies of its 
NATO allies, specifically the US and the EU, in Iraq and take a stance 
systematically at odds with the Western interests. 
Evidence:  
Turkey’s opposition to the Iraq War is usually cited as a prime example of Turkey 
abandoning the Western alliance. Turkish parliament voted in March 2003 to reject the 
US request to open a northern front in Turkey to launch its troops in Iraq. The “no” vote 
took Washington by surprise and harmed to the US-Turkish relations. Washington had to 
readjust its war plans; some even claimed the victory could have been achieved much 
faster with more lasting results had Turkey allowed the US forces to use its territory as it 
did in the first Gulf War.  
The US-Turkish relations were further damaged in July 2003 when the US army 
forces in northern Iraq detained eleven Turkish special forces commandos suspected of 
planning to participate in the assassination of a local Kurdish politician. The Turkish 
soldiers were released in forty-eight hours but they were photographed hooded and 
treated as prisoners by the US, causing an outcry in Turkey for injuring national pride. 
The Turkish General Staff spoke of “the worst crisis of confidence” between Ankara and 
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Washington for more than fifty years, and then Foreign Minister Gul warned, “this harm 
cannot be forgotten.”227 The Turks heavily criticized the US policies for creating an 
autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq that facilitated the PKK terrorist operations 
against Turkey.228 The unfounded perception that the US sided with the Kurds in Iraq at 
the expense of the Turkish security concerns deepened.229 These perceptions were 
pervasive among the Turkish public, leading to the rise of anti-Americanism in Turkey. A 
national survey carried out in Turkey in 2004 showed that one-third of those surveyed 
identified the US as “the greatest threat to the world peace.”230 
Prediction 2: Turkey would not share its Western allies’ vision for Iraq and 
its foreign policy initiatives in Iraq would exceed the bounds of what the US, the EU, 
and its other NATO partners consider acceptable.  
Evidence: 
The structural changes, such as Turkey’s relative economic and military power 
and the power vacuum in the Middle Eastern geopolitics in a multipolar world, have 
prepared a fertile ground for Turkey to pursue a more autonomous agenda and create its 
own sphere of influence. Turkey had some contentious exchanges with Iraq after the 
AKP came to power, including amassing of Turkish troops on its border with Iraq on 
several occasions since 2003. In 2007, Turkey began massing forces on the Iraqi border 
and declared that if Washington or the Iraqi Kurdish leaders did not rein in the PKK 
terrorists, the Turkish army would do it itself. The Turkish parliament voted 
overwhelmingly to authorize a military incursion into Iraq and the US opposed it fearing 
that it would destabilize the relatively peaceful part of Iraq. Following several PKK 
attacks that killed dozens of Turks, Turkey conducted a brief military incursion into 
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northern Iraq in February 2008. Moreover, the rise of the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) in 
Iraq and Syria in 2014 increased the Western criticism of Turkey for not doing enough to 
combat the terrorist group, calling into question Turkey’s NATO membership.231 
Prediction 3: Turkey would orient its trade towards non-Western trading 
blocs that try to limit the influence of the West in the region and it would reject or 
give up its pursuit of EU membership. 
Evidence: 
Turkey’s trade with Iraq, specifically northern Iraq, dramatically increased during 
this period together with increasing diplomatic engagement. In 2008, the Turkish special 
representative for Iraq made an official visit to the KRG and then Foreign Minister 
Davutoglu paid a visit to the KRG as a part of Ankara’s efforts to end its conflict with the 
PKK and establish closer cooperation on issues ranging from economic, strategic, and 
social programs. In 2009, Davutoglu met with KRG President Masud Barzani in Iraq. In 
that year, Turkey and the northern Iraq created the High-Level Strategic Cooperation 
Council, which included the signing of over forty major agreements between Turkey and 
Iraq, created a free trade area, and lifted visa requirements, all of which have been 
instrumental to further the regional integration. The two countries signed an MOU for 
Technical, Training and Scientific Cooperation, contributing to Iraq’s development and 
stability.232  
While trade with the Middle East increased during this period, the level of public 
support for EU membership declined mainly because of the perception that the EU used 
double-standards against Turkey.233 France, Greece and Cyprus closed several chapters of 
the accession criteria, Germany began floating the idea of “Privileged Partnership,” 
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which is short of membership, and the political discourse among the right-wing European 
politicians began to humiliate the Turks who began to lose enthusiasm for the 
membership.234 According to the German Marshall Fund’s 2010 Transatlantic Trends 
survey, the level of Turkish respondents who were still enthusiastic about EU 
membership dropped to 38 percent from 73 percent in 2004. Among the youth, the 
number opposed to EU membership dropped to 30.8 percent as the feelings have grown 
across Turkey that Europe has treated a successful Turkey with insufficient respect.235  
Hypothesis B: It states that recent changes in Turkish foreign policy resulting 
from international and domestic level factors demonstrate that while there is a significant 
change in the direction of autonomy, Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East does not 
represent a fundamental shift away from the West.  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely support or conform to the policies of its 
NATO allies, specifically the US and the EU, in Iraq. 
Evidence:  
Turkey had long-standing tension with Saddam’s Iraq but it also feared a military 
invasion in the country that would force Saddam out of power would open the Pandora’s 
box in Iraq, causing sectarian conflicts, increasing the PKK threat on Turkey’s border, 
and exacerbating regional instability.236 Turks vividly remember the devastating 
consequences of the first Gulf War, in which Ankara fully participated. According to 
Turks, this included supporting 450,000 Kurdish refugees in Turkey and over $35 billion 
in lost economic revenues to sanctions, and the PKK insurgency increased after the war. 
That’s why the Turks opposed a destabilizing military invasion, especially a unilateral 
one, in its neighborhood even though Ankara agreed with the West at the strategic level 
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that Saddam Hussein was a threat to the world peace.  
Ankara, prior to the war, made substantial efforts to thwart the war and maintain 
regional peace. It launched the Istanbul Declaration, bringing together six of Iraq’s 
neighbors, including Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, to head off a military 
attack on Baghdad.237 The EU convened a special summit on Iraq and the Middle East in 
February 2003 to agree on a common position in the crisis and acknowledged Turkey’s 
efforts at a peaceful solution to the problem with a declaration after the Summit.238 
Turkey’s lack of technical support for the Iraq war, stemming from its 
leadership’s opposition to a military conflict next door and strong public opinion against 
the conflict, is hardly unique. Many European countries also opposed the war, leading 
France to block a UNSC vote and forcing the US to take a unilateral action against Iraq 
without the UN backing. This division reflects some of the differences in policies among 
the NATO members towards the occupation of Iraq. The fact that France and Germany 
opposed the attack on Iraq in early 2003 probably also influenced the decision of the 
Turkish policymakers who consider their EU membership agenda a priority. 
Nevertheless, despite denying the use of the Turkish soil as a land base in 2003, 
Ankara allowed Washington to use the Turkish airbase at Incirlik to support military and 
logistical needs in Iraq and Afghanistan; the base has been particularly important for 
NATO and US power projection in the Middle East, including in the 1991 Iraq War. A 
subsequent Turkish Parliament vote in October 2003 approved the deployment of ten 
thousand Turkish troops to Iraq even though they were not deployed because of Kurdish 
fears of Turkey’s intentions in Iraq. The US later reportedly stationed Predator drones in 
Incirlik and sold three Super Cobra helicopters to Turkey.239 The AKP sought to work 
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closely with the military in security policy, especially as it relates to Iraq to avoid any 
disagreements. It also made efforts to eschew a direct confrontation with Washington 
since the fall of Saddam.240 Furthermore, Turkey stepped up its cooperation with the 
international community in the fight against ISIS despite its initial reluctance to get 
involved. It maintained, however, that the cross border operations into Syria and Iraq are 
mainly a defensive measure to avert a potential attack from these territories on Turkey.241 
Similar to the opposition to the Iraq War elsewhere, including those in the US, 
Turkish people’s strong opposition to the war, which played an important role in 
Ankara’s decision, was mainly the result of Turkey’s democratization efforts in the last 
decade. First, as a result of Turkey’s political transformation under the AKP government, 
which included extensive political reforms and restructuring of the judiciary and civil-
military relations, the military and the traditional bureaucracy saw its influence decline in 
the foreign policymaking.242 In 2013, a milestone law was approved by the Turkish 
parliament, rolling back the notorious Article 35 that provided justification for the 
military to intervene domestically in order to protect the Turkish homeland against 
domestic enemies, limiting the military’s domestic role. With the military taking the back 
seat before the crucial 1 March vote, it was clear that the classic triangle consisting of the 
prime minister, foreign ministry, and the military was no longer intact. 
Secondly, the Turkish Parliament, which was traditionally not a key player in 
Turkish foreign policy, was responsible for the decision to oppose the US plans and they 
were responsive to the public opinion.243 An overwhelming majority of the Turkish 
people strongly opposed the occupation of Iraq because they feared the war would have 
significant economic costs similar to the first Gulf War; the lack of a clear UN mandate 
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also reduced the legitimacy of the war in the eyes of Turkish people. Even back in 1991, 
the majority of the Turks had opposed the Turkish government’s support for the 
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, but their voice did not count as much back 
then and then President Ozal’s personal commitment had played a major role in Turkey’s 
participation. Turks also worried that a military invasion would have detrimental effects 
on regional stability, including a refugee crisis similar to the one in 1991, and could lead 
to an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq.244  
In the lead up to the crucial parliamentary vote, the government had actually 
negotiated with the US over how Turkey would be compensated for its cooperation so the 
“no” vote surprised the Americans and perhaps even the government. The parliament 
members had been besieged by phone calls, letters, and faxes from their constituencies, 
who were appealing for a “no-vote.” The opinion polls, the day before the vote, showed 
95 percent of the population was against a war in Iraq. On 1 March 2003, the day of 
voting, around 45,000 people demonstrated against a war on the streets of Ankara. The 
major opposition party, CHP, traditionally close to the military, was openly against 
allowing the US troops to transit; whereas a strong majority of AKP deputies followed 
Erdogan’s call to support the deal, all of the Kemalist CHP voted against it.245  
In the end, the incentives for joining, such as the reward of $6 billion grant that 
could have been leveraged into $24 billion in low cost loans and the right for Turkish 
troops to enter northern Iraq with the American troops did not diminish the strong 
opposition. Even though more deputies (264) voted in favor of the motion to approve US 
access than against (250), 19 abstentions meant that the motion did not receive the 
required majority of votes cast (267 of the 533 votes) and the motion failed.246 According 
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to the Transatlantic Survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund a year later, 71 
percent of the Turkish respondents approved the government’s decision not to send 
troops to Iraq and 72 percent disapproved President Bush’s handling of international 
policies. Similar to the trends in Europe, 88 percent of the Turks said the war in Iraq was 
not worth the loss of life and other costs. 
Prediction 2: Turkey would share its Western allies’ vision for Iraq and its 
foreign policy initiatives in Iraq would be acceptable to the US, the EU, and its other 
NATO partners. 
Evidence: 
Despite the spike in tension after Turkey’s vote, Turkish-American ties gradually 
began to improve because of the unity of vision between the two countries. Official visits 
started a year later with Erdogan’s visit to the US in January 2004 and a return visit by 
President Bush in June on the eve of the NATO Summit in Istanbul. Two years later, 
Secretary of State Rice and Foreign Minister Gul signed a conceptual document titled 
“Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish-American Strategic 
Partnership” that stressed the “strong bonds of friendship, alliance, mutual trust, unity of 
vision and shared set of values and ideas.”247 The advanced strategic partnership 
envisioned close bilateral cooperation on a wide range of areas, such as promoting peace 
and stability in the broader Middle East through democracy, fostering stability and 
prosperity in a unified Iraq, and countering terrorism, including the fight against the PKK 
and its affiliates.248  
In November 2007, Erdogan met Bush in Washington to discuss the unilateral 
operation that Turkey was going to carry out in northern Iraq and the meeting was fruitful 
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in resolving the problem as Bush characterized Turkey “America’s strategic partner” and 
designated the PKK as a common enemy of Iraq, Turkey and the United States. As a 
result, a tripartite coordination mechanism against the PKK was set up and the US 
promised to supply the Turkish armed forces with real time intelligence on the PKK 
bases and movements in the region.249 By December, after a series of violent PKK attacks 
that killed more than forty Turkish civilians and soldiers, Washington had abandoned its 
opposition to Turkish cross-border operations and backed Ankara as Turkey undertook 
air strikes and raids on PKK positions in northern Iraq.250 President Gul’s visit in January 
2008 included discussions on various aspects of regional cooperation, including energy 
projects and the situation in Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq. Despite the high-level political 
interaction, however, Bush’s tenure marked the lowest support among the Turkish public 
for US policies with a 12 percent of the Turks favoring Washington’s recent policies 
when Bush left office in 2008.251  
President Obama’s major foreign policy priorities included a declarative 
document that included “Restoring the Strategic Partnership with Turkey” where “a close 
relationship with a stable, democratic, Western-oriented Republic of Turkey” was defined 
as “an important US national interest.”252 President Obama’s visit to Turkey in April 
2009 on his first overseas visit after the elections, his efforts to revise the Bush legacy in 
the US-Turkey relations, and his use of the term “model partnership” in describing the 
Turkish-American relations generated a lot of goodwill in Ankara’s eyes.253  
The Turkish-US relations received a boost as the AKP’s new policy towards the 
Kurds reduced the tension between Ankara and Irbil. Since Washington would prefer to 
see Turkey, rather than Iran, as the most influential neighbor to Iraq, Ankara and 
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Washington’s interests in the region began to converge.254 Ironically, the AKP 
government’ new political approach, known as the “Kurdish opening” or “Democratic 
opening” to solve Turkey’s PKK problem and remove the armed aspect of the Kurdish 
question led some in Turkey to accuse the AKP of putting into practice a US plan that 
allegedly aims to divide Turkey.255 However, the US military withdrawal from Iraq 
removed another source of tension and gave Turkey a greater incentive to cooperate with 
Washington to influence the developments in Iraq,256 leading to an improvement of 
bilateral relations in recent years. 
Despite some tension with the Central Iraq due to Ankara’s close ties with the 
KRG, Turkey’s vision for a secure, stable, and economically prosperous Iraq is 
completely in line with the interests of the EU and the US. After the invasion, Ankara 
tried to play a productive role in Iraq, except for a 2008 incursion to root out Kurdish 
terrorists. By the mid-2000s, Turks’ traditional perception of “insecurity” towards 
northern Iraq changed and the Turkish-Iraqi relations, especially with the KRG, have 
improved considerably since 2008. Turkish Government acknowledged that the Kurdish 
problem could not be solved by military force alone and began to view it as a major 
opportunity rather than a threat to the Turkish state. The contacts between Turkish civil 
society and business organizations and the Iraqi leaders contributed to the stability in 
northern Iraq. Ankara became an important partner in the reconstruction, economic 
development, and territorial integrity of the country in line with the US policy. 257  
Despite being Sunni, Ankara mostly refrained from playing a sectarian card in 
Iraq but rather sought to maintain the sectarian balance by developing ties with various 
Sunni and Shiite Arab groups in Iraq.258 It facilitated the process of bringing together the 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
116	  
Iraqi Sunni groups and the US authorities in Iraq, contributing to attempts to convince the 
Sunni groups to participate in the 2005 Iraqi elections.259 Davutoglu visited Irbil and 
Baghdad in 2010 to persuade various ethnic and sectarian groups to solve their problems 
in order to overcome the government crisis.260 In 2012, Ankara worked to overcome 
sectarian divisions in Iraq by inviting the Iraqi Sunni and Shiite leaders to Istanbul for a 
conference to seek political reconciliation and establish dialog mechanisms, but the 
conference never came together. Two months later, the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC), under the Turkish leadership, worked to reinvigorate the Mecca 
agreement of 2006 in which the Iraqi factions and political parties agreed to an OIC-led 
plan to end the political violence.  
Since the advent of the Arab Spring, Turkey has played a major role in trying to 
promote stability and democratic values in the Middle East. Turkey emerged as the de 
facto protector of the Iraqi Kurds, the most pro-American element of the Iraqi population, 
against the Shiite-dominated government of the prime minister and its Iranian backers. 
Turkish government supported—though viewed skeptically by the Kemalist 
opposition261—the United States’ Greater Middle East Initiative while stressing that the 
reforms should come from within the region and not be imposed from outside. This 
stance is very much in line with the attitude of the Europeans. In 2009, Turkey, Iraq, and 
the US established a trilateral mechanism to coordinate actions against the PKK; a year 
later, Turkey opened a Turkish consulate in the region. Then Turkish Prime Minister 
Erdogan, accompanied by the ministers of Energy and Foreign Affairs, visited Irbil in 
2011 and emphasized Turkey was ending its policy of denying the presence of the Kurds. 
The US and the EU welcomed Turkey’s constructive approach toward the KRG. 
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Secretary of State Rice said Turkey has built a bridge with Iraqi Kurds despite the 
undeniable problems that persist, and the European Commission’s consecutive progress 
report acknowledged Turkey’s efforts towards achieving national reconciliation, security, 
and peace in Iraq.  
In addition to bilateral cooperation on trade, energy and transportation, which will 
be discussed below, Turkey has also been training the Iraqi security forces, organizing 
seminars for the Iraqi political parties, diplomats, media representatives, and health 
personnel. It hosted an enlarged meeting of Iraq’s neighboring countries to support 
national reconciliation and stabilization in the country. According to Fuller, Turkey’s 
quest for EU membership and desire to maintain good relations with US policies place at 
least as much of a constraint on Turkish freedom of action in northern Iraq because 
Ankara is well aware that the EU would not tolerate any military intervention by 
Turkey.262  
Turkey’s warmer approach toward Iraq is mainly the result of several trends in 
Turkey including democratization efforts—which changed the foreign policy institutions 
and the tools—the leadership’s vision—that changed the foreign policy approach—and 
the economic factors, which will be explained in the next section.263 As the military lost 
its privileged role on foreign affairs and security issues, its hard power approach was 
replaced by a more balanced and pragmatic strategy, giving priority to economic interests 
and soft power.264 At the same time, the Kemalist state elite that shaped Turkish foreign 
policy since the end of World War II was replaced by a more conservative, religious, and 
nationalist elite that has a more positive attitude toward Turkey’s Ottoman past.265 
Turkey’s “reengagement” with the Middle East, including Iraq, has been greatly 
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facilitated by the AKP’s historical memory and ideas about Turkey’s place in the region. 
Relations with Iraq is a priority in the new foreign policy vision of Ahmet Davutoglu, 
who has been the main architect of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, first as the 
chief advisor to the prime minister, then as the foreign minister, and currently as the 
prime minister. Davutoglu’s ideology goes beyond economic integration; he envisions 
Turkey pursuing a value-based foreign policy based on universal values of human rights, 
democracy, good governance, transparency, and rule of law.266 President Obama’s three 
major principles of foreign policy—dialogue, multilateralism, and engagement—fit well 
with Turkey’s new foreign policy vision.267 
Davutoglu argues that Turkey’s Middle East policy should be based on four 
principles: providing common security for the whole region, giving priority to dialogue to 
solve crises, economic interdependence, and cultural coexistence. In 2007, Turkey 
initiated the “Extended Neighboring Countries of Iraq” based on the principle of common 
security and dialogue. It internationalized the Iraq issue by promoting its management 
within the framework of the UN together with the involvement of regional powers. In a 
2009 visit to Baghdad, then Foreign Minister Davutoglu said, “we do not only see Iraq as 
a friend and a neighbor but a great partner that we will shape our future with and a 
country which we should integrate with.” Turkey’s slogan for Iraq was “common destiny, 
common history, common future.” By the end of 2000s, Turkey was holding joint cabinet 
meetings with Iraq, where the two sides debated possibilities for further integration. 
Prediction 3: Turkey’s bilateral trade would increase with both Iraq and the 
Western countries. Turkey would seek greater integration with Iraq but it would 
also pursue EU membership and closer economic ties with the US. 
	   	   	  




In parallel with the diplomatic and political developments, Turkey’s economic 
relations with northern Iraq have also boomed, creating economic interdependence along 
the border. Bilateral trade with Iraq is important for Turkey’s energy security and export 
sector. Turkey’s role in the Iraqi economy is also significant as a provider of agricultural 
produce and consumer goods, as a source of water, as a consumer of Iraqi oil, and as a 
transit point for the export of Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean. Growing economic ties with 
Irbil helped Ankara soften its political approach to the KRG and build more cooperative 
relations with Irbil, contributing to the stability and economic development in northern 
Iraq, an important Western policy objective. 
Turkey’s trade volume with Iraq, including exports and imports, increased from 
non-existent in 2002 to $12 billion in 2013 (see figure 6) and Iraq was Turkey’s second-
largest export partner in 2013 following Germany.268 Turkish private sector has invested 
large sums into the KRG and is the single most dominant economic force there. As much 
as 80 percent of the FDI in northern Iraq comes from Turkey and northern Iraq is an 
important market, where 48 percent out of the 2,300 foreign companies are Turkish, 
making investment that exceeded 700 million in 2013.269270 Turkish construction firms 
have already carried out dozens of modern high-profile projects, including the 
construction of Kurdistan’s “presidential” palace in Irbil, television networks, 
international airports, universities, bridges, highways, and urban infrastructure. The 
Turkish Airlines maintains regular flights to Kurdish cities in Iraq,271 and around 50,000 
Turkish citizens work in northern Iraq, primarily in the construction sector. Khalid Salih, 
Chief Advisor of the Prime Minister of the Regional Administration, expressed his 
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gratitude for Turkish investment in northern Iraq in 2009 by stating that, “we would like 
to see Turkey as an investor in our region. We are ready to give any support needed.”  
Figure 6: Turkey’s Total Trade (Exports + Imports) with Iraq since 1998272 
 
Iraq also contributes to Turkey’s energy security; it is Turkey’s second-largest oil 
supplier, accounting for 17 percent in 2012.273 The Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline, 
which has been operational since 2009 and can reach a total capacity of 71 million tons 
annually, is the only functioning oil pipeline from the Middle East to Turkey.274 When 
the KRG began providing various foreign companies with licenses to dig for oil in 
northern Iraq,275276 Turkish State Company Turkish Petroleum (TPAO) was awarded 50 
percent ownership for development, production and services in Siba and Mansuriah,277 
and $318 million service contract to drill 45 wells in Iraq’s supergiant Rumaila oilfield.278 
TPAO is active in Maisan with a 15 percent share, in Badra with a 10 percent share, and 
in the form of a 2008 MOU to explore for gas.279 Turkey also supplies the region’s 
electricity.280 During a 2012 visit to Ankara, KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani met 
with then President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan, as well as Turkish 
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Energy Minister Yilmaz, and the discussions on the opening of two more border gates, 
and joint oil and gas explorations in the oil-rich northern Iraq dominated the meeting.281 
In January 2015, Turkey and Iraq signed new protocols and agreements on oil, natural 
gas and electricity following the visit of Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister 
to Baghdad.282 
As in the case of Iran, the business lobby groups have been influential on the 
foreign policymaking as the business elite began to explore economic and financial 
opportunities in the neighboring countries, and backed the state in its efforts to stabilize 
the region for the sake of their business interests. The weight and influence of these 
bilateral economic relations increased with the powerful ties between the Iraqi Kurds and 
major actors on Turkey’s political front; major opposition parties, including Turkey’s 
anti-Kurdish nationalist party, are also linked with families and corporations that have 
economic interests in northern Iraq.283  
Institutionally, these business associations can affect Turkish foreign policy in 
two ways. First, they create platforms for interaction with the state by bringing together 
business community members and policymakers in large-scale international business 
events or trade summits, and by facilitating business participation in state leaders’ official 
visits, thereby creating opportunities for direct contacts with policymakers. Second, these 
business associations, especially the DEIK, are represented in the Joint Economic 
Commission meetings, which are held on a bilateral inter-governmental basis with 
foreign countries and they directly contribute to policy formulation.284 The business 
associations’ mobilization behind the policies formulated by the state serves to provide 
greater legitimacy to the policies, contributing to higher trade and investment figures. In a 
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2004 interview, Davutoglu, then an advisor to Prime Minister Erdogan, acknowledged 
that Turkey’s economic interdependence as a result of its export-led growth model, which 
requires outreach to new markets for national products and essential inputs, renders the 
business community a central driver for policy choices.285 
The volume of the bilateral Turkish-Iraqi trade is a phenomenal increase, but 
when compared to the trade volume Turkey has with the EU, it barely makes it to the 
chart (see figure 7). While Turkey runs around $6 billion trade deficit with the United 
States, almost 98 percent of the trade with Iraq constitutes Turkey’s exports to Iraq, 
easing Turkey’s trade deficit. Even though the increase in Turkish-US trade—which rose 
from $6 billion in 2002 to $18 billion in 2013—has not been as dramatic due to a variety 
of factors, including the global financial crisis, geographic distance, and the explicit US 
laws limiting defense trade, there is a high potential for increasing US-Turkey trade 
especially in military goods. The US has traditionally been the leading supplier of 
defense goods and services to Turkey, which persisted despite the end of formal security 
assistance. The Turkish military has a strong preference for US technology but the 
unpredictability of US arms export policies, which have linked defense trade to Turkey’s 
policy on Cyprus and human rights concerns, led Turkey to diversify its defense-




Figure 7: Turkey’s Total Trade (Exports + Imports) with Iraq in Comparison to its 
Trade with EU and US286 
	   	   	  





The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Turkey’s policy in Iraq, 
northern Iraq in particular, does not indicate a fundamental reorientation away from the 
Western alliance. Turkey’s “no” vote on the Iraqi invasion, which borne out of strong 
public opposition to the war as was the case in Europe and elsewhere, was one of the 
most cited examples supporting the claim that “Turkey is abandoning the West.” 
However, Turkey’s lack of tactical support for a destabilizing military invasion in its 
neighborhood does not reflect Turkey’s divergence in strategic vision or interests from its 
Western allies on Iraq.  
Following the war, Turkey has been a helpful ally for the US policy towards Iraq 
not just for refraining from destabilizing Iraq but also for contributing to political stability 
and economic development in Iraq as well as to the peace and prosperity in the region. 
Turkey’s policy goals and vision for the region have mostly been in line with the policies 
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seeks to elevate Turkey’s status as a regional player with both political and economic 
power, but it also desires to create a stable and prosperous region that is economically 
interdependent with which Turkey can trade and maintain close diplomatic relationship. 
The US and the EU have an interest in Turkey’s closer ties with northern Iraq because it 
would serve as a stabilizing force, contribute to the viability of the government, and aid 
in its economic development, especially by facilitating the transportation of northern Iraqi 
oil and other goods to the West.287  
Turkey’s foreign policy in Iraq highlights the importance of political leadership, 
public opinion, and business interests, factors that gained greater influence on foreign 
policymaking during the transformation of the past decade. Turkey’s new leaders 
envision a new role for Turkey at the center, not at the periphery, a new regional order 
with politically stable and economically viable countries that have no conflict with 
Turkey, and they desire to raise Turkey’s economic status to join the ranks of the top ten 
economies in the world. These goals are in line with the desires of the public and the 
businesses; despite occasional policy disagreements with the West on tactical level, these 
goals are largely consistent with the interests of Turkey’s Western allies and international 
norms.   
	   	   	  





Before 2002:  
Since Turkey’s independence, Turkish-Syrian relations have been strained by 
tension resulting from several long-standing disputes. First is an entrenched dispute over 
the province of Hatay (Alexandretta), which France ceded to Turkey in 1939 and Syria 
claimed to be a part of its territory until recently. Second is Syria’s implacable opposition 
to Turkey’s control over the Euphrates waters; Syria, as a downstream nation always 
claimed water rights to parts of the Euphrates River that flows through Turkey.288 Third, 
the Kurdish separatist movement in southeastern Anatolia has also historically plagued 
the Turkish-Syrian relations. From the inception of the violence, Turkey consistently 
argued that Syria was the organization’s major backer, and accused Damascus of 
supporting the PKK to leverage this “water controversy” while Syria accused Ankara of 
violating Syria’s water rights with the development of dams for the Southeastern Anatolia 
Project.289  
Bilateral relations deteriorated further in the late 1990s when Syria sought to 
overcome the impasse over the water issues by openly supporting the PKK and signed a 
Defense Cooperation Agreement with Greece, agreeing to allow the Greek aircraft to use 
its air bases in a conflict with Turkey in 1995. In turn, Turkey signed defense cooperation 
agreements with Israel to coerce Syria into dropping its support for the PKK. In that year, 
Syria, Egypt, and the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council met in Syria and issued 
the Damascus Declaration criticizing Turkey’s water policies.290 In early 1998, Syrian 
Ambassador to the US raised the sensitive issue of the province of Hatay and Turkish 
authorities protested at what they considered to be an irredentist claim from Syria 
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directed at Turkey’s territorial integrity. In September 1998, Turkish Chief of General 
Staff argued that because of Syrian support for the PKK, there actually was an undeclared 
war going on between Turkey and Syria. The Turkish-Syrian tension reached a crisis 
point in October 1998 when Turkey threatened to invade Syria if Damascus did not cease 
supporting the PKK. Syria gave into the threat, expelling the PKK leader Ocalan and 
closing the PKK training camps. 
Hypothesis A: It states that the recent changes in Turkish foreign policy 
stemming from international and domestic level factors indicate a fundamental 
reorientation of Ankara’s foreign policy away from the US and the EU in favor of a 
completely autonomous regional power that would try to limit the Western influence in 
the Middle East.  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely oppose or confound the policies of its 
NATO allies, specifically the US and the EU, in Syria and take a stance 
systematically at odds with the Western interests. 
Evidence: 
Turkish rapprochement with Syria in the mid-2000s was not in line with the US 
policy to isolate Damascus.291 Syrian President Bashar al-Assad visited Ankara in 
January 2004—the first trip by a Syrian president since its independence in 1946—and 
the Syrian leadership recognized the international legal framework accepting Turkish 
borders and Iraq’s territorial integrity.292 In December 2004, then Prime Minister 
Erdogan reciprocated by visiting Damascus to resolve the border disputes with Syria and 
sign a bilateral free-trade agreement.293 Turkish president visited Syria also in 2005 at a 
time when Syria was under American and European pressure to withdraw its troops from 
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Lebanon. A Turkish observer noted that Turkey’s clearing of the nearly 450-mile long, 
1500-foot wide minefield, which was planted at the height of the Cold War in 1952 
between the two countries, is the best evidence of Ankara’s changing attitude towards 
Damascus.294 
With the rise of the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) in 2014, Turkey received 
criticism from the West for not doing enough to combat the terrorist group as it swept 
across Syria and Iraq and seized nearly half of the strategic border town of Kobani. 
Turkey's reluctance to join the anti-ISIS alliance unless it establishes a no-fly zone and a 
safe haven on the Syrian side of the border and air strikes are extended to include targets 
linked to the regime of the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, strained relations with its 
NATO allies.295296 
Prediction 2: Turkey would not share its Western allies’ vision for Syria and 
its foreign policy initiatives in Syria would exceed the bounds of what the US, the 
EU, and its other NATO partners consider acceptable.  
Evidence: 
Turkey pursued closer diplomatic and economic ties with Syria when the US 
characterized the country as a “rogue state” and tried to isolate it diplomatically and 
economically. The number of Turkish tourists to Syria increased from almost nothing in 
the late 1990s to nearly 250,000 in 2007. Even when the Arab Spring-sparked protests 
took hold and the West began to shun Damascus, Turkey had maintained communication 
with Syria, placing Ankara at odds with the Western policy and leading the international 
media to condemn Turkey’s lack of respect for international norms.  
Prediction 3: Turkey would orient its trade towards non-Western trading 
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blocs that try to limit the influence of the West in the region and it would reject or 
give up its pursuit of EU membership. 
Evidence: 
Turkey’s increased economic ties with its southern neighbors, including Syria, in 
the mid-2000s is often highlighted as Turkey giving up on EU membership, especially 
because of Turkey’s efforts to include Syria in the free trade area in the region. In 2004, 
then Prime Minister Erdogan traveled to Syria, where he signed economic and security 
agreements, followed by a presidential visit. In 2006, Ankara and Damascus agreed to 
establish a free-trade zone and the countries established a joint company for oil 
exploration.297 Between 2005 and 2007, the Syrian authorities approved more than thirty 
Turkish investment projects in the country with a total value of over $150 million.  
Bilateral trade significantly increased after the Free Trade Agreement that went 
into effect in 2007 (see figure 8). Then Prime Minister Erdogan defined Turkey’s 
initiative to create a free trade zone and remove visa requirement between Turkey, Syria, 
Jordan, and Lebanon as the “Samgen” process (Sam means Damascus in Turkish), 
implying a Turkish desire to establish an EU-like institution in the Middle East with 
Turkey in the leading position.298 These four countries desiring closer economic and 
cultural integration formed the “Levant Quartet” in December 2010. Davutoglu described 
the lifting of visa restrictions as “the first step of turning economic cooperation into 
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Figure 8: Turkey’s Total Trade (Exports + Imports) with Syria since 1998299 
 
Hypothesis B: It states that recent changes in Turkish foreign policy resulting 
from international and domestic level factors demonstrate that while there is a significant 
change in the direction of autonomy, Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East does not 
represent a fundamental shift away from the West. Specifically:  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely support or conform to the policies of its 
NATO allies, specifically the US and the EU, in Syria. 
Evidence: 
Turkey’s independent and controversial policy of embracing Syria after the AKP 
came to power had its limits. Even though its initial policy toward Syria was at odds with 
the US policy, Ankara made a 180-degree turn when the violence erupted in the country, 
bringing its policy closer to the Western line and showed that Turkey is still bound by its 
responsibilities as a NATO member.300 When the turmoil in Syria began, Turkey’s initial 
response was to try to convince the Assad regime to reform. Then Foreign Minister 
Davutoglu visited Damascus over 60 times since 2003. Assad repeatedly made 
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personal promises to both Davutoglu and Erdogan, who had embraced him as a 
“brother,” but failed to deliver. As Damascus began suppressing public protests, Erdogan 
responded angrily to what he felt was a personal betrayal by stating that Turkey had lost 
all trust and confidence in the Syrian leadership and Ankara began to take a harder stance 
against the Assad regime. It lent military and logistical support to external, armed 
opposition forces, such as the Syrian National Council of resistance, which took up 
residence in Turkey.301 Ankara began to apply the sanctions that the EU had imposed 
beforehand, closed the land border with Syria, and provided safe haven for not only the 
non-violent opposition movements, but also the Free Syrian Army.302  
Turkey stopped short of a direct military action, however, and initially 
discouraged western-armed intervention.303 External factors such as the Arab Spring that 
took hold in the Arab countries played a major role in changing Turkish foreign policy 
towards Syria. In the face of the impasse in Syria, Ankara increasingly felt it must “go 
with the tide of history” in the uprising, as it did towards the developments in the other 
countries of the Arab Spring, and worked to hasten Assad’s collapse. Turkey’s reaction 
actually went beyond the Western reaction in ending the Assad regime; it began 
facilitating heavier arming of the Syrian opposition with external weapons sources and 
urged the West to do the same.  
However, as Turkey swung to the other side of the pendulum, the West began to 
scale down its position and dropped its plans for outright military action to remove 
Assad. This change in Western policy once again left Ankara increasingly isolated in the 
project of removing Assad from power. Furthermore, the AKP faced growing domestic 
opposition to its Syrian policies as the Syrian refugee flow into Turkey reached 1 million 
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in 2014.304 When asked whether they would support military intervention in Syria in 
2013, 72 percent of Turkish people said Turkey should stay out entirely, a 15-percentage 
point increase from 2012, similar to the opposition from the EU and the US at 72 percent 
and 62 percent, respectively. At that point, Turkey also scaled down its ambitions in line 
with the Western policy, though it maintained the rhetoric about its desire to end the 
Assad regime. In a 2012 downing of a Turkish reconnaissance plane, possibly by a Syrian 
anti-aircraft fire, Turkish government decided to invoke the Article 4 in the NATO treaty, 
which provides for urgent consultations if a member considers its security interests are 
threatened. Turkey secured a very favorable NATO statement condemning Syria’s action 
and expressing strong support for Turkey. As Russia and China blocked strong UN 
Security Council actions against Syria, the interests of Ankara and Washington began to 
converge.305  
Turkey’s reluctance to get involved in the ISIS is a tactical difference in approach 
rather than in strategic vision. Turkey vehemently condemns the ISIS—Erdogan likened 
it to cancer in the Muslim community—and wants to root out the ISIS terrorists. 
However, Ankara argues that the root cause of the problem lies within the Syrian regime 
and the regime’s violent suppression of the people provided breathing room for terrorists, 
leading to the creation of the ISIS. Thus, Turkey insisted that the coalition forces should 
first establish a no-fly zone and a safe haven on the Syrian side of the border and air 
strikes should include targets linked to the Syrian regime. Turkey did step up its 
cooperation with the international community on the ISIS further, but it maintained that 
the cross border operations into Syria and Iraq would be mainly a defensive measure to 
avert an attack from these territories on Turkey because direct involvement in Syria 
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would have been politically unpopular especially before the June 2015 elections.306 
Turkey is more vulnerable to a spill over from the crisis than the other allies because it 
shares a 900 km border with Syria, experiences regular direct spill over from the conflict, 
and it also risks retaliation from the ISIS, which has a network inside Turkey. For 
example, an ISIS attack on Turkish tourist resorts would devastate Turkey’s tourist 
economy, which accounts for 10 percent of its national economy. 	  
Despite refusing to give unconditional support to the efforts that do not include 
the removal of Assad, Turkey allowed the use of its air space, opened up humanitarian 
assistance corridors to northern Syria, and cooperated with the allies on information 
sharing. Ankara has also contributed to the international humanitarian efforts by 
accepting the Syrian refugees; it claims to have taken nearly 1 million Syrian refugees so 
far and it bears the bulk of the burden in terms of their necessities.307 The October 2014 
motion at the parliament gave permission for cross-border military operations into Iraq 
and Syria and for foreign troop deployments on Turkish soil, allowing the US-led 
coalition to use its territory to launch attacks. The US and Turkey signed a deal to train 
and equip moderate Syrian rebels as a part of a program that aims to prepare at least 
5,000 rebels a year to fight against ISIS.308309  
Prediction 2: Turkey would share its Western allies’ vision for Syria and its 
foreign policy initiatives in Syria would be acceptable to the US, the EU, and its 
other NATO partners. 
Evidence: 
Even though Washington and Brussels had disagreements with Ankara for 
maintaining its close relations with Syria as the protests broke out and later for strongly 
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advocating military action against Syria when the regime began to kill people en masse, 
both the Western countries and Turkey have the same vision for Syria; they both desire a 
stable, economically prosperous, and democratic Syria that is at peace with its neighbors 
and that can contribute to the regional security. Turkey believed closer ties with 
Damascus would help Ankara, at least until the violence broke out, to nudge Syria 
towards greater reform and compliance with the Western demands such as ceasing 
support for terrorist networks in the region and improving relations with Israel. For 
example, during the 2005 meetings in Damascus, then Foreign Minister Gul and 
President Sezer emphasized the need for domestic reform, argued for the withdrawal of 
the Syrian forces from Lebanon and sought assurance that the international terrorists do 
not enter Iraq from the Syrian territory.310  
Turkey had also made significant efforts to improve its relations with Syria prior 
to the Arab Spring. After the signing of Adana Accords in 1998, Syria had closed down 
the PKK training camps and both countries agreed to establish a direct phone link and 
appoint special representatives for diplomatic missions. Starting in 2003, Davutoglu 
began to court Syria, pulled troops back from the borders, removed the vast minefields in 
the border regions, lifted visa requirements, and opened up the country to increased trade. 
Between 1999 and 2010, 51 protocols were signed on trade, development, and cultural 
exchanges based on the slogan of “common destiny, history and future.”311 Davutoglu 
said, “we must respect the borders between us but we also have to diminish the meaning 
of those borders and build new regional orders. Have there ever been as many wars 
between Turks and Arabs as there have been between France and Germany? If those two 
countries are erasing their borders without it being considered some kind of imposed 
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hegemony, why should it be different in our case? Our economic and cultural borders 
will extend beyond our political borders, but this is a function of geography, it’s not some 
kind of hegemony.”312  
Turkey’s foreign policy initiatives to promote peace in the region by acting as a 
mediator until the violence broke out in Syria, reinforce the Western interests and values 
in the region. Turkey also sought to mediate between Syria and Israel, and Syria and 
Iraq.313 Ankara made significant efforts to broker Syrian-Israeli dialogue beginning in 
2004. Four rounds of indirect talks were ultimately held, but claimed Israel’s Operation 
Cast Lead in Gaza cut off the fifth round. Even though the mediation brought no results 
in resolving the conflict, it showed Turkey as a trustworthy player in the region both to 
the Arabs and to Israel until 2009.  
Turkey played a mediator role in Syria’s troubled relations with Iraq after a series 
of bombs exploded in Baghdad’s Green Zone in 2009. The Maliki government blamed 
the Syrian government for the bombings, held Damascus responsible for supporting 
terrorist activities and destabilizing Iraq, and recalled the Iraqi ambassador. Davutoglu 
traveled to Baghdad and Damascus to communicate their message to each other. In the 
period that followed, Turkey brought the foreign ministers of Iraq and Syria together in 
Istanbul. Turkey not only mediated the crisis, it also invited both countries to establish a 
tripartite border security mechanism aimed at combating the PKK, al-Qaeda, and the 
Ba’athist forces in Iraq.314 Turkey again attempted to mediate between the Syrians and 
Saudis over a micro-crisis involving the quasi-cancellation of a state visit by the king of 
Saudi Arabia to Syria in September 2009 due to tensions between Damascus and Riyadh. 
With the help of Turkey’s last minute interventions, the visit took place in October 2009. 
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Syrian President al-Assad said in an interview that it had “full trust in Turkey,” and 
believed that Turkey could “speak for them.”315 
Turkey even worked with the EU as a channel for a Syrian-EU dialog. The EU 
saw Damascus as a possible key to future peace settlement and liberal economic change 
in the Middle East; Ankara and the EU shared a vision that economic openings in the 
Middle Eastern states could lead inevitably towards a gradual liberalization of the 
political order and encouraged Syria to develop new economic and legal institutions in 
conformity with EU trade practices. Davutoglu participated in then French President 
Sarkozy’s meeting with Assad, Javier Solana, and the EU High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security, in Damascus in January 2009. During the joint press 
conference of Sarkozy and Assad, Sarkozy expressed his appreciation for Davutoglu’s 
active contribution to the process.316 According to the progress report of 2006 for Turkey, 
the level o harmonization of Turkey with the EU in terms of foreign and security policy 
stood around 96 percent. The report mentioned Turkey’s participation in the UN, NATO, 
and EU-led operations and highlighted the examples of harmonization in the policies 
towards Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan as positive developments.317 On 
Syria, Turkey seems to be more closely following the EU line,318 since the EU’s policy 
towards Syria differs from that of the US, which branded Syria as a “rogue state.”  
Turkey’s foreign policy in Syria was heavily influenced by Davutoglu’s new 
vision for Turkey’s role in the Middle East. Davutoglu defined the historical tense 
relations with Syria as a costly luxury for the two states that share such a long common 
border, pointing to major opportunities awaiting vigorous bilateral development, mostly 
in water, agriculture, trade, and communications. Davutoglu’s “zero problems with 
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neighbors” principle, which aims to erase the perception of a country “surrounded by 
enemies” that had permeated the Turkish psychology and become the bedrock of the 
security state. Davutoglu sharply challenged the traditional security-based and western 
“realist” school of Turkish foreign policy that holds nation states are driven primarily by 
“interests and threats posed by enemies.” He tried to resolve existing bilateral disputes 
with neighbors, exemplified by its efforts to launch high-level political dialogue with 
Syria and build stronger ties with the KRG in Iraq. He sought to court different alliances 
to avoid overdependence on any single alliance and prioritize dialogue and cooperation 
over coercion and confrontation.  
Davutoglu’s policy also envisions creating economic interdependence with the 
surrounding countries, which has been instrumental in Turkey’s pursuit of economic 
relations with the Middle Eastern countries. By establishing interdependence in the 
region through free movement of goods and people, Davutoglu’s expectation is not only 
the creation of a venue for Turkey’s exports and business activities but also the 
achievement of regional peace.319320 Since the second half of 2009, Turkey established 
high-level strategic council meetings with Syria where bilateral political, economic and 
security issues were discussed and abolished visa requirements with Syria.  
Davutoglu’s principle on the balance between security and democracy helps 
explain Ankara’s changing foreign policy in Syria that seemed inconsistent to many in 
the outside world. According to Davutoglu, Turkey pursued a three-stage diplomacy in 
Syria based on security concerns and respect for freedom. It first initiated bilateral 
engagement with the regime and worked hard to convince it to introduce reforms. When 
it could not convince the administration to stop the violence and implement reforms, 
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Ankara severed ties with the Baath regime. In late April 2012, then Foreign Minister 
Davutoğlu said, "peace and stability can be restored in Syria, not with the Baath regime 
but with a new political system which takes its legitimacy from the people.’321322After 
September 2013, Turkey launched a regional initiative in concert with the Arab League to 
resolve the conflict; when that failed, it moved to the international stage and supported 
the resolution presented to the UNSC, which was vetoed by Russia and China. After the 
failure of a UNSC resolution and a range of initiatives that demanded President Assad to 
delegate his authority, Ankara amplified its anti-Assad rhetoric and has been at the center 
of humanitarian efforts and arming the Free Syrian Army.  
Prediction 3: Turkey’s bilateral trade would increase with both Syria and the 
Western countries. Turkey would seek greater integration with Syria but it would 
also pursue EU membership and closer economic ties with the US. 
Evidence: 
Turkey’s trade ties with Syria increased during the AKP’s tenure, consistent with 
the overall increase in trade from $1 billion in 2002 to $2.5 billion in 2010, but the 
bilateral trade also declined back to where it originally was at $1 billion in 2013 after the 
turmoil in Syria, reflecting the deteriorating diplomatic relations between the two 
countries.323 Around 94 percent of Turkey’s trade with Syria was Turkish exports, 
including agricultural products, machinery and consumer goods, contributing to Turkey’s 
current account surplus. Turkey viewed Syria as a gateway for Turkish goods to the Gulf 
and Syria saw Turkey as a gateway to the EU.324 
Turkey’s politically active business associations also played a role in increasing 
trade and investment in Syria by actively participating in trade negotiations and in the 
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promotion of other contacts with their Middle Eastern counterparts. Most of AKP’s state 
visits began to be organized by the business community and many businessmen 
accompanied state leaders at their official visits. Turkey’s increased investment in Syria 
could explain its initial intransigence to follow the Western lead in criticizing Syria’s 
domestic policy, providing Ankara with disincentives to sever ties with Damascus. 
Even when the bilateral trade was at its peak, the trade volume between Turkey 
and Syria was still minimal compared to Turkey’s trade with the EU and to a lesser extent 
the US. (see figure 9). When Turkey reversed its policy of seeking economic 
interdependence with Syria, the bilateral trade tumbled and free trade regime was 
annulled. Ankara imposed sanctions, which includes a 30 percent tax on products coming 
from Syria, a freeze of Syrian government assets in Turkey, and a ban on financial 
transactions with Syria’s Central Bank, to the detriment of Turkish businesses. 
Figure 9: Turkey’s Total Trade (Exports + Imports) with Syria in Comparison to its 
























United	  States	   EU	   Syria	  
	   	   	  





The evidence on Turkey’s foreign policy in Syria highlights the challenges 
stemming from the Arab Spring to Turkey’s regional policy of pursuing close diplomatic 
and economic ties with neighboring countries. It also showcases some differences in the 
way Ankara and the US approaches to change a regime that is difficult to deal with. 
Turkey’s initial approach to Syria, which was to keep close diplomatic, political, and 
economic ties and use that leverage to nudge Damascus toward reform, differed from the 
containment policy of the West, particularly the US, Israel, and to a lesser extent the EU. 
Ankara thought it could replicate the policies it pursued elsewhere and achieve zero 
problems with all its neighbors and create economic interdependence, which it hoped 
would lead to stability in the region.  
The Arab Spring changed its calculus, however, forcing Turkey to make a choice, 
and despite its initial hesitation, Turkey chose to stay on the side of its Western allies and 
the international consensus in condemning Assad because Turkey shares the Western 
vision for Syria at the strategic level. Having placed its entire stakes in the opposition, 
Ankara’s policy went even further than the Western stance and demanded a regime 
change. That approach is not against the Western interests since the US and the EU also 
called Assad to step down and to respect the wishes of his people. Despite serious 
security risks, Turkey also agreed to work with the coalition forces in its fight against the 
ISIS and provided critical logistical and military support. Thus, the majority of the 
evidence indicates that Turkey’s changing foreign policy actions in Syria does not 
demonstrate a fundamental reorientation away from the Western alliance or interests. It 
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does indicate, however, that Turkey would not shy away from taking a more independent 
approach than the West when its national interests are at stake.  
In terms of the drivers of Turkey’s foreign policy in Syria, Turkish leaders’ vision 
for Turkey’s role in the Middle East and commercial interests, which are enhanced by 
positive public sentiment, seem to be the main factors affecting foreign policy decisions 
in Syria. Turkish people’s positive view of the Syrians—a sizeable Syrian Turkish 
population lives in southern Turkey—and commercial links, which provide livelihood for 
those living near the Syrian border, played an important role in accelerating the initial 
warming of bilateral ties. Ultimately, it was the AKP leaders’ vision—getting Turkey out 
of the “hostile neighborhood” mentality and creating an economically interdependent and 
stable neighborhood in order to elevate Turkey’s status as an influential regional player—
that steered the foreign policy direction in Syria. 
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4.	  ISRAEL	  	  
	  
Before 2002:  
Turkey was a refuge for Europe’s persecuted Jews in the 1940s and the first 
predominantly Muslim state to recognize the state of Israel in 1949. It then pursued close 
relations with Israel as a NATO member and the US ally. Mindful of its policy of non-
involvement and wary of reaction from the Arab world, Ankara tried to maintain an 
uneasy balance between Israel and the Arab states in the 1960s, but despite immense 
pressure from the Arab governments, Ankara never considered breaking relations with 
Israel completely. Alignment with Israel, largely resulting from a redefinition of Turkish 
regional security concerns, constituted one of the most important aspects of the post-Cold 
War Turkish foreign policy.  
However, bilateral tension flared up from time to time—after the Suez War in 
1956 and when Israel declared East Jerusalem its capital in 1980—leading Turkey to 
downgrade its level of diplomatic representation. However, bilateral relations 
dramatically improved in the 1990s. In 1991, Ankara upgraded its relations with Israel to 
the ambassadorial level and Turkey and Israel signed a tourism agreement in 1992, 
followed by a framework agreement in 1993 comprising of economic cooperation and 
educational exchanges. Turkey’s tourism sector boomed with 300,000 Israeli tourists 
visiting Turkey every year. In 1994, Turkish prime minister visited Israel and the two 
countries signed cooperation agreements in the field of environment, telecom, and drug 
trafficking.326 Both sides also discussed a free trade agreement, which was ultimately 
signed in 1996 and came into force in in 1997. Another agreement on mutual 
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encouragement and protection of investment was signed in 1996 and entered into force in 
1998, and the Turkish-Israeli Business Council actively contributed to the flourishing 
bilateral trade which increased by 600 percent between 1990 and 1998.  
As the tension with the Middle Eastern countries increased, Turkish 
policymakers, especially the military, believed that strategic cooperation with Israel 
would solve their problems by posing a deterrent to Syria and Iran.327 The framework for 
the Turkish-Israeli security cooperation was sealed in two agreements; the Military 
Training and Cooperation Agreement signed in February 1996 in which Turkey and 
Israel agreed to conduct joint training including air force training missions in each other’s 
airspace.328 The second agreement was signed in August 1996 and provided for 
technology transfer, training, intelligence sharing, and regular biannual “strategic 
dialogue” meetings between the two countries’ security and foreign policy officials.329 
Turkey, Israel, and the US held a trilateral search-and-rescue exercise off the coast of 
Israel in 1998 and again in 1999 and this exercise became a symbol of deepening 
strategic alignment between Ankara and Jerusalem, drawing angry protests from Iran and 
some Arab countries. As a result of the close strategic relations, Israel became a major 
source of arms import for Turkey and Ankara was able to enlist the help of the pro-Israel 
lobby and Jewish American organizations in the US.330 
Hypothesis A: It states that the recent changes in Turkish foreign policy 
stemming from international and domestic level factors indicate a fundamental 
reorientation of Ankara’s foreign policy away from the US and the EU in favor of a 
completely autonomous regional power that would try to limit the Western influence in 
the Middle East.  
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Prediction 1: Turkey would largely oppose or confound the policies of its 
NATO allies, specifically the US and the EU, in Israel and take a stance 
systematically at odds with the Western interests. 
Evidence: 
Turkey’s more critical position toward Israel and occasional harsh rhetoric 
criticizing Israel’s policy in the Palestinian territories led to a deterioration of its relations 
with Tel Aviv, which also negatively affected its relations with the West. Erdogan and 
Gul have occasionally spoken out sharply against Israel’s policies toward the 
Palestinians, particularly under the right-wing governments of Ariel Sharon and later 
Ehud Olmert. In 2004, Erdogan said Israel’s assassination of Hamas leader Sheikh 
Ahmad Yassin was a “terrorist act,” and postponed his visit to Israel in reaction.331 A few 
months later, Erdogan criticized Israel’s policy in Gaza, describing it as “state-sponsored 
terrorism.” Turkey also supported the Palestinian bid for statehood with non-member 
status in the UN.  
When Washington and Tel Aviv were trying to isolate Hamas, which they labeled 
as a terrorist organization, the AKP government issued an unofficial invitation to Khalid 
Mashal, a leading Hamas leader, to visit Ankara.332 Representatives of the American 
Jewish Committee called the meeting a “tragic mistake” that would have “serious 
repercussions not only among the governments of Western democracies but the Jewish 
community in the United States and around the world and with those friends of 
Turkey.”333 When Hamas won the Palestinian election in 2006, Turkish prime minister 
took a position different than that of his EU and US counterparts and recognized Hamas 
as the legitimate government of the Palestinians, arguing that the international 
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community must respect the Palestinians’ decision. 
Relations with the US further deteriorated in 2006 when Turkish leaders 
denounced Washington’s failure to call for a cease-fire during Israel’s war with Hizballah 
in Lebanon. Erdogan said that it was “unthinkable to remain silent in the face of this new 
understanding of power, this new culture of violence which defiles the sense of justice,” 
and that the war was “fuelling violence and further strengthening terrorism.” Then 
Foreign Minister Gul warned that US support for Israel’s actions could turn Turks and 
others in the Middle East against the US.334 “Moderate liberal people are becoming anti-
American and anti-EU,” Gul warned.335 The AKP did not write Hamas and Hizballah off 
as “terrorists” but instead insisted upon dialog, arguing for the need to include these 
actors as indispensable political elements in a regional solution, much to the dismay of 
Washington and Tel Aviv.336 At the Davos World Economic Forum in 2009, immediately 
after Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, Erdogan accused Israel of crimes against 
humanity. In 2009, Davutoglu cancelled his visit to Israel when he understood he would 
not be allowed to enter Gaza or meet Hamas officials during the visit.  
Ankara cancelled its participation of a joint NATO manoeuver in Turkey with 
Israel’s participation in reaction to Israel’s blockade of transfer of materials to build 
homes in Gaza. The diplomatic relations became tense when the Israeli Deputy Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs Danny Ayalon publicly humiliated Turkey’s ambassador to Israel in 
early 2010. The relations fell to an all-time low with the Mavi Marmara incident of May 
2010 when an international left-wing private relief flotilla set sail from Turkey, with the 
government’s knowledge and with the intent of delivering food and medicines to Gaza to 
peacefully break the Israeli blockade of Gaza. Israeli commandos attacked the flotilla on 
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the high seas, leading to the death of nine Turks.337 In late 2011, Turkey downgraded its 
diplomatic relations to the second-secretary level in protest against Israel’s refusal to 
apologize or pay compensation for the deaths of eight Turkish citizens and a Turkish 
American. Ankara also froze or cancelled military contacts with Israel. It vetoed Israel’s 
request to open an office in NATO and refused to permit the data gathered at NATO anti-
ballistic missile radar stations on Turkish soil to be passed to Israel.338 Although, Israel’s 
decision to relax its blockade on Gaza, allowing the transfer of some basic necessities, 
and Netanyahu’s US-brokered apology to Turkey in March 2013 mollified some of the 
tension, the new violence in Gaza in fall 2014 triggered public protests in Turkey, leading 
Israel to evacuate all non-essential diplomatic staff from Turkey. 
Prediction 2: Turkey would not share its Western allies’ vision for Israel and 
its foreign policy initiatives in Israel and Palestinian territories would exceed the 
bounds of what the US, the EU, and its other NATO partners consider acceptable.  
Evidence: 
The AKP government pursued a more critical line towards Israel while 
maintaining a more conciliatory approach to the Palestinians, which are not in line with 
the Western policies. Several factors, including the changes in domestic institutions, 
prevailing attitudes in public opinion, and the AKP leaders’ new foreign policy doctrine 
are mainly responsible for this policy behavior. First of all, the military, which was the 
strongest advocate in Turkey for closer ties with Israel, has seen its role in foreign policy 
diminish since the AKP came to power. For the military, Israel represented an “anti-
Islamic” symbol, a source of valuable high-tech military transfers, and a facilitator of 
access to the US Congress. Israeli arms sales to Turkey exceeded $1 billion from 2000 to 
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2004, and the two countries highly institutionalized the military and strategic 
consultation.339  
Turkish public has respect for Israel’s democracy and military success but it has 
greater sympathies towards the Palestinians and expresses anger at Israel’s policy 
towards the Palestinians. Most Turks readily distinguish between Turkey’s 120,000 
Jewish population, which they have a high degree of tolerance and respect toward, and 
the state of Israel, for which they have no popular affection.340 In a 2000 opinion poll, 63 
percent of Turks stated that Jerusalem and al-Aqsa mosque were of importance to them 
and 60 percent demanded a more active Turkish role in defense of the Palestinian people. 
The Jerusalem issue in Turkey is not simply an “Islamist issue” but also an abiding part 
of Turkey’s historical, religious, cultural, and emotional ties with Jerusalem.341 In a 2004 
poll within Turkey, two-thirds of those surveyed believed that Turkey should side with 
the Palestinians while only 3 percent favored siding with Israel.342 In a 2007 study 
conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Turks viewed Palestinians 
more favorably as a nationality than any other national group at 47 percent while only 5 
percent viewed Israel with favor.  
The Turkish leaders increasingly capitalized on the people’s pro-Palestinian 
attitude in order to derive electoral benefits.343 Two months before the local elections of 
March 2009, Erdogan used the annual World Economic Forum platform in Davos to 
further his domestic political goals by pressing Israeli President Shimon Peres on the 
Gaza War. When Erdogan returned to Turkey, thousands mobilized at the airport to greet 
him and hail him as a leader that scolded Peres and Israel. Lebanon’s As Safir newspaper 
wrote, “Erdogan proved once again that he is more Arab and human than most Arab 
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rulers.”344 When Turkey cancelled joint military exercises with Israel in October 2009, 
Erdogan cited public opinion as the reasoning behind this decision stating that his 
decision was “in accordance with his people’s conscience.”345  
The AKP’s regional policy of zero problems with neighbors also led to a shift in 
its relations with Israel where close security ties with Tel Aviv was no longer essential to 
Turkey’s foreign policy. Ankara’s policy of maintaining peaceful relations with 
neighbors considerably decreased the Syrian and Iraqi threats to Turkey and reduced 
Israel’s strategic value to Ankara, especially in late 2000s. Erdogan’s sense of self-
greatness as a Muslim leader probably also played a role in shaping foreign policy 
decisions, especially as the decisionmaking in Ankara gradually began to be centered 
around his personality. As a savvy politician deeply attuned to the hearts and minds of the 
Anatolian heartland, Erdogan’s espousal of a more critical rhetoric toward Israel since its 
Gaza operations and his sensationalized eruption at Davos gained him subsequent 
outburst of support both in Turkey and in the Arab world.346  
Erdogan’s fiery rhetoric is not confined to Israel, however. Beyond the Middle 
East, Erdogan has the reputation of speaking brashly to arouse populist support on issues 
as diverse as the Armenian residents in Turkey, the Kurdish question, the H1N1 flu, and 
most recently the interest rates.347 Anti-Israeli rhetoric is not confined to Erdogan either. 
The AKP government’s immediate predecessor, a staunchly secular government, was 
also quite harsh in its objections to the Israeli policy towards the Palestinians. In a joint 
press conference in Ankara in 2001, the left-wing Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit rejected 
Israeli Prime Minister Sharon’s claim that the Palestinian leader Arafat supports terror. In 
2002, Ecevit described Sharon’s policy towards the Palestinians as “genocide.” 348 
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Prediction 3: Turkey would orient its trade towards non-Western trading 
blocs that try to limit the influence of the West in the region and it would reject or 
give up its pursuit of EU membership. 
Evidence: 
Turkey already had a free trade agreement with Israel since the late 1990s and 
since then the bilateral trade steadily increased despite deteriorating diplomatic relations 
between Ankara and Tel Aviv (see figure 10). Though at a much lower volume, Turkish 
trade with the Palestinians also increased during this period (see figure 11). Turkey 
signed a free trade agreement with the Palestinian authorities in 2004, but the trade 
volume only reached $76 million in 2013, almost all of which was Turkish exports of 
agricultural products, machinery, and consumer goods.  
Figure 10: Turkey’s Total Trade (Exports + Imports) with Israel since 1998349 
 
Figure 11: Turkey’s Total Trade (Exports + Imports) with the Palestinian Territory 
since 1998350 
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Hypothesis B: It states that recent changes in Turkish foreign policy resulting 
from international and domestic level factors demonstrate that while there is a significant 
change in the direction of autonomy, Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East does not 
represent a fundamental shift away from the West.  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely support or conform to the policies of its 
NATO allies, specifically the US and the EU, in Israel. 
Evidence: 
The AKP government has asserted some independence from the West, especially 
from the US, in its policies towards the Israeli and Palestinian conflict and at times defied 
the US policy by refusing to cooperate with Israel on defense-related matters. However, 
at the fundamental level, Ankara’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains in 
line with the Western policies. Despite bilateral tension and harsh rhetoric towards 
Israel’s policies, Ankara has maintained basic diplomatic relations and its bilateral trade 
with Tel Aviv substantially increased during this period. Turkish leaders also made some 
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Prime Minister Erdogan visited the Yad Vashem holocaust memorial in Israel and 
Erdogan and Ariel Sharon established a hotline for the exchange of intelligence on 
terrorism-related issues. In 2007, Shimon Peres became the first Israeli president to 
address the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. That year, Turkey and Israel concluded 
negotiations over the Med Stream project, an offshore water pipeline to connect Turkey 
and Israel across the Mediterranean. In 2008, Turkey and Israel agreed to the construction 
of an oil pipeline between Ceyhan and Ashkelon. Despite Turkey’s criticism of 2006 
Lebanon war, Turkish-Israeli military cooperation had continued apace in the late 2000s 
through joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and defense-industrial 
cooperation.351  
Ankara believes that the inclusion of Hamas, shunned by the West as a terrorist 
organization, as a major Palestinian political player is indispensable to a final peace 
settlement and sought to use its influence to bring Hamas to the table. Ankara tried to 
maintain diplomatic ties with Hamas after its election victory. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs stated that all related parties should respect the result of democratically conducted 
elections and that it would be against democratic principles if outside actors attempted to 
weaken the newly elected order by imposing economic measures against the Palestinian 
administration. Ankara claimed that Hamas was in search of allies in the Middle East to 
end the economic and political blockade it faced from the international system and that if 
Ankara did not intervene, the only possible exit for HAMAS would be the Iran-Syria-
Hezbollah axis.352 Ibrahim Kalin, chief foreign policy advisor to Erdogan in 2010 said, 
“in principle, we believe that it is in Israel’s interest to lift the blockade of Gaza and 
establish some mechanism of international inspections because the blockade created a 
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humanitarian disaster for the 1.5 million Palestinians living in Gaza, and it cornered the 
Hamas government in a way that was only going to lead to further violence.” He further 
argued, “we are trying to bring Palestinian Authority and Hamas officials together so they 
can talk with the Israelis, which is also a core US goal."353 
Because Turkey firmly supports a two-state solution for the resolution of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict in line with Western interests, it sought to motivate Hamas to 
help resolve the conflict. Top political operatives from Hamas have visited Ankara and 
Turkey sought to mediate the political split between Hamas and Fatah leadership in the 
West Bank as a part of an effort to build coherent negotiating parties on both sides. At the 
same time, Erdogan made a strong appeal to Hamas to renounce terror and drop its policy 
of non-recognition of Israel, a vital Israeli and Western objective.354 In both 2006 and 
2011, Turkey’s president informed the Hamas leader that it must come to recognize 
Israel’s existence as a part of any peace settlement.355  
The Turkish-American relations did not necessarily suffer as the Turkish-Israeli 
diplomatic relations deteriorated. During President Obama’s April 2009 visit to Turkey, 
four months after the Davos incident, both presidents pledged to strengthen the economic 
pillar of the relationship.356 In 2013, during Obama’s visit to Israel, Prime Minister 
Netanyahu offered a formal apology to Turkey for its attack on the ship Mavi Marmara, 
fulfilling one of Ankara’s major preconditions for the restoration of diplomatic ties with 
Israel. Moreover, the US remained Ankara’s closest foreign defense partner and a major 
source of Turkish military technology, and Turkey’s defense policy remains tightly 
integrated with NATO, which reinforces Turkish-US bilateral military ties. Ankara is one 
of the few NATO countries that sustain NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement. Turkish 
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warships support important NATO maritime security operations and goals in the Black 
Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean and Turkish soldiers support the ISAF in Afghanistan. 
Ankara also plays an important role in promoting NATO’s energy security by serving as 
a vital conduit for oil and gas reaching Europe from Eurasia.357 
Prediction 2: Turkey would share its Western allies’ vision for Israel and its 
foreign policy initiatives in the region would be acceptable to the US, the EU, and its 
other NATO partners. 
Evidence: 
Turkey’s more conciliatory approach of communicating with Hamas, defending 
the Palestinians’ rights, and at times harsh rhetoric against Israel have raised concerns 
about Ankara turning away from the West. However, Turkey’s strategic vision for the 
region is in line with the Western vision for the region. Ankara has made the resolution of 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict a main pillar of its goals in the region and acted as a mediator 
using diplomatic means to achieve regional peace and stability. Ankara also extended 
diplomatic efforts for peaceful resolution of the Syrian-Israeli conflicts.358  
Turkey declared that talking to Hamas was a part of its official strategy to “talk to 
all parties” and communicate its messages of democracy and dialogue with every group 
and sect in the region.359 Unlike the US, the EU has been supportive of Turkey’s 
diplomatic outreach to Hamas for the resolution of the conflict. At least in the early 
2000s, Turkey and the EU consulted each other on many issues including the Palestinian 
issue. After some complaints from both the EU and Turkey about the lack of consultation 
about framing a policy towards Hamas and the developments in the Palestinian 
territories, officials from the EU’s accession commission consulted with the Turkish 
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officials on framing a policy towards the Palestinians. According to Davutoglu, the EU 
would generally ask the opinion of Turkey after reaching a conclusion but before issuing 
it and that Turkey would generally support these common positions.360  
Davutoglu met with Mashal twice in Syria. His second visit came as a result of 
then French President Sarkozy’s request for help from Erdogan. Turkey was part of a 
mediation process between Hamas and international actors while maintaining regular 
contacts with Fatah. Professor Richard Falk, the UN’s special rapporteur on the 
Palestinian territories, highlighted Turkey’s importance to Hamas’s engagement. In 
reference to the invitation of Hamas in 2006, the rapporteur said, “it is tragic that this 
effort failed and was at the time criticized. In retrospect, both the wellbeing of the Gazan 
civilian population and the security of Israel would have greatly benefited by taking 
advantage of the Turkish initiative and moving to implement the readiness of Hamas to 
establish a long-term truce.”361 Some pundits even claimed that Ankara’s engagement 
with Hamas, similar to Norway and Switzerland, could provide opportunities to the West 
in the resolution of the conflict since Ankara remains one of the few western channels to 
engage Hamas.362  
Davutoglu’s foreign policy doctrine is a major driving factor in its policy towards 
Israel and Palestine. According to Davutoglu, Ankara advocates a political order based on 
dialog and multi-dimension, an economic order based on justice and equality, and a 
cultural order based on inclusiveness and peace.363 His new diplomatic approach aims to 
enable Turkey not to be a “bridge” but a “central” country in the region and that requires 
Ankara to pursue proactive and preemptive peace diplomacy by mediating between Israel 
and Syria, the Sunnis and the Shiites in Iraq, and contribute to reconciliation efforts in 
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Lebanon and Palestine. His “rhythmic diplomacy” calls for a more active involvement in 
all international organizations as evidenced in its non-permanent membership of the 
UNSC, membership in the G-20, and participation in the African Union, Gulf 
Cooperation Council, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Arab League.364  
Turkey’s value-based foreign policy was a major determinant of its support for 
the people in the Arab spring, namely in Tunisia, Egypt, and later Syria. The AKP 
leaders’ regional ambitions as a protector and defender of the people’s rights, including 
those of the Palestinians, also contribute to Ankara’s policy in the region. In his post-
election victory speech in June 2011, then Prime Minister Erdogan chose to speak as a 
Middle Eastern leader; he said, “all friendly and brotherly nations from Baghdad, 
Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, Tunis, Skopje, Sarajevo, Baku and Nicosia…the hopes of 
victims and the oppressed have won. We will become much more active in regional and 
global affairs. We will take on a more effective role. We will call, as we have, for rights 
in our region, for justice, for the rule of law, for freedom, and democracy.”365 According 
to an Arab Public Opinion poll in 2010, Turkey was the country playing the most 
constructive role in the region, and Erdogan rose among the Arab respondents to the 
“most admired leader” status in 2010 when he did not even appear in the previous poll of 
the most admired world leaders in 2008.366 
The AKP leadership did not view closer Middle Eastern relations as dichotomous 
or detrimental to Turkey’s Western orientation at home or abroad as had been trumpeted 
under the military rule in the 1980s. The Turkish leaders deemphasized the Islamic threat 
in the region and pursued an approach that takes advantage of the shared religion and 
heritage to boost economic opportunities. The core leadership of the AKP comes from a 
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political tradition that glorifies the Ottoman past as well as historical and cultural ties 
with the Islamic world. Their background also demonstrates that they are at ease in their 
dealings with their Middle Eastern counterparts. Erdogan graduated from a religious 
vocational high school, Gul worked at the Islamic Development Bank in Saudi Arabia 
between 1983-1991, and Davutoglu worked as a professor at the International Islamic 
University of Malaysia from 1990 to 1993. Favoring a more moderate version of 
secularism at home and a more activist policy in foreign affairs, Ankara, under the AKP 
leadership, began to exert more “soft power” in the Middle East, emphasizing economic 
cooperation, greater interdependence, and conflict mediation.367  
Prediction 3: Turkey’s bilateral trade would increase with Israel as well as 
with the Western countries. Turkey would seek greater integration with Israel but it 
would also pursue EU membership and closer economic ties with the US. 
Evidence: 
In line with the general trend, Turkey’s trade with both Israel and Palestine 
increased during this period. Despite the diplomatic fallout with Israel, bilateral trade did 
not decrease; the two dips in trade correspond to the global and European financial crises 
of 2009 and 2012. Economic ties remained strong during the AKP’s tenure and continued 
its rise even after the flotilla incident. In fact, while Turkey’s trade with the Middle 
Eastern countries decreased following the Arab Spring, it didn’t decline with Israel. The 
Turkish-Palestinian trade also increased, but the volume is insignificant—$76 million in 
2013 in comparison with $5 billion with Israel or $169 billion with the EU (see figure 
10). Thus, business interests with the Palestinians are unlikely to enter into the 
calculation as the government makes foreign policy decisions regarding the conflict. 
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After the Free Trade Agreement was signed with Israel in 1997, bilateral trade 
figures had reached $2 billion by 2004 and $5 billion in 2013. In 2004, Turkey agreed to 
sell 50 million cubic meters of water annually to Israel and signed an $800 million 
contract to build and manage three energy plants in Israel.368 In 2005, Erdogan proposed 
to Israel the creation of a new pipeline that would provide Ceyhan oil to Haifa via a 
pipeline through Cyprus.369 In 2007, Turkey and Israel agreed to build a pipeline system 
connecting Black Sea to the Red Sea. Israel has also invested in Turkish agricultural 
development.370 Turkey was a popular tourist destination for Israel, bringing $1.85 billion 
in revenues, at least until the flotilla incident in 2010.371 However, Turkey’s trade with 
Israel is not vital to Ankara. It sells iron, steel, machinery, consumer goods and apparel to 
Israel and buys from it mineral fuel and machinery that are easily substitutable. On the 
other hand, Turkey is Israel’s sixth-leading export destination.  
Figure 12: Turkey’s Total Trade (Exports + Imports) with Israel and the 




























	   	   	  





The divergence between the Turkish and the US policy is greater on the Israeli-
Palestinian issue than on other issues treated in this study. Turkey’s more critical line 
towards Israel, stemming from the view of its leadership and the longstanding public 
sympathy for the Palestinians, is not consistent with the interests of its Western allies, 
namely the US and to a lesser extent the EU. The AKP leadership’s foreign policy 
doctrine aims to elevate Turkey’s regional influence by creating a network of stable and 
prosperous countries with which Turkey shares close political and economic ties. That 
required Ankara to improve its relations with countries like Iran and Syria so it no longer 
necessitated the maintenance of security ties with Israel. In that sense, the strategic 
relationship between the two countries was very much a product of unique circumstances 
in the 1990s so a sharp adjustment to a new “normal” was inevitable.  
Also, Turkey’s regional influence, advancement of its economic interests with 
Arab leaders, and the leadership’s domestic popularity increased the attractiveness of 
speaking out on behalf of the Palestinians, further deteriorating its relationship with 
Israel.373 The Palestinian example highlights that the AKP prioritizes economic interests 
of its constituents, as in the case of Sudan and Libya, but when economic interests and 
the electorate’s ideological views are in conflict, the government tends to give more 
weight to the vocal ideology as in the case of Palestine and Syria. 
However, Turkey’s more independent stance towards Israel does not prove a 
fundamental reorientation from the Western framework during the AKP period. Turkey’s 
relationship with Israel has always been rocky; both sides had recalled ambassadors or 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
158	  
relegated the diplomatic representation down to the secretariat level several times before 
2002 and the staunchly pro-secular governments before the AKP had also used harsh 
rhetoric against Israel in support of the Palestinians. At the fundamental level, Ankara’s 
position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains in line with the Western policies. 
Turkey is firmly committed to the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
actually made significant efforts to mediate between the two sides as well as with Israel 
and Syria before its relations soured with Israel. On how to handle the conflict, Ankara 
believes that maintaining a dialogue with major stakeholders, including Hamas, is 
essential to reach a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
However, democratization process with the EU’s membership criteria and decline 
of the security threats led to the diminishing the role of the military and increasing role of 
the public opinion, leading to a policy change in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The 
Turkish public is very sensitive to the sufferings of the Palestinian people. During the 
1990s when the security concerns were high, the governments and foreign policymakers, 
including the formerly influential military bureaucracy, were able to ignore the criticisms 
of the public in its relations with Israel.374 Turkey’s closer ties to the Palestinian leaders 
that the West shuns also stems from the convergence of Turkish public opinion favoring 
the Palestinians and the AKP leaders approach to the resolution of the conflict that 
emphasizes dialog with all partners. 
Furthermore, Ankara has robust economic relationship with Tel Aviv, which also 
suggests that in the case of Israel, Turkey’s economic interests could prevent the political 
fallout between the two countries. Bilateral diplomatic and economic relations improved 
recently following the Arab Spring and Israel’s apology for the flotilla deaths. While 
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Turkish trade with the Middle East declined in recent years, its trade with Israel did not. 
Despite the ups and downs in its relations with Israel, Turkey’s foreign policy direction 
has not shifted away from the Western framework; it still actively participates in NATO 




	   	   	  





There is no doubt that Turkey has been pursuing a more active and independent 
foreign policy in the Middle East since the AKP came to power and its approaches have, 
at times, different from those of its Western allies. It voted against the sanctions on Iran 
at the UNSC. It denied the US the use of Turkish soil as a base to launch the Iraqi 
invasion. It sought closer diplomatic and economic ties with Syria when the West tried to 
isolate it. It maintained communication with Hamas, which the West labeled as terrorist, 
and used harsh rhetoric and critical diplomacy towards Israel in support of the rights of 
the Palestinians.  
However, as explained in the case study, when we take a closer look at the 
context beyond the media highlights, Turkey’s disagreements with the Western policies 
have mostly been over competing priorities and different approaches to regional 
challenges, rather than over the fundamental values and interests. On how to handle the 
Iranian nuclear problem and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Ankara displayed a modest 
movement towards positions that create tension with the West. Turkey believed sanctions 
against Iran would not work and create regional instability. Ankara was convinced that 
maintaining a dialogue with major stakeholders, including Hamas, could help reach a 
solution to the conflict and believed that the blockade or other Israeli operations in the 
Palestinian territories were counterproductive. Prominent Turkey scholar Taspinar 
describes AKP’s Turkey as Turkish Gaullism, increasingly acting on its own in search of 
full sovereignty, greater influence, and most importantly Turkish national pride; France 
sought a nuclear deterrent, pursued realpolitik, and left the NATO military structure 
under Charles de Gaulle.375 
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On the critical issues related to the region’s stability and development, Ankara’s 
position is at minimum compatible and in most instances strongly supportive of, Western 
interests. Turkey opposes a nuclear Iran and its stance on many regional issues from Iraq 
to Syria to Yemen is opposite to the Iranian stance. Ankara opposed the Iraq war fearing 
it would destabilize the region and hurt its economic interests, but it cooperates with the 
US in contributing to the resolution of the sectarian conflict, stability, and economic 
development in the country.  
Despite its initial hesitation for similar reasons, Turkey’s policy in Syria is in line 
with the US interests; it also supports the Western fight against the ISIS though it 
advocates ending the Assad regime first. Despite its rhetoric and divergent views and 
approaches, Turkey is committed to the two-state solution in Israel and hopes for the 
resolution of the conflict. Ibrahim Kalin, chief foreign policy adviser to Erdogan said in 
2010 that “if you look at the issues, we are working together with the United States; we 
see a lot of convergence. We have fully cooperated on Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, the 
Caucasus, and the Balkans. So the fact that we disagree on style in terms of addressing 
Iran’s nuclear problem doesn’t’ mean our strategic alliance is in jeopardy. On the 
contrary, the list of issues we work together is long.”376 
Domestic factors such as economic interests, transformation of domestic 
institutions, and prominence of public opinion as a result of Turkey’s democratization 
process, and the foreign policy vision of the AKP leadership stand out as the main drivers 
of Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East. Admittedly, international-level, structural 
factors, including the end of the Cold War, the Soviet threat, and the bipolar world order, 
the political vacuum in the Middle Eastern geopolitics following the Arab Spring as well 
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as Turkey’s rising economic status relative to its counterparts in the region have created 
the necessary preconditions for the emergence of Turkey’s new multi-dimensional and 
proactive regional policy that is less dependent on its Western partners. The EU’s 
perceived condescending approach to Turkey’s accession that hurt the Turks’ national 
pride and several high-profile incidents that increased the urks’ mistrust of the US also 
contributed to Turkey’s search for a new role and adoption of a more multi-faceted 
approach to the region.  
However, only with a single-party government, which enjoyed a parliamentary 
majority and ushered in political stability and strong economic growth, that the Turkish 
foreign policymakers found a fertile ground to adopt a new approach to policymaking. 
Thanks to the EU-inspired democratization process, Turkish foreign policymaking moved 
from a military-dominated, closed-door process to involve more democratic debates 
among the public and decisionmaking by the elected civilian leaders. That process 
resulted in a less security-oriented and more liberal approach to the Middle East that 
emphasizes soft power, peaceful reconciliation, and greater economic interdependence, 
an approach that takes into account Turkish people’s sensitivities towards people with 
whom they share similar history, religion, and geography.  
Public opinion has never mattered this much in Turkey’s history. In a 
Transatlantic Survey by the German Marshall Fund in 2004, 75 percent of the Turkish 
respondents said Turkey should take an active part in world affairs. This foreign policy 
activism was simultaneously accompanied and reinforced by a rapid expansion of 
Turkey’s external trade and investment flows into the Middle Eastern region, providing 
new markets for Turkey’s increasingly politically active entrepreneurial class and 
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resulting in an impressive growth for Turkey, which tripled its GDP in nominal US dollar 
terms in the past decade. For example, Turkish businesses make up the majority of 
construction sector in the Middle East and when its indirect contribution is taken into 
account, construction sector accounts for close to 30 percent of GDP and creates 
employment for nearly 2 million people.377 Finally, more than Erdogan’s personality and 
populist rhetoric, it is Davutoglu’s foreign policy vision, which stretches from pragmatic 
to ideological, that had a profound impact on Turkey’s recent activism in the Middle 
East. His foreign policy doctrine advocates the necessity of pursuing a multidimensional 
foreign policy that views its relations with US, EU, and the Middle East as 
complementary. 
In sum, the majority of the evidence on Turkish foreign policy behavior in the 
Middle East demonstrates that Turkey has not reoriented its foreign policy direction from 
the West to the East. Prominent Turkey scholar Ian Lesser observed that in spite of all 
accusation of Turkey’s dramatic foreign policy reorientation and widely discussed “end 
of the alliance,” these crises were very rarely ideologically driven and manifested a 
“strategic drift,” not a radical “shift of ideological axis.”378 However, Turkey’s 
transformation in the last decade means that the West has to reckon with a more 
confident and assertive Turkey that claims a greater role and influence in the region 
without shaking its firm alliance with the West.  
On most accounts, a more democratic and secular Turkey has values and interests 
that are closer to those of the West and that translate into similar positions on most policy 
issues. A worthy distinction needs to be made between the US and the EU where 
Turkey’s new foreign policy emphasis on increasing active diplomacy, economic 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
164	  
interdependence, and soft power for regional peace and prosperity is more in line with the 
EU policy in the region.  
The Middle East, however, is immensely different from Turkey. Turkey’s 
national identity is ethno-culturally different from that of the Arab world. Institutionally, 
Turkey has enjoyed more democratic institutions and processes since the birth of the 
Republic. Despite the recent restrictions on media and personal freedom, the country 
undoubtedly is more democratic than those Arab countries in the region replete with 
authoritarian governments. As the only Muslim member of NATO, Turkey boasts the 
second-biggest land forces in NATO after the US and its GDP is higher than that of any 
country in the Middle East and more than the combined GDP’s of Iran, Iraq, and Syria.379  
The changes in Turkish foreign policy in the past decade symbolize the shifting 
preferences of Turkish leadership from meeting the expectations of Western partners to 
securing Turkey’s own national interests, rather than Turkey’s turning away from the 
West to the East or from the secular Europe to the Islamist Arab world. For today’s 
Turkey, NATO is the security framework that Ankara binds itself to and places its trust in 
against some threats in the Middle East.  
The majority of Turkey’s trade is still with Europe (see figure 13), not the Middle 
East. Despite the slow membership process for various reasons, including some that are 
not in Ankara’s control, Turkey still very much wants to become an EU member. In a 
2010 article pleading for Turkey’s EU membership, Davutoglu said: “the enlarged 
portfolio of our foreign policy now encompasses a wide spectrum of geographical areas, 
organizations and issues, without a fundamental change in its priorities…Turkey is not 
reorienting its foreign policy, as some argue nowadays. While Turkey pursues a policy of 
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constructive engagement in its neighborhood and beyond, full integration with the EU is 
and will remain the priority. I want to make it clear: Membership in the EU is Turkey’s 
strategic choice and this objective is one of the most important projects of the Republican 
era.”380 Turkish people would rather go to Paris or Rome for vacation than to Tehran or 
Riyadh and they would send their kids to universities in Washington or London rather 
than to Cairo or Dubai. As Gul argued Turkey’s active involvement in its region and 
multilateral relations with the countries in the Middle East is not an option to replace its 
connections with Europe and that the security and stability of Europe and the Middle East 
are complementary.381 
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CHAPTER	  5:	  TURKISH	  FOREIGN	  POLICY	  IN	  EURASIA	  
 
This dissertation aims to answer the question of whether the recent transformation 
in Turkish foreign policy is a fundamental reorientation of the country towards the East 
and abandoning of the Western alliance. In order to answer this question, the study 
examines the changes in Turkish foreign policy and analyzes the factors driving these 
changes using international and domestic levels of analyses derived from the framework 
of realism and liberalism introduced in chapter 3. This chapter conducts a case study and 
uses the congruence method of hypothesis testing to examine Turkey’s foreign policy in 
the Eurasia region and assess whether its policy in Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus 
demonstrates fundamental a shift away from Ankara’s anchorage in the Western 
framework. 
The first section lays out the main hypotheses for the case study and the next 
section introduces the changes in Turkish foreign policy in Eurasia through a brief 
readout of Turkey’s foreign policy in the region before and after 2002. Then it conducts 
three mini cases on Turkish foreign policy towards Russia, Central Asia, and the 
Caucasus. Each case begins with a brief recount of Turkey’s foreign policy towards this 
region before 2002. It then analyzes the available evidence against the predictions of the 
two hypotheses. Finally, it concludes by summarizing the findings on whether Turkey’s 
foreign policy transformation is a fundamental reorientation of the country and by 
identifying those factors that are dominant in driving Turkish foreign policy in Eurasia. 
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5.1.	  THE	  CASE	  STUDY	  FRAMEWORK	  
	  
Hypothesis A: It states that the recent changes in Turkish foreign policy stemming 
from international and domestic level factors indicate a fundamental reorientation of 
Ankara’s foreign policy away from the US and the EU in favor of a completely 
autonomous regional power that would try to limit the Western influence in Eurasia.  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely oppose or confound the policies of its NATO 
allies, specifically the US and the EU, in Eurasia and take a stance systematically at odds 
with the Western interests. 
Prediction 2: Turkey would not share its Western allies’ vision for the Eurasia 
region and its foreign policy initiatives in the region would exceed the bounds of what the 
US, the EU, and its other NATO partners consider acceptable.  
Prediction 3: Turkey would orient its trade towards non-Western trading blocs 
that try to limit the influence of the West in the Eurasia region and it would reject or give 
up its pursuit of EU membership. 
Hypothesis B: It states that the recent changes in Turkish foreign policy resulting 
from international and domestic level factors demonstrate that while there is a significant 
change in the direction of autonomy, Turkey’s foreign policy in Eurasia does not 
represent a fundamental shift away from the West.  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely support or conform to the policies of its 
NATO allies, specifically the US and the EU, in Eurasia. 
Prediction 2: Turkey would share its Western allies’ vision for the Eurasia region 
and its foreign policy initiatives in the region would be acceptable to the US, the EU, and 
its other NATO partners. 
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Prediction 3: Turkey’s bilateral trade would increase with both the Eurasian and 
the Western countries. Turkey would seek greater integration with the Eurasia region but 
it would also pursue EU membership and closer economic ties with the US. 
 Parameters for the Predictions: Before Turkey’s foreign policy actions are 
examined under these predictions, it is useful to define the parameters for the West’s 
broader expectations from Turkey. The US, the EU, and other NATO partners expect or 
prefer a Turkey that closely supports and cooperates with the Western policies and 
interests in the region. They want Turkey to aid the Western counterterrorism efforts, 
support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the regional countries, and contribute 
to regional stability, economic development, good governance, rule of law, and 
promotion of democratic and secular values in the region. 
The US and the EU want Turkey to uphold international norms and rule of law 
when it comes to dealing with the regional problems and expect Turkey to join Western 
efforts to fight terrorism in the region. The EU also expects Turkey to continue the 
democratization process and launch liberal political and economic reforms to meet the 
EU membership criteria. The US and the EU policies toward specific countries may 
differ from each other and their policies may change depending on the specific timeframe 
under examination, but I will attempt to highlight basic expectations and acceptable 
behavior towards the countries examined in the case studies. 
 On Russia, the US expects Turkey to oppose Russian aggression in the region, 
including in Georgia and Ukraine, and support the Western efforts in opposing Russia’s 
attempt to create an exclusive sphere of influence in its neighborhood. Turkey’s close 
economic ties with Russia because of its energy dependence on Moscow are acceptable 
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to the West, especially to the EU, which is also struggling to reduce its dependence on 
Moscow. However, entering into a military alliance with Russia would be an 
unacceptable redline to both the US, the EU, and other NATO partners.  
 On Central Asia and the Caucasus, the West expects Turkey to uphold 
international norms and contribute to the regional peace and stability. They want Turkey 
to aid the efforts to develop the region’s economy and integrate the regional economies 
through improved energy and transportation infrastructure. The US and EU positions 
converge in this region but the EU is more excited about the prospects of Turkey’s 
facilitation of the transfer of the Caspian energy sources to Europe to improve its energy 
security and expects Turkey to contribute to the efforts to spread democratic and secular 
values in the region.   
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5.2.	  OVERVIEW	  OF	  FOREIGN	  POLICY	  CHANGE	  IN	  EURASIA	  
	  
 Turkey’s Eurasia policy was completely dominated by its relations with the 
Soviet Union, which was historically an adversary and a security threat to Turkey and its 
predecessor the Ottoman Empire. Stalin’s efforts to gain control of the Turkish Straits 
after the Second World War prompted Turkey to abandon Ataturk’s policy of neutrality 
and join the Western alliance against the Soviet Union by seeking membership in the 
NATO. During this period, Turkey consciously refrained from cultivating contacts with 
the Turkic and Muslim populations beyond its border and tamed its pan-Turkic and pan-
Islamic ambitions because of Russia’s sensitivity toward its control over the non-Russian 
nationalities.  
International factors such as the end of the Cold War and the bipolar world had an 
impact on Turkish foreign policy toward Eurasia. With the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, Russia’s territorial borders had receded far from Turkey and Ankara began to see 
Russia not as an enemy but a normal state it could cooperate with; however, the opening 
up of the new “Turkic world” sparked new political rivalries between Turkey and Russia. 
Ankara saw Central Asia and the Caucasus as a new field for expanding Turkish 
influence in the 1990s and Turkey’s foreign policy objectives in the region included 
contributing to the regional economic development, providing direct support to the 
regional states’ state-building efforts, and helping them integrate into the global system. 
Turkey became the first country to recognize the independence of all the Central Asian 
and the Caucasian countries. It established a new directorate in 1992 dealing with the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and established the Turkish International 
Cooperation Agency (TIKA) to provide development assistance and coordinate Turkey’s 
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economic and socio-cultural relations with these countries. Ankara even floated an 
ambitious goal for a Turkic Common Market and a Turkic Bank.  
While Turkey sought to become a role model for the post-Soviet Turkic states in 
Eurasia, with active support of the US and the EU, the Russian federation saw a rival 
country undermining its political presence in the region and weakening its control over 
the region’s energy resources. Turkish inroads into Central Asia were viewed as “plots” 
to encircle Russia, reinforcing Moscow’s suspicion that Turkey and other Western 
powers wanted to isolate Russia from its allies in the Middle East. As a result, Russia 
sought to minimize Turkey’s influence in the region; for example, it threatened Turkey 
with a nuclear retaliation if Ankara intervened in 1992 when the Russian-backed Armenia 
defeated Azerbaijan militarily and took over Nagorno-Karabakh, creating a frozen 
conflict that Russia can manipulate to its advantage.383 
International factors such as the tension between Russia and the West put Turkey 
and Russia at odds with each other; the two countries experienced a series of political 
frictions in the 1990s, especially as Russia viewed Turkey as a vehicle for NATO’s 
expansion in the South Caucasus. However, the economic dimension of the bilateral 
relations obliged both countries to keep their geopolitical competition at least on a 
manageable level. Bilateral tension peaked in 1993 to 1996, when the Russian security 
forces meddled in Azerbaijan, provoking the overthrow of the pro-Turkish president, and 
in 1994 when the Russian combat units in Georgia assisted the Abkhazians in a failed 
secessionist bid.384 In 1997, Russia threatened to sell the SAM-300-PMU-1 missiles, 
which could reach into southern Turkey, to the Greek Cypriot government. In 1999, the 
Russian Air Force general declared that Russia was stationing S-300 missiles and MiG-
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29 fighters in Armenia to protect it against threats from Turkey and NATO.385  
At the fundamental level, the US and the EU have been supportive of Turkey’s 
increasing role in Eurasia as a secular and democratic country with a pro-Western 
outlook. They gave diplomatic backing to the oil and gas pipelines connecting the region 
to the West. These initiatives supported Turkey’s geopolitical interests while blocking 
Iran’s access to the Caspian energy and preventing the reassertion of Russian hegemony 
in the region.386 Washington and Ankara worked closely to strengthen ties to Georgia and 
Azerbaijan and encouraged both countries to adopt a stronger pro-Western position, a 
strategic cooperation that was further strengthened by the war on terrorism following the 
September 11 terrorist attacks.  
In 2001, the Bush administration succeeded in repealing the Section 907 of the 
Freedom Support Act, which, introduced by the Armenian lobby, barred direct US 
government support to Azerbaijan.387 The Bush and Clinton administrations emphasized 
Turkey’s pivotal role in the region. In a 1998 testimony before the House Foreign 
Relations subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Assistant Secretary for Energy Policy 
and International Affairs Robert Gee declared that Turkey needs support because it is an 
“anchor of stability” in a troubled region. Later that year, the US Eximbank, Trade and 
Development Agency, and the US-based Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
awarded the Turkish state pipeline company BOTAS a project credit of $823,000 to 
enable Turkey to tap the US expertise on technical, financial, environmental, and legal 
matters for the construction of an oil pipeline from Azerbaijan. Also in 1999, the US 
Caspian Finance Center, the first of its kind, opened in Ankara to assist the US 
companies interested in investing in the Caspian energy market.388 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
173	  
  The Turkish-Russian relations gradually began to improve thanks to both 
countries’ strong economic interests and reached a level of close partnership by the 
2000s, a time when the West began questioning the continuing importance of Turkey as 
the peace dividends of the end of the Cold War swept in. The US Congress became 
hesitant about approving arms sales to Turkey, and some European states, such as 
Norway, Germany, and Belgium, questioned or cancelled the sale of offensive weapons 
to Turkey. As a result, the Turkish security establishment assessed that it was in the 
interest of Turkey to have good relations with Moscow to strengthen its position in the 
Western security structures and began to actively include Russia in its regional 
cooperation initiatives.389  
  The members of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), which Turkey 
launched in 1989 and includes Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, 
Moldova, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine, signed an agreement in Istanbul in 1992 to 
promote cooperation in the fields of energy, transportation, communications, information 
and ecology. In 2000, Turkey initiated the establishment of a “Caucasus Stability Pact” 
under OSCE’s surveillance, involving Russia and the Caucasus countries. In 2001, it 
created a “strategic triangle” between Russia, Turkey, and the Central Asian countries for 
enhanced consultation on regional political matters. Also that year, Turkey, Russia, 
Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, and Georgia officially launched the Black Sea Force to 
foster cooperation between the littoral countries of the Black Sea, bringing together 
Ankara and Moscow within the framework of a joint military force for the first time in 
their five hundred years of diplomatic relations.390 Turkey and Russia also deepened 
regional cooperation in late 2001 through the “Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia,” 
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the first official document that described the Turkish-Russian relations as a 
“multidimensional partnership.”391 
  Admittedly, the political tension between Ankara and Moscow had begun to 
decline even before the AKP came power, especially since 2000, but following the rise of 
the AKP, the Turkish-Russian economic and political partnership was upgraded with four 
high-level visits between the two countries in 2009 and the establishment of an 
Intergovernmental High Level Cooperation Council in 2010. A Turkish diplomat even 
described Ankara’s regular political dialog with Moscow in 2006 as the “most regular 
and substantial” the Foreign Ministry has with any country.392 Economic ties between the 
two countries received a significant boost during this period with high profile energy 
deals and a substantial increase in bilateral trade. Russian public opinion toward Turkey 
was also positive during this period. In a 2005 poll in Russia, 71 percent of the Russians 
displayed a positive attitude toward Turkey with 51 percent considering it a reliable trade 
and economic partner, 16 percent seeing it as a fraternal country, and only 3 percent 
thinking that Turkey is an enemy country and a probable rival.393  
After the AKP came to power, Turkey increased its engagement with the Central 
Asia region, albeit at a much lesser degree than its outreach to the Middle East. Ankara’s 
policy for the region—contributing to a stable, independent, and economically prosperous 
Central Asia to help these countries build free market economies and functioning 
democracies—has largely been in line with the Western interests in the region.394 The US 
backing played an important role in reinforcing Turkish outreach toward Central Asia. 
Ankara’s policy after 2002 was more pragmatic than its ideological outreach in the 
1990s; it emphasized pragmatic concerns such as mutual economic interests and the 
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region’s socio-economic development rather than lofty political goals based on ethnic 
and cultural affinities.  
During this period, Turkey has continued to support the region’s sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and its socio-economic and democratic development through its 
development organization TIKA, but it prioritized stability and energy security. It aimed 
to facilitate energy relations between the region and Europe that advance the project of 
transforming Turkey into an energy hub, but it maintained a delicate balance between its 
interests and the Western objectives on the one hand and the interests of the other major 
powers, including Russia, China, Iran, and India, on the other hand. Turkey’s trade 
volume with the Central Asian countries reached $7.5 billion in 2013, making Turkey 
one of the Central Asian states’ top trading partners. Turkey supplemented its economic 
ties with high-level diplomatic visits to the region. It established the High Level Strategic 
Cooperation Council mechanisms with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and the Cooperation 
Council with Tajikistan.395  
Turkey’s political and economic ties to the Caucasus region deepened during this 
period, even more than Ankara’s ties with Central Asia because of geographical 
proximity and Turkey’s energy interests. The AKP government valued its relations with 
the Caucasus region also because these countries created a buffer zone between Turkey 
and its historic rival Russia. Ankara has strongly supported the territorial integrity and 
independence of these countries to balance Russia’s influence in the region and out of 
fear that any instability and power politics played in the region could spill over into 
Turkey’s own territory. In addition to historical, cultural, and linguistic connections to the 
region—many Turkish citizens can trace their origins back to the Caucasus—Turkey’s 
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pragmatic economic and foreign policy considerations, including Ankara’s need for 
energy supplies, have also shaped its attitude towards the region.396 Turkey is the largest 
trade partner for Georgia and Azerbaijan and one of the largest investors in these 
countries. Bilateral trade more than tripled during the AKP period reaching nearly $1.7 
billion for Georgia and nearly $3.2 billion for Azerbaijan.  
Turkey had the backing of the US and the EU in its political and economic 
engagement with the Caucasus region and supported the Western interests in the region at 
the expense of Russia. Economic relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia deepened with 
the launching of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC), which Russia strongly opposed 
because it would provide an alternative venue for the Azeri energy resources to reach 
Europe bypassing Russia. Turkey believed the BTC oil pipeline and gas pipelines from 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan would enable the newly independent states to decrease 
their dependence on Russia and strengthen ties with Turkey.397 The US strongly 
supported these projects as a non-Russian and non-Iranian outlet for Caspian energy and 
former President Clinton even witnessed the signing of a commitment to BTC by 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The EU was also a big supporter of these energy 
projects because it enhanced its energy security by reducing their dependence on energy 
imports from Russia. 
Turkey’s foreign policy toward Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus after the 
AKP came to power will be examined in the following sections. 
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While the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated an 
existential threat to Turkey, the Turkish-Russian relations suffered mutual mistrust 
because of the historical enmity from the Ottoman Era, clashing worldviews and national 
interests in Eurasia, and Russia’s resentment of Turkish and Western involvement in 
Russia’s backyard.398 The Russians felt uncomfortable about the strategic implications of 
Turkey’s alliance with the US within the NATO—which sponsored Partnership for 
Peace-related activities in the region—and the Western involvement in the transportation 
of Eurasian energy resources through Turkey bypassing Russia.  
Regional conflicts and instabilities in the Balkans, the south Caucasus, and the 
Middle East highlighted the two countries’ often clashing political, economic, and 
cultural interests. For example, in the two major post-Cold War crises in the former 
Yugoslavia— in Bosnia and Kosovo—Russia sided with the Serbs and Turkey sided with 
Bosnian Muslims and Kosovars, actively supporting the NATO’s punitive actions against 
the Serbs. Relations among the Greeks, Greek Cypriots, and the Russians flourished in 
the 1990s leading Ankara to perceive an evolving anti-Turkish entente. For example, 
Russia offered to sell the Greek Cypriots the S-300 air-defense systems, deployment of 
which would have radically changed the eastern Mediterranean military balance. In the 
1992-1993 Armenian-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia sided with 
Armenia and Turkey supported Azerbaijan. In the Middle East, the Turkish military’s 
large-scale operations in northern Iraq against the PKK irked the Russian Government 
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and the Russian Duma appealed to President Boris Yeltsin in 1998 to grant political 
asylum to Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader who had fled to Russia following his 
expulsion from Syria. The Russians also alleged Turkish complicity in support of Grozny 
during the 1994-1996 Russo-Chechen war.  
Despite these bilateral frictions however, Turkey and Russia found a way to 
resolve conflicts, ease political tension, and deepen bilateral cooperation to enhance 
mutual trust. Following a series of deadly collisions in the Turkish straits, Turkey 
unilaterally imposed new traffic regulations in the Straits in 1994 despite strong objection 
from Russia, the Straits’ primary foreign user. Confronted with Turkish resistance 
following the International Maritime Organization’s endorsement of Turkey’s position in 
1995, Russia sought Bulgarian and Greek cooperation in developing a pipeline from 
Bulgaria to Greece, bypassing the Straits.399 Turkey’s subsequent revision of the traffic 
rules somewhat eased the tension. Similarly, Russia’s deployment of military equipment 
in the northern Caucasus in excess of the limits set by the 1990 treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe caused bilateral tension, but Ankara and Moscow found a 
compromise on each other’s treaty ceiling during 1998 and 1999, resolving a major 
discord. 
The Turkish-Russian rapprochement accompanied the increasing economic ties 
between the two countries, especially in trade, construction, and tourism, deepening their 
economic interdependence. In 1992, Turkey and Russia signed the Friendship Treaty, 
which formed the fundamental basis for the Turkish Russian relations in the post-Soviet 
era. In the mid-1990s when the Western nations refused to sell weapons that could be 
used against its Kurdish rebels, Turkey became the first NATO country to buy arms, 
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rifles, and helicopters from Russia.400 In 1993, Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, who 
chose Moscow as the destination of her first foreign visit, stated that Russia and Turkey 
viewed the world from “practically the same” position and praised the relationship that 
was entering a new stage based on mutually beneficial cooperation rather than 
competition.401 Then came Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin’s official visit 
to Turkey in December 1997—the first in twenty-five years by a Russian or Soviet head 
of government—to sign a $20-billion Blue Stream Accord. According to the gas deal, 
Russia would supply Turkey with as much as 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas per 
year over a 25-year period via a new 1,200 km pipeline under the Black Sea.402 This visit 
came on the heels of the EU’s Luxembourg summit decision, which had seemingly 
closed the door to Turkey’s prospects for full EU membership.403 In 2001, the foreign 
ministers of Turkey and Russia signed the Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia, 
creating a Russian-Turkish High-Level Joint Working Group and a Caucasus Task Force.  
Turkey’s outreach to Russia to improve bilateral relations began before the AKP 
came to power, but it significantly accelerated and the bilateral relations substantially 
deepened under the AKP rule. Turkey’s foreign policy toward Russia after the AKP came 
to power will be examined below. 
Hypothesis A: It states that the recent changes in Turkish foreign policy 
stemming from international and domestic level factors indicate a fundamental 
reorientation of Ankara’s foreign policy away from the US and the EU in favor of a 
completely autonomous regional power that would try to limit the Western influence in 
Eurasia.  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely oppose or confound the policies of its 
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NATO allies, specifically the US and the EU, toward Russia and take a stance 
systematically at odds with the Western interests. 
Evidence: 
Turkey’s close diplomatic and economic ties to Russia led Ankara to take 
positions on regional and international issues that created tension with the West. During 
the Georgian crisis of 2008, Turkey did not strongly condemn Russia’s military 
aggression against Georgia. Turkish policymakers acted carefully in order to minimize 
the tension during the crisis and the Caucasus Stability Cooperation Platform that Ankara 
put forward with Russia and the three Caucasian countries excluded major Western 
powers such as the US and the EU. The United States complained that it was not 
informed about the Platform beforehand, undermining the Turkish-US-Azeri-Georgian 
geopolitical bloc that had emerged in the second half of the 1990s.404  
During the Russian-Georgian conflict, Moscow pressured Ankara to uphold the 
Montreux Convention and not allow the passage of the US navy, which was delivering 
humanitarian aid to Georgia via the Bosporus, out of fear that it could be transferring 
military equipment. When the US requested official permission from the Turkish 
authorities for the passage of two NATO-flagged vessels to the Black Sea through the 
Straits, Turkey strictly applied the rules of the 1936 Montreux Convention, which limits 
the foreign ships’ number, total tonnage, and duration of stay in the black Sea. Having 
placed its decision on this basis and putting a 21-day restriction on the presence of the 
American vessels in the Black Sea waters, Ankara tried to maintain a delicate balance 
between the two major powers, raising questions about Turkey’s loyalty to the NATO.405 
During that time, the Russian customs officials were inspecting Turkish trucks at 
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the border posts to Russia with exceptional diligence, taking the trucks to a red lane and 
checking them one by one. Many in Turkey interpreted the difficulties the Turkish trucks 
faced as Kremlin’s punishment for Ankara’s permission to the entry of US ships into the 
Black Sea.406 However, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov quickly asserted that 
there could be no politics involved in trade.407408 This friction did not hurt Turkish-
Russian relations and the two countries signed an agreement on simplified customs 
procedure within a month.409 A year later, then President Gul and Medvedev signed a 
political declaration affirming the status of Turkish-Russian relations as a 
“multidimensional strengthened partnership,”410 and established the “High Level 
Cooperation Council” in 2010.  
International factors such as Turkey’s frustration with the US policies in the 
Middle East, such as the Iraq War, and the EU’s slow rolling in granting Turkey 
accession to the Union played an important role in Ankara’s rapprochement with 
Moscow. During the periods of increasing tension with Washington, some Turkish 
military officials even made an emotional call for a military reorientation towards 
Moscow rather than to Washington.411 In December 2002, Erdogan met with Putin and 
they reached a consensus about the need to solve the Iraqi conflict through peaceful 
means.412 After announcing Turkey’s candidacy in 1999, the EU had not started 
accession talks with Turkey over divergent issues such as broadcasting and educating in 
the Kurdish language, abolition of the death penalty, and solution of the Cyprus problem. 
In response, Secretary of the Turkish National Security Council General Tuncer Kilinc 
proposed—though immediately rejected both by the Turkish General Staff and the 
government—the formation of a “Russian-Turkish-Iranian axis” to stand against the EU’s 
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“unacceptable” requests.413 The Turkish-EU relations further deteriorated after 2004 
when the Greek Cypriot government entered the EU with the claim of representing the 
whole island, including the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, despite 
protests from Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots.414   
The deepening of the ties with Moscow was also visible in international 
platforms; Turkey supported Russia’s quest to join the World Trade Organization and 
Moscow’s desire to obtain an observer status at the Organization of the Islamic 
Cooperation. Russia supported Turkey’s observer role in the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO)—in which Turkey became a dialogue partner in 2013—and 
Turkey’s bid for a non-permanent seat in the UNSC.415 Furthermore, Ankara chose not to 
extend NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean to the Black Sea to 
placate Russia.  
More recently, Turkey refused to join the US and the EU sanctions against Russia 
for Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and support for rebel groups in Eastern Ukraine. 
Turkey continued to pursue investment deals in Russia ranging from the agricultural 
sector to the automobile. For example, a Turkish shoe producer inked a $100-million 
contract to provide boots for the Russian military. Turkey’s decision to boost exports to 
Russia, following Moscow’s decision to impose countersanctions on western food 
products, tainted its pro-Western image. In September 2014, a Turkish exporters’ 
association announced tentative plans to nearly triple food exports to Russia to $3 billion 
by 2015. The Foreign Ministry of Greece, an EU member whose food products were 
banned in Russia, issued a statement in August 2014 implying that Turkey was cheating 
its European allies by trying to increase its trade with Russia.416  
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Ankara also looks to Russia as well as to China for a number of military 
procurement projects, in addition to building its own defense industry, raising fears in the 
West that Turkey is reducing its military dependence on NATO allies. The Russian S-300 
or S-400 missile systems are attractive to the Turkish military industry’s proposed multi-
billion dollar long-range missile defense project.417418 NATO allies are concerned that 
Turkey—which has the second-largest land force in NATO after the US—is making an 
aggressive push to carve out a more independent military, risking its decades-long 
alliance with the West, just as both sides seek each other’s help to counter security 
threats, particularly in the battle against the Islamic State militants in Syria and Iraq.419  
Prediction 2: Turkey would not share its Western allies’ vision for Russia 
and its foreign policy initiatives in the region would exceed the bounds of what the 
US, the EU, and its other NATO partners consider acceptable.  
Evidence: 
While the Western powers focused on incorporating the former Soviet Union 
countries into the orbit of the EU and NATO, and maintain a lukewarm relationship with 
Russia in the 2000s, Turkey asserted its independence by actively seeking closer ties with 
Russia on political, security, and economic matters. Putin made a historic visit to Turkey 
in 2004, the first Russian head of state to visit Turkey in the last 32 years, and the two 
sides signed a Joint Declaration on Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional 
Partnership. The declaration recognized both countries as Eurasian powers with shared 
interest in security and stability in the Caucasus, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, and 
emphasized the need to cooperate more via the Intergovernmental Commission on 
Military, Technical and Defense Industry Cooperation.420  
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Also in 2004, Turkey proposed to Russia a new security initiative known as the 
Black Sea Harmony that would entail joint naval maneuvers. When the first two of these 
maneuvers was carried out in 2006, it caused anxiety in the West, fearing Turkey may 
increasingly seek to make the Black Sea primarily the province of the riparian Black Sea 
powers and discourage great power rivalry within it. In 2005, Putin and Erdogan met four 
times, including a seven-hour meeting in Sochi, and the two sides extended their 
cooperation in military and defense sector. Russia even allowed Turkish president to 
make an official visit to the Russian Republic of Tatarstan, an ethnically Turkic nation, in 
2005. 
Despite the past political tension between Ankara and Moscow for Russia’s 
support for the PKK and Turkey’s sympathy for the Chechen Muslims, the two countries 
also reached a common understanding on terrorism that was solidified in a joint 
declaration in 2004. With increasing bilateral ties and deepening Russian cooperation 
against terrorism and separatism, Turkey also became less vocal on the Chechen issue. In 
2004, Erdogan called for a joint action against terrorism and peaceful settlement of the 
Chechen issue “within the framework of Russia’s territorial integrity.”421 
Domestic factors such as pro-Russian sentiments among some groups inside the 
Turkish armed forces and the rising sympathy for Russia among the Turkish public, 
especially as the economic interdependency strengthened, also played a role in increasing 
Turkish-Russian ties. Turkey has no openly anti-Russian faction in the Turkish 
parliament in the post-Soviet era, not even the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) 
known for its ultranationalist ideology and its strong support for the Turkic peoples of the 
region, has an anti-Russian agenda. The Turkish-Russian relations did not suffer when 
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the MHP was a part of the governing coalition in 1999 despite the renewed Russian-
Chechen fighting in late 1999. On the contrary, there was a small group of neo-
nationalists in Turkey who favored the formation of a strategic axis between Turkey and 
Russia against the West. It sympathized with the idea of Eurasianism with an emphasis 
on a kind of “geopolitical alliance” to be formed between the countries of Eurasia though 
neither Turkish nor Russian government showed any sign of an intention to form a 
Eurasian alliance with each other.422  
Prediction 3: Turkey would orient its trade towards non-Western trading 
blocs that try to limit the influence of the West in the Eurasia region and it would 
reject or give up its pursuit of EU membership. 
Evidence: 
Turkey significantly increased its trade with Russia as well as with other BRIC 
countries of Brazil, India, and China during this period. Ankara also rhetorically 
expressed interest in joining some Eurasian blocs and pursued energy deals with Russia, 
which could undermine the EU’s energy security. Turkey’s total trade—exports and 
imports—with Russia, one of its major trading partners, increased dramatically during the 
AKP period from $5 billion in 2002 to nearly $37.5 billion in 2014, mainly driven by 
Russia’s energy exports to Turkey (see figure 14). Turkey imported 10 percent of its oil 
and 56 percent of its natural gas from Russia in 2012.423 Russia is the biggest market for 
Turkish contractors and Turkey is the top destination for Russian tourists. While both 
Russian and the Western trade with Turkey increased from 2002 to 2013, the proportion 
of Ankara’s trade with Moscow as well as with Beijing increased more than its trade with 
Brussels and Washington (see figure 15). 
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Figure 14: Turkey’s Trade with Russia since 1998424 
 
Figure 15: Turkey’s Main Trade Partners in 2002 and 2014425 
	   	  
Erdogan sometimes expressed his frustration with the stalling EU progress 
through empty rhetoric about leaving the EU. In 2013, he said, “when things go so 
poorly, you inevitably…seek other paths. That’s why I recently said to Mr. Putin: ‘Take 
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altogether. Why all this stalling?”426 Ironically, as Erdogan was telling his interviewer 
that Turkey might join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the American, German 
and Dutch troops were busy setting up the Patriot batteries along Turkey’s southern 
border to protect the country from the Syrian missiles.427 Erdogan’s rhetoric also came at 
a time when the public support for continuing the EU process was at a historic low. A 
survey by the Istanbul-based Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies found that 
only 33 percent of those surveyed believed Turkey should continue working towards 
joining the EU over the next five years.  
As the prospect of full Turkish membership in the EU remains elusive, many 
Turkish intellectuals, politicians, and opinion makers began to talk about alternative 
futures for Turkey with different geographical priorities and different identities.428 
Around the time when the US-EU free trade talks through the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership were taking place, Turkey rhetorically floated the idea of joining 
the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, fully knowing that becoming a 
member of the Russia-led Customs Union would make Ankara ineligible to become an 
EU member in the future. During a visit by then Russian president Medvedev in 2010, 
the two countries reached an agreement to abolish the visa requirement for stays less than 
30 days,429 while Ankara maintains visa requirements for many EU members. Bilateral 
trade and investment received a boost from the visa-free regime and from the non-stop 
ferry service between the ports of Kavkaz, Russia and Samsun, Turkey that carry railcars 
across the sea from Russia to Turkey.  
Turkey, similar to some Eastern European countries, has at times undercut its 
European counterparts to gain an upper-hand in the energy trade with Russia. In 2009, 
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only three weeks after the signing of the EU-backed Nabucco project—which would link 
natural gas resources of Azerbaijan and possibly Iran, Iraq and Turkmenistan to Europe 
through Turkey bypassing Russia—Russian prime minister visited Turkey with proposals 
to lay the South Stream pipeline on the Black Sea bed. Turkey reacted positively to 
because of Ankara’s high dependence on Russia for its energy needs even though 
Russia’s proposal for the South Stream pipeline was considered the main rival to the 
Nabucco line. At that time, Turkish leaders publicly said that national interests rather 
than a change of orientation toward Moscow had been the driver of heightened 
cooperation with Russia.430 
During the late 2014 state visit of the president of Russia, which has been 
experiencing economic downturn under the Western sanctions, Putin surprised the world 
by suspending its plans for the South Stream and announcing that it would run pipes to 
Turkey instead; Putin also called Turkey a “strategic partner.” This Turkish Stream, 
which is estimated to cost around $10 billion as opposed to the $40 billion cost for the 
South Stream, is slated to be completed by December 2016 and could funnel up to 63 
bcm of gas under the Black Sea from Russia to Turkey and on to Greece and the EU. 
Russia’s Gazprom’s Chief Executive said “Turkish Stream is now the only pipeline” and 
warned if Europe wants more Russian gas then it will need to find its own way to tap into 
the Turkish stream.431 
The West was not happy with Gazprom’s decision on the Turkish stream. The EU 
had opposed Russia’s previous proposal for the South Stream fearing that it would 
increase Russia’s dominance of the European gas market, but Gazprom’s plan to shift the 
Russian gas that now flow to Europe through Ukraine to the new pipeline through Turkey 
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would further weaken Kiev in its struggle with Moscow.432 Brussels warned Moscow that 
it has long-term contractual obligations to supply its gas to Europe through Ukraine, 
plunging Ankara to the middle ground between the West and Russia.433 According to 
some Turkish officials, Turkish Government appears to be trying to use Gazprom’s need 
for a face-saving alternative to the South Stream as leverage to negotiate lower prices for 
Russian gas.434 The Russian leader pledged a 6 percent discount on the price of the 14 
bcm of gas available for sale annually to Turkey from the pipeline. However, the deal 
would further increase Turkey’s gas dependency on Russia to over 75 percent and would 
place the country more firmly in the Russian energy camp.435  
Hypothesis B: It states that recent changes in Turkish foreign policy resulting 
from international and domestic level factors demonstrate that while there is a significant 
change in the direction of autonomy, Turkey’s foreign policy in the Eurasia region does 
not represent a fundamental shift away from the West.  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely support or conform to the policies of its 
NATO allies, specifically the US and the EU, towards Russia. 
Evidence: 
Turkey’s foreign policy under the AKP government, which emphasizes 
eliminating Turkey’s problems with neighbors, prioritizing pragmatic economic interests, 
and maintaining multidimensional foreign policy, significantly improved Ankara’s 
relations with Moscow. Even though Turkey has refrained from taking sides in any 
“Russia vs. the West” struggles—because of its energy dependency on Russia—and had 
some tactical differences with the West on some foreign policy approaches against 
Russia, Ankara has maintained its support for the Western policy towards Moscow at the 
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fundamental level. Erdogan’s words in 2008 sums up Turkish leaders’ thinking: 
“America is our ally and the Russian Federation is an important neighbor. Russia is our 
number one trade partner. We are obtaining two-thirds of our energy from Russia. We act 
in accordance to our national interest… We cannot ignore Russia.”436  
Davutoglu’s principles of zero problems with neighbors and multidimensional 
foreign policy have played an important role in shaping Ankara’s policy toward 
Russia.437 Turkish politicians have made developing bilateral political and economic 
relations with Russia a priority and consider Russia a necessary partner for regional peace 
and stability in Eurasia.438 Turks also don’t see its relations with Russia as a zero-sum 
game, believing that Ankara’s longstanding ties to the West do not preclude it from 
seeking closer ties to Moscow. Davutoglu stated that “Turkish-Russian relations 
constituted an integral component of Turkey’s multidimensional foreign policy,” in an 
article he wrote for a Russian journal. Addressing the crowd in a Turkish think tank in 
Washington in 2009, Davutoglu said, “We are not involved in a bipolar world anymore. 
It means our good relations with Russia are not an alternative to the EU. Or our model 
partnership with the United States is not a new partnership against Russia.”439  
Turkey has been a staunch supporter for strengthening the sovereignty and 
economy of the former Soviet Union (FSU) countries—an important US and EU 
objective in the region. Ankara’s efforts to bolster the region’s political and economic 
independence put it at odds with Moscow’s efforts in increasing the FSU countries’ 
dependence on Russia to keep them in its orbit. Turkey is also helping some FSU 
countries develop their militaries, offsetting their security dependence on Russia.440 The 
five-day war in August 2008 between Russia and Georgia actually demonstrated the 
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fragility of the Turkish-Russian relationship. Ankara has close political, economic, and 
military relations with Georgia and felt uneasy about the risks posed by the war on 
regional stability in the neighboring Caucasus. Some Russian newspapers even accused 
Turkey, together with the US, of being responsible for the crisis, on the grounds that it 
was one of the two major suppliers of military aid to Georgia.441 Even though Turkey’s 
reaction to Russia during the Georgia war was muted, Ankara consistently maintained its 
principled stance on Georgia’s territorial integrity and it was one of the first countries to 
send humanitarian aid to Georgia immediately after the conflict. 
Again, during the Ukraine crisis, Turkey tried to maintain that balance among its 
priorities: its strong commitment to its NATO allies and Western values, including the 
international norms and rule of law, its sympathy for the Crimean Tatars—Turks’ ethnic 
brethren—and its economic dependence on Russia, decreasing Ankara’s autonomy in 
foreign policy. Some 250 people protested Russia’s takeover of Crimea in front of the 
Russian Consulate in Istanbul, chanting “Turkey, help your brothers!” in March 2014.442  
Then Foreign Minister Davutoglu was one of the first envoys to meet with 
Ukraine's new government in Kyiv in February 2014 following months of protests that 
led to the ouster of the country's pro-Russian president. He said, “for Turkey, Ukraine’s 
territorial integrity, stability, and prosperity are crucial. Crimea is of great importance to 
Turkey as it is doorway to Ukraine. It is also important due to the presence of Tatars and 
Turkey’s cultural heritage.”443 Turkey condemned Russia's annexation of Crimea in 
March 2014 in line with the positions adopted by the US and the EU, and stressed its 
support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, maintaining that Crimea is part of Ukraine.444 
More recently, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in May 2015 ahead of a 
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NATO meeting that “nothing can justify Russia's actions in Ukraine and other ex-Soviet 
states, Ukraine, Crimea, Georgia” in a strong criticism of Russia. He further added that 
Turkey was ready to play a “constructive role” in the disputes between Russia and the 
West over Ukraine.445 Ankara did not join the West, however, in its sanctions toward 
Russia because Ankara depends on energy imports from Russia and as a result, it is more 
vulnerable than the EU. Several EU countries, including France, Germany and Italy, were 
also reluctant to impose severe sanctions for fear of igniting a trade war and jeopardizing 
their gas supplies from Russia.446	  
Turkey’s increasing arms trade with Russia is also a part of its multidimensional 
foreign policy, probably based on its past troubles with the West in arms trade, and it 
does not necessarily mean Ankara is abandoning the military alliance. The U.S. imposed 
an arms embargo on Turkey for more than three years following Ankara’s 1974 military 
intervention in Cyprus. During the 1991 Gulf War and 2003 Iraq War, NATO allies 
agreed only after long and contentious discussions to deploy the Patriots system to 
protect Turkey.447 More recently, some military officials in Ankara have been warning of 
a possible arms embargo from Washington. In December 2014, Congress approved the 
transfer of several naval frigates to Mexico and Taiwan, excluding Turkey, which had 
been slated as one of the original recipients, over concerns about its policies toward Israel 
and Cyprus. 448  
Despite these trade frictions, the US arms sales to Turkey totaled $2.7 billion in 
2013 and the military relationship between the two sides is one of the strongest elements 
of the bilateral relationship.449 Furthermore, Turkey’s arms purchase from Russia is in 
line with the general trend of Turkish efforts at diversifying its arms supplies, 
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exemplified by increasing military purchases from China and heavy emphasis on local 
arms production.450 In March, Prime Minister Davutoglu said, “a nation that does not 
have its own defense industry cannot have a claim to independence.” 451 
The Turkish Government allayed NATO’s fears from Turkey’s attempt to build 
its own defense industry and seek military technology from non-Western allies by 
highlighting that Ankara closely cooperates with its NATO allies against security threats 
such as the Islamic extremism in the region. The government said it deported around 
1,000 would-be jihadists and boosted intelligence sharing to combat the Islamic State. In 
March, Turkey allowed the US to deploy armed drones at the Incirlik Air Base to help 
fight the militants. Since 2013, Ankara has hosted 750 NATO troops and five Patriot 
batteries from the alliance, joined NATO’s antipiracy operation off Africa’s coast, and 
participated in the U.K.-hosted Joint Warrior drill. In early 2015, NATO spokeswoman 
Carmen Romero said, “Turkey contributes to strengthening our collective defense in 
response to Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine, and Turkey is also making a 
significant contribution to our missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan.”452  
Turkish public values and strongly supports the NATO alliance but they also want 
their government to take a more independent approach to regional challenges, including 
the Russian aggression, in line with the national interests. According to the German 
Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic survey in 2013, 49 percent of the Turks thought the NATO 
was still essential to the country’s security. When asked what Turkey should do in 
managing relations with Russia, 40 percent of the Turks said it should take an 
independent approach. However, 19 percent said it should work closely with the EU and 
27 percent said it should work closely with the US, compared with only 9 percent of the 
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ten EU countries—including Germany, France, Italy, UK—that said the EU should work 
closely with the US.453 
Prediction 2: Turkey would share its Western allies’ vision for the region and 
its foreign policy initiatives toward Russia would be acceptable to the US, the EU, 
and its other NATO partners. 
Evidence: 
Despite the high-level diplomatic visits and close economic ties between Ankara 
and Moscow and Turkish politicians’ empty rhetoric, Turkey inherently does not trust 
Russia, with whom the Turks fought for centuries, and does not share Russia’s vision for 
the region. Therefore, Ankara’s relationship with Moscow is vulnerable to changing 
external factors and is likely to deteriorate as their fundamentally divergent views and 
interests come to the surface. Turkey and Russia stand practically on the opposing sides 
of the recent international conflicts. The conflict in Syria is one of the most important 
arenas of geopolitical rivalry between Turkey and Russia. While Russia is the biggest 
supporter of the Syrian leadership, Ankara supports logistically the opposition forces in 
northern Syria, informally supplying them with weapons and providing them with 
intelligence data and medical treatment. Ankara also directly countered Russia’s 
engagement in Syria; in 2012 Turkey twice forced Syrian and Armenian airplanes 
carrying Russian military equipment for Syria to land.454 
Moscow is a key military ally to Turkey’s main regional rivals, including 
Armenia, Cyprus, and Greece. The policies of Ankara and Moscow also diverge on other 
issues such as the independence of Kosovo, Iran’s nuclear program, and Cyprus. Russia 
is the main military ally of Cyprus, which perceives Turkey as the key threat to its 
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security. At the end of October 2014, Russia conducted naval exercises with the Cypriot 
and Israeli navy for three days in waters east of Cyprus. Russia provided political support 
to the Greek Cypriots by blocking Turkey’s attempts in the UNSC, as a non-permanent 
member, to lift the economic sanctions on the Turkish Cypriots. Medvedev even paid a 
visit to Nicosia in 2010, emphasizing Russia’s close economic and political relations with 
the Greek Cypriots.455  
Despite showing ostensible support for the Turkish-Armenian political 
normalization process, Kremlin still seems to be “reluctant to welcome too close a 
rapprochement between Turkey and its main strategic ally in the Caucasus.”456 Russia’s 
strong support for the Armenian claim of a genocide, which Turkey does not recognize, 
also strained bilateral relations in the past. More recently, Russia’s Duma approved a 
resolution in 2015 declaring that the Ottomans had committed genocide against their 
Armenian subjects in 1915. Putin’s use of the word “genocide” for the centennial 
commemoration of the killings led to political fallout. The Turkish foreign ministry 
released a statement that said, “taking into account the mass atrocities and exiles in 
Caucasus, in the Central Asia and Eastern Europe committed by Russia for a century; 
collective punishment methods such as Holodomor as well as inhumane practices 
especially against Turkish and Muslim people in Russia’s own history, we consider that 
Russia is best-suited to know what exactly “genocide” and its legal dimension are.”457 
The Turkish-Russian relations are not immune from the ongoing energy 
competition between the West and Russia and the two countries compete in providing 
alternative routes to transfer Central Asian and Caucasian energy resources to Europe. 
Ankara has strongly supported the Eurasian states’ efforts to join the Euro-Atlantic 
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institutions and energy initiatives circumventing Russia.458 Russia regards the Baku-
Tbilisi-Erzurum oil pipeline supported by Turkey, US, and the EU as an obstacle to its oil 
trade and challenge to its status in the Caspian basin. Turkey’s energy dependence on 
Russia, Ankara’s Achilles heel, which explains Turkey’s support for Russia’s latest 
proposal for the Turkish Stream, portend that the Turkish-Russian relations will fall short 
of becoming a strategic partnership against the US and the EU. Turkey, just like the EU, 
has an interest in reducing its energy dependence on Moscow and it has supported the 
EU-backed regional energy projects such as importing gas from Azerbaijan through a 
Trans-Caspian pipeline.  
Following the Russian gas cutoff to Ukraine in 2006 as a punishment for the 
“orange revolution,” Europeans, who depend on the Russian gas through the Ukrainian 
pipeline, began to search for alternative energy transportation projects to reduce their 
dependence on Russian energy. The previously mentioned EU-backed Nabucco project 
envisioned a pipeline to carry the Caspian and Middle Eastern natural gas via Turkey, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to Austria, bypassing Russia. Turkey joined the project 
while refusing to participate in Russia’s Blue Stream II proposal, which would carry 
Central Asian gas into Europe through Turkey via a pipeline to be built in parallel with 
the Blue Stream, causing resentment in Moscow. On the Turkish stream, Ankara also 
claimed that the new pipeline bypassing the troubled areas in Ukraine could actually 
enhance the EU’s energy security. 
Turkey’s Caucasian ethnic minorities, supported by active ethnically-based 
lobbies, also had some impact on Turkey’s rhetoric against the Russian moves but did not 
translate into real action in support of these minorities. Before Russia took over Crimea, 
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Davutoglu expressed his concern about how the developments in Crimea might impact 
the Tatars, Turks’ ethnic and religious kin, and his ministry issued a statement in March 
2014, calling the referendum on whether the region should become part of Russia as a 
“wrong” move. There are more Tatars in Turkey than there are in Crimea and three times 
more ethnic Abkhaz living in Turkey than in Abkhazia, Georgia. Turkey’s Abkhazians 
have powerful ethnic lobbies that advocate for Turkey’s recognition of Abkhazia’s 
independence and for Turkey’s support for the Abkhazians in their conflict with Georgia, 
a move that Turkey has been reluctant to take because it strongly supports Georgia’s 
territorial integrity. In line with the EU’s policy in the region, Turkey has tried to find 
ways to develop beneficial trade relations with Abkhazia after it was recognized as a de 
facto independent state by Russia in 2008 with the goal of reducing Abkhazia’s 
dependence on Russia.459 
Despite having divergent visions on strategic issues, domestic economic interests 
have been a major factor that drove Turkey and Russia to form a kind of “silent 
solidarity” for the resolution of regional security matters. Successful management of their 
significant energy projects, such as the Turkish Stream and the Akkuyu nuclear plant 
project, requires a certain degree of stability and predictability in Turkish-Russian 
relations. Turkish scholar Ersen argues if it had not been for the economic links between 
the two countries, Turkish-Russian relations could have suffered serious blows due to 
political problems. As a result of the energy competition and Russia’s takeover of 
Crimea, earlier pro-Russian sentiment in the Turkish public began to fade away and 
concerns about Putin’s aggression replaced the empty rhetoric about the formation of a 
Turkish-Russian axis in the region. According to the German Marshall Fund’s 
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Transatlantic survey in 2013, 68 of Turks had unfavorable opinion of Russia, up from 46 
percent in 2010 though the numbers for US and the EU are also high at 61 percent and 51 
percent, respectively.  
Prediction 3: Turkey’s bilateral trade would increase with both Russia and 
the Western countries. Turkey would seek greater integration with Russia but it 
would also pursue EU membership and closer economic ties with the US. 
 Evidence: 
Turkey’s overall trade increased with Russia and the West as well as with other 
countries like China, commensurate with the rise in its GDP during this period. Turkey, 
after the EU, was Gazprom’s second-largest market and Russia is Turkey’s most reliable 
energy supplier and single largest supplier of natural gas. Thanks to the direct link 
beneath the Black Sea to Russia, the flow of gas from Russia has never been disrupted; 
Russia even increased the export volume when Iran briefly suspended gas exports to 
Turkey. During Putin’s visit to Turkey in 2009, the two sides signed a number of energy-
related agreements involving the expansion of the pipeline network in the Black Sea, 
providing crude oil for the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline, building of the gas storage 
depots, and power plants in Turkey; a Russian-Turkish consortium won the tender for 
constructing the first Turkish nuclear plant in southern Turkey.  
Turkey’s greater economic ties with Russia is inevitable given it currently meets 
more than half of its energy needs with exports from Russia and its rapidly growing 
economy will need even more. In 2013, Turkey had the highest consumer energy prices 
among the 34 members of the OECD and its electricity demand is expected to grow at a 
rate of seven percent per year through 2020. According to the International Energy 
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Agency (IEA), Turkey’s energy use will continue to grow at an annual growth rate of 
around 4.5 percent from 2015 to 2030 and will approximately double over the next 
decade, one of the fastest growths in energy demand of countries in the OECD. The IEA 
expects the electricity demand growth to increase at an even faster pace.460 Not 
surprisingly, Russia’s share of Turkey’s total trade increased while that of the EU and the 
US declined during this period because Turkey’s energy imports from Russia 
significantly increased (see Figure 17). 
Figure 16: Turkey’s Natural Gas Supply Mix in 2012 (in percentages)461 
 
Turkey’s business interest groups have also played an important role in increasing 
Russian-Turkish economic ties as well as maintaining Turkey’s EU ties. Parts of the 
Turkish business community have developed a strong economic stake in trade with 
Russia. For example, Turkish construction firms such as GAMA, Tekfen, and ENKA 
have substantial investments in Russia and constitute an important domestic lobby for 
trade with Russia.462 During then Prime Minister Erdogan’s 2005 trip to Moscow, six 
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booming bilateral trade in the fields of construction, retail sales, banking, 
telecommunications, food and beverage, glass, and machine industries. Some Turkish 
officials lamented that their government gives gas deals with Russia an undue priority 
over other energy projects because of effective lobbying by private Turkish construction 
companies that hold substantial Russian investments.463  
During a joint news conference, Erdogan thanked for the share given to Turkish 
contractors in building for the Winter Olympics and asked for a similar share for the 2018 
World Cup, demonstrating the business-minded government’s motivation. In St. 
Petersburg, the two countries’ leaders agreed that the bilateral trade volume, now nearly 
$38 billion, should reach $100 billion by 2020. The head of the largest private 
commercial and financial conglomerate, Koc, in Turkey foresees Turkey’s greatest future 
economic opportunities as lying mainly in Russian and Middle Eastern markets although 
he made sure to emphasize that the Western markets will remain important.464  
Turkey’s economic ties with the West, especially the EU, have indeed remained 
strong even though the EU membership process lost its momentum towards the late 
2000s. Bilateral trade with the EU at nearly $170 billion in 2013 is five times the bilateral 
trade with Russia. The average FDI in Turkey, which had stayed below $1 billion before 
2000, increased to 15.8 billion in 2006 and to $100 billion in 2013,465466 and the three 
quarters of that foreign investment still come from the EU member countries. Despite 
Erdogan’s occasional rhetoric criticizing the slowing accession process due to various 
issues, Turkey has been committed to its EU membership goal. Right after Erdogan made 
those comments about the Shanghai Cooperation Organization being “a better, much 
stronger” club in 2013, he invited EU ambassadors to dinner, playing down his remarks 
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and trying to convince them that he really does take the relationship seriously.467  
Admittedly, the accession process was stalled mainly because of some European 
members’ intransigence, especially Cyprus’ politically motivated move to block some 
chapters, and Turkey’s lack of political will to complete the necessary reforms. However, 
in 2013, the EU started negotiations with Ankara on regional affairs, the first time in 
three years it opened up a new policy area with Turkey.468 In October 2014, President 
Erdogan stated that the EU membership in the bloc remains his long-term strategic goal 
and the government has rolled out plans for overhauls that would ease its EU path.469 In 
May 2015, Turkey and EU announced a framework for expanding its decades-long 
Customs Union (CU); two sides will discuss extending the CU to include services, 
government contracting, and most agricultural goods. This agreement serves to anchor 
Turkey and the EU members’ trade interests in parallel with their close cooperation over 
the past year on intelligence sharing and security ties to stem the flow of Western fighters 
to the self-declared Islamic State and to other extremist militant groups in Syria and 
Iraq.470  
The role of the NGOs and interest groups has been very constructive in 
maintaining and increasing Turkey’s relations with the EU. Turkey’s biggest employers 
group, Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD), has a foreign 
policy forum, which airs its pro-EU views and it closely works with the universities in 
this respect. Other economic organizations and think tanks, including the Turkish Union 
of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB), which represents the small business 
community, Economic Policies Research Institute, and Turkish Economic and Social 
Studies Foundation strongly support the European agenda, defining one of the aims of 
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their foreign policy program as to “contribute to the harmonization of Turkey with the 
EU.”471 TUSIAD, TOBB, and the Foundation for Economic Development, have lobbied 
in the European capitals for Turkey’s EU membership and strongly support the 
government’s activities for EU membership.472   
Turkey also continued to seek closer economic ties with the US during this 
period. Turkey and the US have a Cabinet-level mechanism for discussing the US-
Turkish commercial and economic relations through the Framework for Strategic 
Economic and Commercial Cooperation (FSECC). In 2013, the two countries set up a 
High Level Committee to provide a venue for a dialogue between officials from the 
Turkish Ministry of Economy and the Office of the US Trade Representative as an 
intergovernmental forum where both sides can develop the idea of a free trade agreement 
between Turkey and the US. The United States Chamber of Commerce (USCC) and the 
Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) have also been 
working on the idea of a bilateral free trade agreement. In a forthcoming report, the 
USCC is advocating the idea of a formal “TTIP+3”—the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership the US and the EU are working on—that would bring Turkey, 
Canada, and Mexico into a “second TTIP round” or a “comprehensive US-Turkey free 
trade agreement following the conclusion of any TTIP agreement between the United 
States and the EU.473 
 
Conclusion: 
 Turkey’s relations with Russia provide a difficult case to test Turkey’s Western 
orientation because Turkey’s policy positions or lack thereof, which are strongly 
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motivated by its economic interests, at times have complicated the Western policies in the 
region. However, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that while Turkey and 
the West sometimes opt for different approaches towards Russia at the tactical level, their 
interests at the strategic level are closely aligned.  
Turkey’s response to the Georgian and the Ukrainian crises, and Ankara’s pursuit 
of energy deals with Russia provide evidence for an autonomous foreign policy that 
prioritizes Turkey’s national interests. However, when viewed within its specific context, 
the lack of a strong response from Turkey—a middle-power state that is much weaker 
than Russia and has energy dependency on Moscow—is acceptable to the West, just like 
Ankara’s need to continue its energy trade with Russia that is under the Western 
sanctions is understood by Turkey’s Western allies. In this case, Turkey acted more like 
an autonomous-minded European ally than an adversary.  
When it comes to the overarching vision for the region, the preponderance of the 
evidence shows that Turkey shares the same vision with its Western allies for the region. 
Turkey strongly supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the former Soviet 
Union countries and fundamentally opposes Russian aggression in the region. To that 
end, Turkey has been supporting the security and economic independence of Central 
Asian and the South Caucasus countries while making efforts to avoid an open 
geopolitical confrontation with Russia. Turkey and Russia have been on the opposite 
sides regarding many international conflicts before and after the AKP came to power, 
including the conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Syria, Iran, the Azeri-Armenian frozen 
conflict, and the Ukrainian crisis. Russia militarily and economically supports Turkey’s 
rivals, including Armenia and Cyprus. Turkey’s foreign policy principles towards the 
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regional conflicts, which emphasize dialogue, diplomacy, and economic interdependency 
for regional peace and prosperity, have been in line with the policies of the US and the 
EU even though Turkey’s approach on emphasizing engagement with rather than 
containment of Russia differs from that of the US. 
As for the drivers of Turkey’s foreign policy towards Russia, first of all, 
international factors such as the end of the Cold War and the bipolar world order and 
Turkey’s stalling EU accession bid had a major impact on warming Turkish-Russian 
relationship. After announcing Turkey’s candidacy in 1999, the EU did not start 
accession talks with Turkey because of divergent issues such as broadcasting and 
educating in the Kurdish language, abolition of the death penalty, and solution of the 
Cyprus problem. Turkey felt betrayed when the Greek Cypriot government entered the 
EU and rejected the UN plan that the Turkish Cypriots accepted.474   
Second, Turkish leaders’ new foreign policy doctrine, which stresses eliminating 
conflicts with neighbors and maintaining multidimensional foreign policy, also played a 
role in Turkey’s efforts to maintain closer political and economic ties with Russia and to 
involve Russia in regional peace efforts. Turkey believes that antagonizing Moscow 
would destabilize the region and considers Russia as a key party to the resolution of the 
frozen conflicts in the region. 
Third, and most importantly, domestic economic interests, especially Turkey’s 
energy needs, have created powerful incentives to deepen its relationship with Russia and 
raise it to a higher level of partnership. The energy and trade links between Ankara and 
Moscow have forced both countries to keep their geopolitical competition and political 
conflicts at a manageable level. With a trade volume of nearly $40 billion, rivaled only 
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by the EU as a bloc, it is understandable why neither Turkey nor Russia wants to 
antagonize each other despite their diverging interests about emerging political crises in 
the region. Considering Turkey’s energy dependence on Russia and their future joint 
projects, both countries have strong incentives to maintain stable political relations.  
However, Turkish-Russian relationship is bound to experience tension in the 
future because Turkey and Russia do not have common strategic interests for the regional 
conflicts at the fundamental level and their increasing economic ties have not eliminated 
the longstanding mutual mistrust. Pragmatic economic interests of two “trading states” or 
naked opportunism, rather than well-formulated long-term strategies, have been the real 
driving force behind the rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow.  
Russia is Turkey’s major trading partner and the finalization of the Blue Stream 
pipeline elevated Turkey’s status as one of the major recipients of Russian natural gas in 
Europe. The future of the bilateral energy projects, including the recent Turkish stream, 
requires the maintenance of a friendly atmosphere based on Richard Rosecrance’s 
“trading state” logic. Yet, the Turkish-Russian relations are not fully institutionalized. 
Currently, the main motor of bilateral relations between the two countries is the personal 
dialogue between Erdogan and Putin, resembling the Turkish leaders’ energetic 
cooperation with the Syrian leadership before the Arab Spring.475  
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2.	  CENTRAL	  ASIA	  
	  
Before 2002 
The collapse of the Soviet Union opened a world of newly independent Turkic 
states and Turkey enthusiastically embraced them, becoming the first country to 
recognize their independence in 1991. Then Prime Minister Demirel declared that a 
“gigantic Turkish world” was emerging from “the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China,” 
and spoke of forming an “association” of Turkish states. Then President Ozal announced 
the next century would be “the century of the Turks.” Central Asians were also excited to 
have found a long-lost relative. Kazakhstan’s president declared in 1992 that the 
establishment of official relations between the two countries satisfied “the longing which 
the Turkish and Kazakh peoples had been feeling for each other for years.” 
Turkmenistan’s president noted “our peoples, who were separated artificially in the past, 
are now coming together again.” Uzbekistan’s President asserted that Turkey was “the 
most suitable country and the one closest to us in terms of both geography and the policy 
it is conducting.”476 
This euphoria did not last long, however. Turkey believed its ethnic, linguistic, 
religious, and cultural affinities would pave the way for closer ties and rising Turkish 
influence, but its initial foray into the region had limited success for several reasons. 
Turkey lacked the financial and diplomatic resources to play a substantial economic and 
political role; autocratic Central Asian leaders quickly lost enthusiasm for the Turkish 
model, which emphasized democracy, secularism, and a free market economy; and 
finally, the Russian influence on Central Asia was much deeper and entrenched than 
previously thought. The first Turkic summit in Ankara in 1992 produced little of 
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substance; the Central Asians, having just emerged from 70 years of Soviet 
colonialization, did not want to replace one form of domination by another.477 Ironically, 
at the summit of “Turkish-speaking states” in Istanbul in 2001, most of the heads of state 
spoke Russian, not Turkish. With this realization, Turkey began to focus on economic 
issues, socio-cultural development, and education, mainly through the Turkish 
International Cooperation Agency (TIKA).478 It provided around $1 billion in foreign aid 
to Central Asian countries in the last 20 years, one-fourth of its total foreign aid in the 
same period. In 1999, Turkey was the second-largest investor in Central Asia after Russia 
and its trade with the region stood around $1 billion.479 Turkey offered to take around 
10,000 students from the Turkic republics each year and opened up Turkish schools. 
Turkish businesses began to set up shops, hotels, and construction companies in Central 
Asia.480  
The US and the EU promoted Turkey’s secularism, democratic structure, and 
market economy as a good model to the Central Asians. For example, US President Bush 
senior declared Turkey as a model for the Turkish Republics.481 Turkey’s policy in the 
region was in line with the US policy underpinned by the 1999 Silk Road Strategy Act, 
which amended the US Foreign Assistance Act to provide a mandate for the support of 
the economic and political independence of the countries of Central Asia and the 
Caucasus.482 The EU also supported the Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia 
project to fund the development of a transportation corridor from the Black Sea to Central 
Asia, which would link the region into existing trans-European networks.  
Turkish foreign policy towards Central Asia after the AKP came to power will be 
examined below. 
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Hypothesis A: It states that the recent changes in Turkish foreign policy 
stemming from international and domestic level factors indicate a fundamental 
reorientation of Ankara’s foreign policy away from the US and the EU in favor of a 
completely autonomous regional power that would try to limit the Western influence in 
Eurasia.  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely oppose or confound the policies of its 
NATO allies, specifically the US and the EU, in Central Asia and take a stance 
systematically at odds with the Western interests. 
Evidence: 
There is not enough evidence for the Turkish opposition to the Western policies in 
Central Asia because Turkish and Western interests are well-aligned in the region aside 
from the Turkish leadership’s occasional rhetoric expressing interest in joining the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes China, Russia and the four Central 
Asian states. 
Prediction 2: Turkey would not share its Western allies’ vision for the 
Central Asia region and its foreign policy initiatives in the region would exceed the 
bounds of what the US, the EU, and its other NATO partners consider acceptable.  
Evidence: 
There were some Western concerns in late 1990s and early 2000s, that Turkey 
was trying to carve out its own sphere of influence in Central Asia and create a Union of 
Turkic-Muslim states on ideological grounds. Davutoglu’s book Strategic Depth seemed 
to lend credence to that view. He argued that Turkey’s character requires making full use 
of its “natural sphere of influence,” opening up to former Ottoman territories, and 
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adjoining regions inhabited by the Turkic and Muslim peoples. According to Davutoglu, 
“Turkey’s national interest lies in the proper utilization of its geography” which would 
make it possible for Turkey to become the “central country” it is destined to be.483 
However, Turkey’s foreign policy actions do not support such attempt to carve out its 
own sphere of influence at the expense of the West and there is insufficient evidence to 
claim Turkey’s vision for Central Asia differs from that of its Western allies. 
Prediction 3: Turkey would orient its trade towards non-Western trading 
blocs that try to limit the influence of the West in the Eurasia region and it would 
reject or give up its pursuit of EU membership. 
Evidence: 
Turkey’s policy of increasing economic interdependence in the region and 
promoting free trade areas, in addition to some pro-Eurasian rhetoric, have raised some 
low-level concern about Ankara’s orientation. The Confederation of Businessmen and 
Industrialists of Turkey has established a framework, titled the “Turkey-Eurasia Foreign 
Trade Bridge,” which aims to connect the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Caspian 
Sea regions and to transform the region into a free trade zone. In its 2007 convention, it 
hosted 72 bureaucrats from Eurasian countries, 500 businesspeople from 12 Eurasian 
countries, and 1,200 Turkish businessmen to explore joint business opportunities.484  
Turkey and the Turkic Republics also cooperate through the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which was 
founded by Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan in 1990, and also includes Azerbaijan and the five 
Central Asian countries. The organization aims to improve economic cooperation, 
including through free movement of goods, harmonization of customs, and removal of 
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visas.485 Turkey has already removed visa requirements for the Central Asian countries, 
greatly easing the movement of goods and labor. Erdogan also floated the idea of joining 
the Customs Union of Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus, even though becoming a 
Customs Union member would make Ankara ineligible to become a EU member in the 
future. 
Hypothesis B: It states that recent changes in Turkish foreign policy resulting 
from international and domestic level factors demonstrate that while there is a significant 
change in the direction of autonomy, Turkey’s foreign policy in the Eurasia region does 
not represent a fundamental shift away from the West.  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely support or conform to the policies of its 
NATO allies, specifically the US and the EU, in Central Asia. 
Evidence: 
Turkey’s policy in Central Asia, which aims at bolstering the independence and 
economic development of these countries, maintaining the regional stability, and ensuring 
its energy security, is in line with the US and EU policies in the region. In a 2012 
interview with an Egyptian outlet, then Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu stated that 
Turkey’s primary objectives toward Central Asian countries have concentrated on 
supporting “the efforts for a working democracy and free-market economy, political and 
economic reform process, political and economic stability and prosperity in the region.” 
He also emphasized that Turkey hopes to “contribute to the emergence of an environment 
conducive to regional cooperation, support their vocation toward Euro-Atlantic 
institutions, and to assist them to benefit from their own energy resources.”486 
The US policy toward Central Asia has historically been aimed at strengthening 
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the independence of the Central Asian states and checking on the ambitions of Russia and 
Iran in the region. After the war in Afghanistan, the US began to pay more attention to 
the region from the security perspective to support the International Security Assistance 
Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan, maintain regional stability, keep out religious terrorism, 
and to improve regional connectivity and integration for a stable and prosperous Central 
and South Asia region. Washington used to have an air base in Uzbekistan until 2006 and 
a transit center in Kyrgyzstan until 2014. In a recent address at the Brookings Institution, 
Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken discussed Washington’s three important 
objectives in the region, which included strengthening partnerships to advance mutual 
security, forging closer economic ties, and advancing and advocating for improved 
governance and human rights.” Blinken cited Washington’s New Silk Road initiative 
aimed at helping develop the region’s connectivity.”487  
EU member countries supported the US policies in the region, mainly through the 
NATO activities in Afghanistan, and later through increased trade and promotion of 
democratic values via outlets such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
(OSCE). In 2005, the EU created the position of Central Asia representative and in 2007 
it adopted the “European Union and Central Asia Strategy for a New Partnership” 
document for a more comprehensive approach under the guidance of Germany. As 
Russia increased its influence on the former Soviet countries, exemplified by the 
Ukrainian natural gas crisis in 2008—when Russia cut off gas to Ukraine for political 
reasons and caused gas shortages in Europe—the EU began to develop a direct 
relationship with Central Asia with the aim of ending these states’ dependence on Russia 
and diversifying its energy resources. This goal suits the interests of the Central Asian 
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states as well, especially that of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, who want to transport its 
vast oil and natural gas resources to the world market via non-Russian routes. A recent 
476-page report from the International Energy Agency stated that the EU’s energy 
security increasingly depends on the production in and safe transit of energy goods 
through the neighboring countries,” and highlighted Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan as 
emerging oil and gas powerhouses.488 
Turkey has fully supported the US and the EU policies in Central Asia. In early 
2000s, the US hailed Turkey as a secular and democratic model for the Central Asian 
states, and provided diplomatic and economic support to reinforce Turkey’s position as a 
vital participant in the region’s political and economic development. Ankara’s policies in 
the region, which aim at maintaining regional peace, stability, and prosperity, are in line 
with Washington’s objectives. As a NATO member, Turkey was a strong supporter of the 
war in Afghanistan. Ankara deployed around 1,750 Turkish troops and reconstruction 
teams as a part of the International Security Assistance Force and used Turkish aid to 
promote post-conflict reconstruction and capacity building.489 In order to maintain 
regional stability in Central and South Asia, Turkey spearheaded the Istanbul process 
with the participation of 14 regional countries. It supports the nations and regional and 
international organizations that aim to tackle the challenges facing the regional countries 
and contribute to peace and stability in Afghanistan and in the wider region through 
capacity building efforts.490  
When the Uzbekistani security forces killed hundreds of people during a violent 
protest in 2005, known as the Andijon Massacre, the US was critical of the country’s 
human rights violations, leading to the closure of its base in the country. The EU placed 
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an embargo on Uzbekistan though it was unable to continue the embargo due to Russia 
and China’s opposition. Turkey also condemned Uzbekistan’s crackdown on protestors, 
leading to the closure of many Turkish businesses and freezing of bilateral relations for 
the next decade.  
Turkey’s desire to become an energy hub between Central Asia and Europe and 
its policy to support the Central Asian states’ economic development to reduce their 
dependence on Russia were also in line with the US and the EU’s energy policy for the 
region. Kazakhstan was able to export a small volume of oil through Azerbaijan and 
Turkey is actively involved in the talks about various Southern gas corridor projects to 
bring Turkmen gas through Azerbaijan and Turkey to Europe.  
Prediction 2: Turkey would share its Western allies’ vision for the Central 
Asia region and its foreign policy initiatives in the region would be acceptable to the 
US, the EU, and its other NATO partners. 
Evidence: 
 Turkey’s vision for the region, “a stable, independent and prosperous Central 
Asia” according to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, is similar to the vision of its Western 
allies. Turkey has shown less appetite for asserting its independence in Central Asia, 
compared to its approach in the Middle East and made it clear that it has no intention of 
creating a Turkic sphere of influence that would complicate the Western interests in the 
region. Then Foreign Minister Gul also underlined the pragmatism of Turkish policies by 
stating in 2004 that Turkey’s foreign policy in Eurasia was not guided by “ideological, 
emotional or narrow national considerations.”491  
Turkey has been a staunch supporter of the political and economic sovereignty of 
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the Central Asian states by engaging them through high-level diplomacy and helping 
them integrate with the global market. In 2009, Ankara signed a Strategic Partnership 
treaty with Astana during the visit of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev and 
established the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC). Turkey and 
Kazakhstan expanded the areas of cooperation during Erdogan’s visit in May 2012. In 
October of that year, Kazakhstan’s president visited Turkey for the first meeting of the 
HLSCC. During the foreign minister’s visit in 2013, the Joint Strategic Planning meeting 
was held under the HLSCC.492 Turkey also established the HLSCC with Kyrgyzstan in 
2011. During Erdogan’s visit to the country in 2013, he said Kyrgyzstan’s democracy had 
given Turkey hope, while his counterpart responded that Turkey was a model for the 
development of Kyrgyzstan.493 Turkmen president’s two visits to Turkey in 2012 brought 
the two countries together in various joint projects for investment. Turkish president 
visited the country in 2013 and the prime minister paid another visit in 2014.494 
Turkey also supported close cooperation with Central Asian states in the 
international organizations, such as the OSCE, Confidence Building Measures in Asia 
(CICA), the Turkic Council, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Economic 
Cooperation organization, and sought to contribute to the regional peace and stability by 
mediating between the parties in Central Asia. Ankara actively supported Kazakhstan’s 
bid to join the World Trade Organization and to the rotating lead of the OSCE. Turkey 
sought to mediate disputes over oil and gas fields in the Caspian between Turkmenistan 
and Azerbaijan. Ankara has actively cooperated with the Central Asian countries through 
the CICA, which aims to enhance peace, security, and stability in Asia.495 On the 9th 
Summit of the Heads of State of Turkish Speaking Countries in Nakhchivan in 2009, the 
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leaders signed an agreement to establish the Council of Cooperation of Turkish Speaking 
States, also known as the Turkic Council; its first Summit was held in Kazakhstan in 
2011.496  
Growing pluralism in Turkey and increasing emphasis on economic and socio-
cultural issues—as the Foreign Ministry’s role has increased at the expense of the 
military—played an important role on Turkish foreign policy toward Central Asia. The 
ministries of Culture and Energy, nongovernmental agencies, and the business interest 
groups, such as the construction industry, have exerted substantial influence on foreign 
policy. The Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TIKA), set up in 1992, plays an 
important role in Central Asia by facilitating the activities of businessmen, organizing 
cultural exchanges, and assisting in socio-economic development projects such as 
building hospitals and schools. Almost half of the assistance Turkey provides to Central 
Asia goes to social infrastructure. The Hizmet movement—the followers of Turkish 
religious scholar Fetullah Gulen—has also played an important unofficial role in 
promoting Turkish interests in Central Asia, especially in the field of education, though 
the movement’s recent fights with the current government in Turkey may result in 
waning of its influence. Turkey also provides scholarships of higher education to students 
from the Turkic communities, bringing over 10,000 students to Turkey every year, and 
the Turkish Ministry of Education and civil societal organizations have opened over 300 
schools in these countries. 497 
Turkey’s new “value-based” foreign policy principles, which aim to develop soft 
power in Central Asia, are also in line with the US, especially with the EU foreign policy. 
Gul stated that Turkey does not look at its environment and to the international system 
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from a security perspective.498 Davutoglu’s five principles—which include balance 
between freedom and security, zero problems with neighbors, multi-dimensional and 
multi-track policies, a pro-active diplomatic discourse, and transition to rhythmic 
diplomacy—are also in conformity with the EU’s “Good neighbor” policy and its agenda 
for Turkey. The EU requires the applicant countries to settle their differences with their 
neighbors in a peaceful way and have good neighborly relations before becoming 
members.499500  
Turkey’s policy priorities in Central Asia, which include ensuring that these new 
states acquire the necessary abilities to establish stability and security to effectively cope 
with regional and domestic problems, is backed by civil society activities. TIKA’s role 
has only grown under the new Turkish foreign policy. In 2009, half of Turkey’s Official 
Development Aid, around $665 million, went to Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were among the three largest recipients of Turkish aid.501 
These funds sponsored projects in economic and industrial infrastructure development, 
health and education sectors, academic cooperation between Turkish and Eurasian 
universities, internship programs in Turkey for Central Asian and Caucasian university 
students, Turkish language programs, and the promotion of business and trade.502  
In addition to encouraging the republics to adopt the Latin alphabet instead of 
Cyrillic, Turkey established many Turkish Culture Centers and schools including several 
universities. Kazakhstan’s president publicly praised the importance of Turkish schools 
in Kazakhstan. In April 2015, Erdogan visited Kazakhstan and made $800 million dollar 
deal and discussed areas of cooperation in energy and transportation, including the 
possibility of connecting Zhezkazgan-Beineu railway with a new Akhalkalaki (Georgia) - 
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Kars (Turkey) railway line, which is under construction. That line would give Kazakhstan 
access to the European countries through the port of Baku and Istanbul on the new 
railway tunnel Marmaray.503 
Prediction 3: Turkey’s bilateral trade would increase with both the Central 
Asian and the Western countries. Turkey would seek greater integration with the 
Central Asian countries but it would also pursue EU membership and closer 
economic ties with the US. 
Evidence: 
Turkey’s trade and investment with the Central Asian countries increased during 
the AKP period and Ankara’s increasing engagement with the region on energy trade and 
transportation greatly benefit the EU’s energy security and Washington’s goal of 
reducing Russian influence in the region. Turkey’s trade volume with the region reached 
$7.5 in 2013 with Turkish investment exceeding $5 billion (see Figure 18). Turkish 
contractors’ projects exceed $50 billion with more than 2000 Turkish companies 
operating on the ground, according to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Turkey 
also signed bilateral agreements with the Central Asian countries such as the Turkey-
Kazakhstan Joint Economic Commission to improve bilateral trade relations between the 
two countries. Following a series of diplomatic visits, Turkey and Kazakhstan signed a 
Strategic Partnership Treaty in 2009.504 Following an official visit by the Tajikistani 
president to Turkey in 2006 and a series of reciprocal visits, the two countries’ presidents 
participated in the Tajik-Turkish Business Forum conducted in 2009. Turkey’s Joint 
Economic Commissions with the countries of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan 
were also held in 2008, 2008 and 2009, respectively.505 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
218	  
Figure 17: Turkey’s Total Trade (Exports + Imports) with Central Asian 
Countries506 
 
Turkey’s economic interests—providing alternative outlets for Turkish exporting 
businesses and investors and seeking alternative sources of energy to reduce its 
dependence on Russia and Iran—also influenced Turkish foreign policy in Central Asia. 
Turkish business groups played a significant role in this regard. Under the AKP, the 
small-scale family businesses in Anatolia, which are more dynamic, flexible, and able to 
make inroads without a great deal of capital, emerged as a new cadre of businessmen in 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). These SMEs, key to Turkey’s rapid economic 
growth, were increasingly active in Turkey’s expanding businesses in Central Asia. In 
2007, the representatives of the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges 
and a large number of businesspeople accompanied then President Gul in his trip to 
Turkmenistan, where Turkish contractors account for nearly 90 percent of all 
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Turkey’s potential role as an energy bridge between Central Asia and Europe, 
which would increase its attractiveness to the EU member countries, also entered in 
Ankara’s policy calculus. Davutoglu stated in a 2013 paper that Turkey’s approach to 
Central Asia is based on several principles, which include abstaining from destructive 
competition, fostering cooperation in the Asia-Europe region, and harmonizing its 
regional interests with the EU membership process and its trans-Atlantic alliance 
relations.507  
Despite stalling reforms on the road to EU membership, Ankara has recently 
shown a renewed interest in its EU bid. After moving to the presidency in 2014, Erdogan 
said the EU membership in the bloc remains his long-term strategic goal and the 
government made concrete plans to revive the process.508 In fact, Turkey’s access to the 
EU markets made Ankara even more attractive to the Central Asian states that are trying 
to increase economic cooperation with the West to reduce their dependence on Russia.509 
While the SMEs are more active in Central Asia and the Middle East, larger Turkish 
corporations have generally focused on the more established markets in Europe, where 
Turkey enjoys duty-free access via a customs union.  
Conclusion: 
Turkish foreign policy in Central Asia under the AKP government has focused on 
the region’s stability, economic prosperity, and integration with the world. The region is 
one area where Turkey’s interests and the Western interests are the most aligned, 
evidenced by the lack of examples where Turkish and the Western policies or interests 
clash. Turkey’s active political and economic engagement in the region increases 
Turkey’s stake in the regional stability and contributes to the efforts aimed at rooting out 
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religious terrorism in the region. Increasing Turkish influence in Central Asia also 
reduces the influence of Russia, which has become more aggressive recently, and Iran, 
which has the potential of spreading its Islamic ideology, even though Ankara has made 
efforts to maintain a balanced policy and eschewed competition in the region. Ankara’s 
efforts at becoming an energy bridge between Central Asia and Europe enhances 
Turkey’s and the EU’s energy security while helping the Central Asian countries develop 
further ties with the West and reduce their dependence on Russia. 
International factors such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and opening up of 
the new Turkic world as well as the domestic factors, including the Turkish leaders’ new 
foreign policy concept, which emphasizes zero problems with neighbors and proactive 
foreign policy to increase Turkey’s influence and soft power, have played an important 
role in Ankara’s outreach to the region. However, Turkey’s economic interests, 
increasing Turkish exports and investment in the region—advanced by strong business 
lobbies—and Turkey’s desire to benefit from the region’s vast energy resources had even 
greater impact on Turkey’s policy in the region. Turkish trade with the regional 
economies is dominated by Turkey’s exports, contributing to its trade surplus with the 
region. While Turkey is a top trading partner for almost all of the Central Asian states, no 
Central Asian country lies within the list of Turkey’s top 20 trading partners. 
Turkey’s outreach to Central Asia has its limitations, however. Compared to 
Turkey’s policy in the region in the 1990s, its new foreign policy has moderate and more 
realistic goals to achieve. Turkey had high hopes of integrating the Turkic republics into 
the Western-oriented political-economic structures in the 1990s, but due to a host of 
complex issues with Central Asian post-Soviet regimes, Ankara abandoned the idea of 
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promoting democratic reforms in favor a focus on regional security. In line with Turkey’s 
ill-matched political and economic capabilities—as opposed to Beijing’s massive 
spending spree on the regional gas pipelines and infrastructure projects, or Kremlin’s 
coercive actions in the region—Turkish policymakers have generally maintained a low 
political profile in the region that is consistent with a strategy of non-interference.  
On the socio-cultural front, the AKP showed much more interest in Central Asia 
than did the earlier Islamist Welfare Party, partly because the AKP received a great deal 
of electoral support form the nationalist strongholds in central Anatolia who support close 
Turkish ties with Central Asia. However, the Turkish leaders are unlikely to let Ankara’s 
ties with Central Asia outweigh its strong economic ties to Russia.510 As then Prime 
Minister Gul stated, Turkey would “pursue cooperative relations that do not harm either 
party’s interests in line with good-neighborly practices with the Russian Federation, and 
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3.	  THE	  CAUCASUS	  
	  
Before 2002:  
 The collapse of the Soviet Union created opportunities for Turkey in the energy-
rich Caucasus region and Turkey became one of the first countries to recognize these 
countries’ independence. The presidents of Georgia and Azerbaijan publicly professed 
friendship for Turkey and sought intensified cooperation soon after independence. In 
1991, President Ozal became the first Turkish president to visit Baku and in 1992, then 
president of Azerbaijan visited Ankara to sign the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. 
At the opening of a Turkish channel in Baku in 1998, Azerbaijani president praised 
Turkey as Azerbaijan’s closest friend and supporter,512 and Georgia signed its first 
defense cooperation agreement with Turkey in 1997.  
In contrast, the Turkish-Armenian relations remain strained by the legacy of the 
massacre of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915-1916 and more recently by the frozen 
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian-populated enclave in Azerbaijan. Turkish-
Armenian relations are marked by deep mutual mistrust between the two countries and 
occasionally led to clashes with Russia, Armenia’s main supporter and security guarantor 
in the region. Turkish officials still remember the number of Turkish diplomats 
assassinated in the 1980s by members of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of 
Armenia.513 Turkish officials also suspected that the Armenian nationalists had close 
links with the PKK, providing bases in Armenia and supplying them with weaponry.514 
Turkey recognized Armenia’s independence in 1991 like that of other former Soviet 
states, opened a consulate in Yerevan, but did not establish full diplomatic relations 
because of its failure to conclude a bilateral accord in which the Armenians would 
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renounce their claims to the Turkish territory. Turkey also maintained it would not 
normalize diplomatic relations until Yerevan withdraws its forces from all the territory it 
occupied in Azerbaijan.515   
The escalation of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh forestalled any possible 
moves towards normalization of relations. In 1992, the Turkish armed forces held 
maneuvers near the border with Armenia, prompting the Russian commander of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States Armed Forces to declare that a Turkish military 
intervention could lead to a Third World War. The opposition leftists party leader Ecevit 
called for the launching of air strikes against Armenia and then Turkish prime minister 
warned that she would ask the parliament for authorization to go to war if Armenia 
attacked Nakhichevan. Then Turkish president calmed the situation arguing that such war 
would be perceived by the outside world as a Christian-Muslim struggle and damage 
relations with the US. Following Armenia’s extension of its occupation of the 
Azerbaijani territory by capturing Kelbajar, Turkey imposed an embargo on Armenia in 
1993. Ankara lifted its blockade in 1995 after the hostilities had ceased and under 
diplomatic pressure from the US.516 Bilateral tension somewhat eased in late 1990s with 
the Turkish state minister’s official visit to Yerevan in 1999 and a reciprocal visit from 
the Armenian president. 
Turkey’s past relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan were not without conflict 
either, but both sides were eager to resolve the problems quickly to maintain mutual trust. 
Even though Turkey had been a firm supporter of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, the two 
countries experienced tension when the ultranationalist groups connected to the Turkish 
intelligence tried but failed to overthrow pro-Russian President Haydar Aliyev in a 
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planned coup to restore the former pro-Turkish president, who was overthrown by 
Russian help. Relations were quickly restored, however, with both sides making an effort 
to continue diplomatic visits and security cooperation.  
Because the Ottomans had ruled what is now southwest Georgia until the late 
nineteenth century, there are around 750,000 Abkhazians in Turkey, nearly three times 
more Abkhazians than those in Georgia. 517 Georgian authorities were concerned about 
this community’s pressure on the Turkish government to adopt a more supportive line 
towards the Abkhazians. Immediately after the Soviet breakup, central authorities in 
Georgia were also suspicious of Turkey’s possible links with the Muslim-populated 
Ajaria, a region seeking more autonomy from Tbilisi. Turkey worked to increase mutual 
trust with the Georgians by increasing high-level visits and signing several defense 
agreements in 1997 and 1999.518 By 1995, Georgia was able to reduce its dependence on 
Russia and cultivate closer ties with Turkey, prompting Yeltsin to warn against “any 
attempt to drive a wedge between the Caucasus and Russia,” referring to Turkey.519  
While engaging with the Caucasian countries, Turkey tried to maintain a balanced 
foreign policy by including Russia into the regional frameworks. In 2000, Turkey and 
Russia launched a joint initiative to create a “South Caucasus Stability Pact,” similar to 
the Balkans Stability Pact. It would be open to the OSCE members, base its principles on 
the OSCE norms and values, increase Turkey’s regional profile, and enhance the Western 
involvement and Russian cooperation in the region.520 However, continuous disputes over 
Nagorno-Karabakh and Moscow’s lack of enthusiasm inhibited its implementation.  
At the same time, Turkey was concerned about Russia’s aggressive policy toward 
Turkey’s neighbors in the Caucasus, which could threaten Turkey’s security. Moscow 
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dragged its feet in withdrawing from its base in Georgia, which it agreed to vacate by 
2001, introduced a visa regime for Georgians working in Russia, and periodically cut off 
gas to Georgia to exert political pressure. Russia also sought to use the separatist 
tendencies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to put pressure on Georgia during this period; 
the Russian Duma amended a law in 2002, allowing the residents of these territories to 
become Russian citizens. Turkey also worried that a serious shift in Georgia’s position 
back toward Russia could endanger the plans for the BTC pipeline and leave Azerbaijan 
more exposed. In 2001, Russia also signed a series of defense agreements with Armenia, 
broadening defense cooperation and strengthening Moscow’s military position in the 
region. Turkey was irked by Russia’s decision to supply Armenia with MIG-29s and S-
300 missiles, deployed in the Russian bases in Armenia.521 
Turkey’s foreign policy in the Caucasus after the AKP came to power will be 
examined below. 
Hypothesis A: It states that the recent changes in Turkish foreign policy 
stemming from international and domestic level factors indicate a fundamental 
reorientation of Ankara’s foreign policy away from the US and the EU in favor of a 
completely autonomous regional power that would try to limit the Western influence in 
Eurasia.  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely oppose or confound the policies of its 
NATO allies, specifically the US and the EU, in the Caucasus region and take a 
stance systematically at odds with the Western interests. 
Evidence: 
 Turkey’s strained relationship with Armenia is a major point of contention in 
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Ankara’s relations with its Western allies. Efforts by the Armenian lobby in the US and 
in European countries to introduce genocide resolutions condemning Turkey for the 
massacre of the Armenians in 1915 have exacerbated these tensions and continue to 
damage the Turkish-Western relations.522 The Turkish-French relations were damaged 
when the French Parliament passed a resolution making it illegal to deny the “Armenian 
genocide.”  
The Armenian lobbies around the world gained momentum for the centennial 
anniversary of the killings in April 2015. Pope’s use of the word “genocide” led Turkey 
to summon the Vatican ambassador and recall its ambassador. The European Parliament 
passed a resolution using the word  “genocide” to describe the 1915 killing of Armenians 
and Germany also used the word “genocide,” further straining the Turkish-EU 
relations.523 Erdogan lashed out at France, Germany, and Austria as well as at Russian 
president, who also called the killings “genocide.” Erdogan accused the European leaders 
of supporting “claims constructed on Armenian lies,” and said "they should first, one-by-
one, clean the stains on their own histories."524 
The Armenian issue has also created tension in the Turkish-US relations. A non-
binding resolution calling the World War I-era killing of Armenians genocide narrowly 
passed by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives under the 
pressures of the Armenian diaspora in March 2010, leading Turkey to recall its 
ambassador. Turkish General Mehmet Yasar Buyukanit warned that Turkey’s “military 
relations with the US would never be as they were in the past” if the House passed the 
measure. In an October poll in Turkey, 73 percent of Turks surveyed said that if the 
House passed the resolution, their opinion of the US would decline, and 83 percent said 
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that they would oppose Turkish assistance to the US in Iraq.525 The measure failed to 
pass. In April 2015, even though President Obama stopped short of using the term in his 
annual message, opting instead for the Armenian term Medz Yeghern (great catastrophe), 
in his speech commemorating the centennial anniversary of the killings, Erdogan, 
nevertheless, accused the US of siding with Armenia.526527 
Prediction 2: Turkey would not share its Western allies’ vision for the 
Caucasus region and its foreign policy initiatives in the region would exceed the 
bounds of what the US, the EU, and its other NATO partners consider acceptable.  
 Evidence: 
Turkey’s closing of its border with Armenia and lack of diplomatic representation 
because of unresolved territorial issues and Armenia’s takeover of Nagorno Karabakh, 
remains as the sticking point in Turkish-Western relations. Turkey’s attempt at 
maintaining a balanced foreign policy towards the region between Russia and the West 
has at times drawn negative reaction from the US and the EU. Turkey’s reluctance to take 
a stronger stance along the side of the Georgians during the Georgian-Russian war of 
2008 was criticized as Ankara appeasing Moscow’s aggression. Turkey felt squeezed 
between the demands of its important economic partner Russia and its long-term allies, 
the US and the NATO as well as the Georgians. The Turkish citizens of north Caucasian-
origin, including Abkhazians, Ossetians, and Georgians took to the streets demanding 
actions from the government during the crisis.528 
Prediction 3: Turkey would orient its trade towards non-Western trading 
blocs that try to limit the influence of the West in the Eurasia region and it would 
reject or give up its pursuit of EU membership. 
	   	   	  




 Turkey’s efforts at increasing economic interdependence in the region and 
promoting free trade areas could lead to some concern about Ankara’s economic 
orientation to the region. Turkey signed a Free Trade Agreement with Georgia in 2007 
and lifted visa applications for 90 day-stays, leading to increased trade and investment in 
the region.529 In fact, Turkish and Georgian citizens are able to travel to each other’s 
country with their national identity documents, without even passports. Turkish-Azeri 
trade ties also increased during the AKP period, especially after the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
oil pipeline (BTC) became operational in 2006, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Natural Gas 
Pipeline (BTE) became operational in 2007, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway was 
launched in 2007.530  
During this time, Ankara’s EU accession process significantly slowed down, 
however. Some European countries such as France and Germany kept raising barriers to 
the EU entry, insisting that Turkey was too big, too poor and above all too Muslim to 
qualify. In November 2013, the head of the influential Turkish Industry and Business 
Association said they were “deeply worried about the impression that Turkey and the EU 
are drifting apart.”531  
Hypothesis B: It states that recent changes in Turkish foreign policy resulting 
from international and domestic level factors demonstrate that while there is a significant 
change in the direction of autonomy, Turkey’s foreign policy in the Eurasia region does 
not represent a fundamental shift away from the West.  
Prediction 1: Turkey would largely support or conform to the policies of its 
NATO allies, specifically the US and the EU, in the Caucasus. 
	   	   	  




Turkey’s support for the sovereignty and economic development of Georgia and 
Azerbaijan contributes to the EU and the US policies in the region. Turkey has been a 
key country supporting Georgia’s NATO membership and helping Georgia to reform its 
armed forces to match the NATO standards. After the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia, 
Tbilisi’s relations with NATO have rapidly improved under the Individual Partnership 
Action Plan. Turkey maintained close political and economic ties with Azerbaijan and 
supported Baku’s efforts to transport its energy resources to Europe through Turkey, 
helping Azerbaijan reduce its dependence on Russia. These efforts contribute to the EU’s 
goals for energy security—which became even more important after the Russian 
intervention in Ukraine—and to the US objective of decreasing Russian influence in the 
region. A recent International Energy Agency report discusses the Southern Gas Corridor 
projects, including the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and the Trans-Adriatic 
Pipeline (TAP) that are expected to carry Caspian gas, specifically Azeri gas, to Europe 
reducing the EU’s dependence on Russia.532 A ground-breaking ceremony to prepare the 
backbone of the TANAP took place in Turkey in March 2015. 
In line with the desires of its Western allies, Turkey took some small steps to 
improve its lack of political relations with Armenia during the AKP period, but the 
efforts failed mostly because of the opposing voices from the Armenian diaspora and 
Turkish nationalists. Erdogan proposed in 2005 to turn the highly contentious issue of 
past Ottoman massacres of Armenians over to an international scholarly panel for 
resolution, arguing against leaving it to politicians to pass a historical judgment. 
However, the Armenians rejected it and put forward its own proposal in 2007 to establish 
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alternative commissions to discuss various outstanding issues between the two countries 
after the normalization of diplomatic relations. In 2007, Turkey opened the historical 
Armenian Church in Van as a museum and an Armenian committee came to Turkey for 
the opening ceremony but the expected visits from the Armenian foreign minister or the 
minister of culture to commemorate the opening did not take place, missing another 
chance to thaw the bilateral relations.  
Then Foreign Minister Davutoglu expressed Turkish desire to have good relations 
with Armenia in 2008, stating that Turkey does not see Armenia as a threat or enemy.533 
That year, a group of 200 Turkish intellectuals issued an apology for what they call “the 
Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915” and expressed 
their shared feelings of pain with their Armenian brothers. Then Turkish President Gul 
accepted an invitation from his Armenian counterpart to watch a soccer match in 
September 2008 in a first-ever visit of a Turkish head of state to Yerevan, paving the way 
for the Turkish-Armenian framework agreement toward reconciliation in April 2009. The 
Protocol on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, signed with Armenia in Zurich in 
October 2009 identified a roadmap for normalization of bilateral relations in a mutually 
satisfactory manner. The official statement from the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs 
was positive, but the Turkish nationalists took to the streets to protest against the 
agreement, while the Dashnaktsutyun party in Armenia withdrew from the ruling 
coalition in protest against the talks with Turkey.  
Hopes for normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations were dashed when a 
strong anti-Turkish group led by the Armenian Tasnaksutyun Party, which had strong 
economic and political links with the Armenian Diaspora, expressed its opposition to any 
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rapprochement with Turkey. Turkish prime minister also announced in 2009 that Turkey 
would not open its land border with Armenia unless Yerevan ends the occupation of the 
Azeri territory. In April 2010, Armenian president declared that his government would 
unilaterally postpone the ratification of the Protocol within the Armenian parliament to a 
future term.  
However, in a rare public speech in April 2014, then Prime Minister Erdogan 
offered “condolences” for the mass killing of Armenians during the Ottoman era and said 
he was “sorry” for what happened. Even though the critics pointed out that Erdogan’s 
statement fell short of acknowledging what happened, which would have been a 
politically unpopular move before the presidential elections later that year and 
parliamentary elections in 2015, it nonetheless shows the change in Turkey’s pluralistic 
society, which allows discourse and debate on such sensitive topics as the Kurdish and 
Armenian issues.534535 The recent friction with the world leaders during the centennial 
commemoration of the tragedy probably will continue to strain Turkey’s relations with 
Armenia. 
At the height of the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, Turkey’s close ally 
Azerbaijan expressed its displeasure for Turkey’s normalization of relations before the 
resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh issue. At the time when Turkey and Armenia were 
preparing the framework for normalization process, Baku made a deal to accept 
Moscow’s purchase offer for its 500 million cm gas per annum to be sold to Dagestan; 
Turkey had counted on these reserves in justifying the existence of the Nabucco pipeline 
project.536 When the normalization process failed with the Armenian president’s 
suspension of the Protocols, Turkey realized that its foreign policy goals in the region can 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
232	  
only be resolved with restoring the former Turkish-Azerbaijani relations and swiftly 
returned to its former policy line and reiterated Azerbaijani claims over the lands under 
the occupation of Yerevan. Baku welcomed the change by making an official visit to 
Ankara in December 2009, which also seemed to ease the problems between the two 
states over the price of gas.537  
Prediction 2: Turkey would share its Western allies’ vision for the Caucasus 
region and its foreign policy initiatives in the region would be acceptable to the US, 
the EU, and its other NATO partners. 
Evidence: 
Turkey’s vision for the region during the AKP period, with strong emphasis on 
supporting the sovereignty, economic development, and global integration of the 
countries in the Caucasus, has been in line with the US and the EU’s vision for the 
region. Turkey has strongly supported the Caucasus countries in their efforts to 
modernize and strengthen ties with the West since their independence.538 Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia all signed up for the NATO’s Partnership for Peace programs, 
but the NATO has been circumspect about Russia’s interests in the South Caucasus 
because Russia remains extremely suspicious of the role of the US and NATO in the 
region. Ankara concluded an “Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual 
Assistance” with Azerbaijan in 2010 and issued a Joint Statement on the establishment of 
the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council, consolidating the legal framework for 
expanding bilateral relations. Georgia and Turkey signed the Declaration of Friendship 
and Cooperation in 2004 and Ankara continued to support improvements in Georgia’s 
defense sector. 
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The AKP’s policy of zero problems with neighbors, proactive diplomacy, and use 
of soft power to achieve regional peace and economic interdependence played an 
important role in its Caucasian policy. Ankara has also made efforts to achieve 
comprehensive peace in the South Caucasus, in line with the interests of its Western 
allies, believing that regional cooperation opportunities will encourage the parties 
towards a settlement.539 Turkish politicians pursued trilateral talks with Armenia and 
Azerbaijan for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations and for the resolution of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Then Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan met with 
both Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts in 2008 in the hope of finding a solution to 
the problem.540 Turkey also actively participated in the efforts of the OSCE Minsk 
Group, which seeks a peaceful, just, and lasting settlement in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict.  
In December 2013, then Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu attended the 
gathering of foreign ministers from the Organization of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation in Yerevan, the first senior Turkish official’s visit to Armenia since the 
failure of the 2009 signings of a framework agreement on reconciliation. He said he was 
motivated by a desire to promote peace in the South Caucasus, but his Armenian 
counterpart said bilateral ties can only be normalized “without any preconditions,” 
referring to Ankara’s previous demands that Armenia return the occupied territories 
around Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan.541  
Turkey has tremendous soft power in Azerbaijan as its relations with Azerbaijan 
is close to “one nation, two states” in the words of the Azerbaijani President Aliyev. 
Their strategic relations received a further boost from the oil and gas pipeline connections 
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benefitting both countries’ political and economic interests. Azerbaijan went so far as to 
allow direct flights from Baku to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus when 
international support was needed for the Turkish case.542 Turkish-Azeri relations have 
also been developing in education and cultural spheres. Azeri students come to Turkey 
for education and young diplomats receive training by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. There are 15 middle schools and 11 high schools as well as a university in 
Azerbaijan that were opened with direct Turkish investment and contribution. Turkish 
television programs are widely watched in Azerbaijan and Turkey was behind the push 
towards the reintroduction of the Latin alphabet in Azerbaijan, bringing the two 
languages even closer.543  
Turkey also made efforts to find a peaceful resolution to Georgia’s Abkhazia 
problem while continuing to support the territorial integrity of Georgia. Mostly 
influenced by the demands of Turkish citizens of both Georgian and North Caucasian 
origin, Turkey tried to bring the two sides together and offered alternative openings, but 
its efforts proved fruitless. When the tension between Georgia and Russia heightened and 
Russia’s retaliation by ceasing the delivery of gas in the winter of 2007 led to gas 
shortages in Georgia, Turkey allowed natural gas destined for Turkey to be diverted to 
Georgia to help out.544 When the conflict broke out, Turkey immediately sent 100,000 
tons of food aid and started a project to build 100 houses for refugees in Gori, near South 
Ossetia. The Turkish company TAV continued the operation of Tbilisi airport during the 
military conflict.545 
After its initial muted reaction to the Russia-Georgia war in 2008, Ankara became 
rather active with Erdogan’s direct involvement and proposal for a multilateral 
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diplomatic initiative, the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform.546 The Platform 
brought together Turkey and Russia with the three Caucasus countries, called for 
economic and energy cooperation among the countries, and highlighted the importance of 
regional peace and stability. Although this is not a completely new idea—then Turkish 
President Demirel had proposed the Caucasus Stability Pact in 2000—the initiative 
provided a forum for communication to wound the scars of the August crisis, sought to 
contribute to regional peace efforts with the inclusion of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and 
improved the conditions for Turkey’s opening up towards Armenia in 2009.547 Erdogan 
publicly stated his hope that the Platform would contribute to the efforts for the 
establishment of peace and stability in the region. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and 
Russia have responded positively to the offer, praising it as a constructive attempt.548 
Even though this platform drew some resentment in Washington, the EU gave green light 
to the initiative and the EU progress report on Turkey’s accession negotiations positively 
mentioned the project.549 The NATO also expressed support for the platform, calling it a 
constructive step for security in the wider Black Sea region with reference to Turkey’s 
policy line during the crisis.550 
Prediction 3: Turkey’s bilateral trade would increase with both the 
Caucasian and the Western countries. Turkey would seek greater integration with 
the Caucasian countries but it would also pursue EU membership and closer 
economic ties with the US. 
Evidence: 
Turkey’s efforts to forge closer economic cooperation with the Caucasus 
countries and increasing energy links between the Caucasus and Europe are in line with 
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the Western interests. Ankara calculated that its aim to have stronger influence within the 
Caucasus region increases Ankara’s importance and value to the Western world and 
contributes to its desire to join the EU. Davutoglu stated in his book Strategic Depth that 
“if Turkey does not have a solid stance in Asia, it would have very limited chances with 
the EU.” Indeed, the EU Commission’s 2014 Progress Report also stressed Turkey’s vital 
strategic location in terms of developments in the Black Sea region and the Middle East, 
and recommended deepening the cooperation between Ankara and the EU in a host of 
areas of concern to both sides.551 
Turkey is the largest trade partner for Georgia and Azerbaijan and one of the 
largest investors in these countries. Bilateral trade increased from around $0.3 billion in 
2002 to around $1.7 billion with Georgia and nearly $3.2 billion with Azerbaijan, 
dominated by Azerbaijan’s gas exports to the country (see figure 19). Turkey and 
Georgia signed a Free Trade Agreement in 2007, which lifted visa applications for 90 
day-stays.552 The Batumi airport on Georgia’s Black Sea coast, which was built and 
operated by a Turkish company, functions as a joint Turkish-Georgian facility, allowing 
Turkish citizens traveling to Turkish towns without a passport.  
Aside from the trade in oil and gas, Turkish investments in Azerbaijan’s non-
energy sector also increased, contributing to Azerbaijan’s economic diversification. Some 
1,200 Turkish companies operate in Azerbaijan’s various sectors, including 
telecommunication, transportation, confection, marketing, furniture, banking, and 
building construction.553  
Increasingly, Azerbaijan also began to invest in Turkey. On the day Turkey and 
Azerbaijan sealed agreements on the transit of Azeri gas to the European markets through 
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the Southern Corridor, Azerbaijan inaugurated the $5 billion Petkim project, one of the 
largest chemical plants in Turkey, owned by the Azeri state company, and laid the 
foundation for the construction of a new oil refinery, also owned by the Azeri state 
company. Azerbaijan also invested more than $500 million in the construction of the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway.554555 
Figure 18: Turkey’s Total Trade (Exports + Imports) with the Caucasus556 
 
Energy security was one of the AKP government’s priorities because of Turkey’s 
heavy dependence on Iran and Russia for its energy needs. The government strongly 
supported the idea of becoming a “regional energy hub” and undertook policies designed 
to strengthen its connections to the Caspian resources through Georgia and Azerbaijan 
during this period.557 Turkey made a deal with Azerbaijan and Georgia to construct an oil 
pipeline from Baku through Tbilisi to Ceyhan on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast, Baku-
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strongly supported this project because it would enhance the European energy security 
and reduce Russia’s as well as Iran’s leverage in the region.558 It invalidated the Russian 
efforts to use a northern pipeline route from Baku to the Russian port of Novorossiysk on 
the Black Sea to transport the South Caspian oil to maintain its political leverage over 
these countries. In addition to the BTC oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas 
pipeline became operational in March 2007 and began to deliver gas from Shah Deniz of 
Azerbaijan. This project effectively ended Georgia’s gas dependency on Russia, provided 
an important alternative route for Azerbaijan to transport its gas to Europe, and reduced 
Russia’s and Iran’s leverage over Turkey.559  
 Turkey also promoted the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad connection, dubbed the 
“Iron Silk Road,” to create a direct railroad transportation between Turkey, Georgia and 
Azerbaijan. Even though strong opposition from the Armenian lobby in the US for 
bypassing Armenia prevented the American official investment for the project, the 
railroad connects Turkey and the Caucasus to Europe without having to pass through Iran 
or Russia. Therefore, it is of a strategic value to the Caucasus countries, to Turkey, and to 
Europe. The three countries signed the project in May 2005 and it is slated for completion 
in 2016.560 
 Even though there is no trade connection between Turkey and Armenia, trade 
through the third countries, such as Georgia, has been increasing. There is considerable 
informal trade between Turkey and Armenia as the air routes link the two countries. 
Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council, which plays an important role in 
thawing of the bilateral relations, argued the indirect trade volume through third parties 
reached over $300 million by the end of 2009 and could easily reach up to $500 million 
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in the case of normalized political relations.561 Because of the economic problems in 
Armenia, an estimated 70,000 Armenian citizens are still working illegally in Turkey 
according to the Turkish officials.562  
Conclusion: 
Turkish foreign policy in the South Caucasus under the AKP government has 
emphasized regional peace, economic prosperity, and integration with the West. The 
region is another area after Central Asia where Turkey’s interests and the Western 
interests are well-aligned, except for the Armenian issue. Turkey has made substantial 
efforts in mediating between the countries to resolve frozen conflicts by creating 
opportunities to increase the dialogue and building trust, but its attempts at normalizing 
relations with Armenia have been limited. Turkey strongly supported economic 
integration with Georgia and Azerbaijan by boosting bilateral trade and facilitating their 
trade with the world. Ankara strongly supported the new energy and transportation 
infrastructure in the region, which would bolster economic independence and economic 
integration of the Caucasus countries and contribute to the energy security of Europe.  
In the process, Turkey remained firmly committed to the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Caucasus countries while maintaining its non-interference 
policy to refrain from directly clashing with Russia and to avoid being caught in the 
Russia vs. West debate. The high trade volume between Turkey and Russia also serves as 
a major deterrent to any initiative that may be construed as Turkey opposing Russian 
interests (see figure 20).  
Figure 19: Turkey’s Trade (Exports + Imports) with Russia Compared to Other 
Eurasian Countries563 
	   	   	  




In fact, Turkey’s economic and security interests with Russia trumped ethnic, 
cultural, and religious considerations during this period. Turkey chose not to play the 
ethnic card to avoid angering Moscow. Although cultural, linguistic, and religious 
affinities were probably the initial stimulants of closer ties, Ankara’s new attitude toward 
the region was based more on pragmatic economic and foreign policy considerations than 
on simple nationalist rhetoric or sentimental concerns.564 Turkey, which is home to 3 
million Circassians and had backed the Chechens in the 1994-96 Chechen-Russian war, 
did not support them during the Second Chechen-Russian war in 2000. Erdogan, by 
attending the opening of the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014, did not heed the call from 
the Circassians who were mourning the 1864 Grand Exile and placed ads in newspapers 
saying, “Mr. Prime Minister, please don’t go to Sochi.”565 Turkey also is home to the 
Abkhazians who have a strong ethnically-based lobby in Turkey, but Ankara did not let 
these issues deteriorate its relations with Georgia. Ankara condemned Russia’s takeover 
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upsetting Russia. In spite of Turkey’s caution, however, Russia remains suspicious of 
Turkey’s ambitions in the Caucasus.  
As for the drivers of the Turkish foreign policy, international factors such as the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s aggressive attempts to keep the Caucasus countries 
in its orbit in late 2000s, and the Western reaction to Russia’s aggression had a significant 
impact on Turkey’s policies for the neighboring Caucasus region. Turkey had a stake in 
the resolution of the conflicts in the neighborhood because the spillover effects of any 
instability would threaten its own security. Domestic factors such as Turkey’s economic 
interests, mainly the energy deals, and the Turkish leadership’s new foreign policy 
concept emphasizing zero problems with neighbors, multidimensional foreign policy, and 
proactive diplomacy to increase Turkey’s influence in the region also played an important 
role in Turkey’s economic and diplomatic outreach to the region.  
  
	   	   	  





The preponderance of the evidence indicates that Turkey’s transformation in 
Eurasia does not represent a fundamental shift in Ankara’s foreign policy. On Turkey’s 
relations with Russia, especially in its arms trade, energy deals, and lack of a strong 
reaction from Ankara towards Russia’s aggressive policies because of its energy 
dependency on Moscow, we see a modest movement of Ankara toward positions that 
create tension with the West. However, on the critical issues of upholding the norms of 
international law and maintaining the world order in this part of the region, supporting 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Central Asian and the Caucasus countries, and 
providing for Europe’s energy security, Turkey’s position is at minimum compatible 
with, and in most instances strongly supportive of, Western interests. 
Turkey’s foreign policy actions in Central Asia and the Caucasus are almost fully 
supportive of the Western policies, with the exception of the unusual case of Armenia. 
Turkey’s vision for the region is in line with the Western interests while it is 
fundamentally at odds with the Russian interests. The clash of Turkish-Russian interests 
in the region stems from their differing vision for a regional order in Eurasia. Turkey 
aims to solidify the newly gained independence of those states and bolster their economic 
development, which could decrease their dependence on Moscow. Turkey also desires to 
become a major actor in the region to benefit from economic and security cooperation 
while increasing its influence and elevating its status as an energy hub in the region; 
Ankara remains wary about Russia’s geopolitical ambitions in the region, especially 
Moscow’s close military ties to Armenia.  
Unlike the natural alignment of Turkish and Western interests in Central Asia and 
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the Caucasus, Turkey’s warming relations with Russia and its more accommodating 
policy approach towards Moscow because of its close economic ties, do pose some 
challenges to the West. This view is likely to raise more concerns following Russia’s 
aggressive actions in Ukraine. However, at the fundamental level, Turkey’s strategic 
interests and vision for the region are not in line with the Russian interests. Turkey and 
Russia have been on the opposite sides of the many international conflicts before and 
after the AKP came to power, ranging from the conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Syria, Iran, 
the Nagorno-Karabakh, and Ukraine. Turkey’s principles towards these conflicts, which 
emphasize diplomacy and promotion of economic interdependence for regional peace and 
prosperity, have been in line with the policies of the US and the EU.  
Turkey’s policy towards Russia resembles an independent-minded European 
country. Again the French example is apt here. France was the first country to start 
making business deals with China when the world shunned Beijing for its violent 
crackdown in the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989. France was also another European 
country that vehemently opposed the Iraq war and that was reluctant to impose sanctions 
against Russia after the latter’s takeover of Crimea. 
Turkey’s foreign policy actions in the Eurasia region highlight three important 
drivers of its foreign policy: systemic changes in the region, Turkey’s economic interests, 
and its leadership’s new foreign policy principles. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
opened the door to the Caucasus and Central Asia for Turkey while sapping Russia’s 
power. The emergence of independent republics rendered Turkey as one of the important 
players in the region, more so for the Caucasus, where Ankara previously had only a 
marginal influence and no active involvement. Turkey’s growing political, security, and 
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economic outreach to the region during the AKP coincided with Russia’s increasingly 
aggressive approach to the regional issues to keep the former Soviet Union countries in 
its orbit. 
Ankara acknowledges that the same democratization and Europeanization 
processes that helped Turkey to achieve its remarkable economic and political 
developments in the last decade help create spillover commercial and diplomatic effects 
into its relations with its Eurasian neighbors. Also, Turkey’s closer relations with Russia 
during the 2003-2006 and 2009-2010 period coincide with Turkey’s relatively cooler 
relations with the West, suggesting that the trends in Turkey’s relations with the US and 
EU at the international level continued to exert a considerable degree of influence on the 
evolution of Turkey’s relations with Russia.566 Russia vs. the West dynamics, especially 
after Russia’s takeover of Crimea and the Western sanctions against Russia, will 
increasingly define the regional dynamics and test the limits of the Turkish foreign 
policy.  
 Secondly, Ankara’s foreign policy in the region satisfies its goal of quenching the 
ever-increasing thirst for energy, exploring new venues for growing Turkish 
entrepreneurs, and curbing the country’s expanding energy dependence on Russia. It also 
contributes to Turkey’s aspiration to attain significant weight within the Eurasian energy 
politics to boost its global position, especially in the eyes of Brussels and Washington.567 
 Thirdly, Davutoglu’s foreign policy principles had a profound impact on Turkey’s 
foreign policy changes in Eurasia. Turkey aims to position itself as a “central country” in 
the words of Davutoglu, at the intersection of a geographically strategic region, as a key 
Eurasian power within the EU. Turkey embraced multidimensional foreign policy 
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concept to balance its relations with Russia and the West and to maintain its critical 
economic ties to Moscow. Ankara pursued a proactive diplomacy in its outreach to 
Central Asia and the Caucasus to increase Turkey’s soft power in the region, to mitigate 
regional tension, and contribute to regional peace, stability, and economic prosperity.  
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CHAPTER	  6:	  CONCLUSIONS	  AND	  POLICY	  IMPLICATIONS	  
 
This dissertation conducts case studies on Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle 
East and Eurasia and examines whether the changes in its foreign policy indicate a 
fundamental shift from its Western orientation. It concludes that Turkey’s foreign policy 
transformation in the last decade represents a significant change in the direction of 
autonomy, but not a fundamental reorientation of the country away from the Western 
framework. The study also finds that while international factors played an important role 
in preparing the ground for Turkey’s transformation, domestic factors, particularly 
Turkey’s economic interests, its new foreign policy elite and their vision, and Turkish 
public opinion, have been the main drivers of its foreign policy.  
More specifically, first of all, Turkish government’s critical attitude towards 
Israel’s policy, mainly stemming from strong public opposition to Israel’s policies in the 
Palestinian territories, constitutes the greatest divergence from the Western position. A 
series of diplomatic row between Turkey and Israel culminated in the flotilla incident in 
2010 which led Turkey to downgrade its diplomatic relations to the second-secretary 
level, break military contacts and refuse the NATO’s cooperation with Israel. Although 
relations somewhat improved after Israel’s US-brokered apology in 2013, the new 
violence in Gaza in fall 2014 triggered protests in Turkey, leading Israel to evacuate all 
non-essential diplomatic staff from Turkey.  
However, at the fundamental level, Ankara’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict remains in line with the Western policies. Turkey is firmly committed to the two-
state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and actually made significant efforts to 
mediate between the two sides as well as with Israel and Syria before its relations 
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soured with Israel. On how to handle the conflict, Ankara’s position diverges from the 
US and to a lesser extent from the EU because Ankara is convinced that maintaining a 
dialogue with major stakeholders, including Hamas, can help reach a solution to the 
conflict and believes that the blockade or other Israeli operations in the Palestinian 
territories are counterproductive. In line with the Western interests, Turkey continuously 
urged the group to recognize Israel, renounce violence, and uphold all the international 
agreements between the Palestinian authority and Israel.  
Secondly, on some issues affecting Turkey’s security and economic interests and 
regional stability, Ankara has adopted divergent priorities and advocated different 
approaches, resulting in a modest movement toward positions that create tension with the 
West. For example, Ankara opposed the Iraq War because it feared the removal of a 
central authority in Iraq would cause sectarian conflicts, increase the PKK threat on 
Turkey’s border, and exacerbate regional instability. Turks remember the devastating 
consequences of the first Gulf War, which increased PKK insurgency and cost, according 
to Turks, over $35 billion in lost economic revenues to sanctions as well as the burden of 
supporting 450,000 Kurdish refugees in Turkey. Thus, a great majority of the public, 95 
percent according to a poll the day before the war, was against the war. Nevertheless, 
despite denying the use of the Turkish soil as a land base in 2003, Ankara allowed 
Washington to use the Turkish airbase at Incirlik to support military and logistical needs 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. After the Iraq war, Ankara worked to facilitate the process of 
bringing together different factional groups in Iraq such as convincing the Sunnis to 
participate in the political elections and sought to establish dialog mechanisms and build 
trust, contributing to political reconciliation and relative stability in the country. With the 
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rise of the ISIS, Ankara supports the Western fight against the terrorist group but it 
advocates first ending the Assad regime, which it believes is the root cause of extremism 
and violence in the region. 
Turkey voted against the sanctions on Iran but Turkey also opposes Tehran’s 
nuclear ambitions so its Iranian policy at the fundamental level does not run counter to 
the Western policy. At the tactical level, however, Ankara’s method of dealing with the 
Iranian nuclear problem—which favors diplomatic solution and opposes economic 
sanctions or military action to protect Turkish security and economic interests—diverges 
from that of Washington and Tel Aviv. Prior to Turkey’s no vote, Turkish and Brazilian 
leaders had made significant efforts on a swap deal with their Iranian counterparts but 
when their efforts, which the pundits assessed to be unexpectedly successful, were 
sidelined by the UNSC decision to impose new sanctions against Iran, Ankara, together 
with Brazil, voted against the sanctions. In November 2010, several months after the “no” 
vote, Turkey approved the deployment of anti-missile radar system in its territory at 
NATO Lisbon Summit, a move that the Iranians vehemently opposed but Washington 
considered an important component of European security 
Thirdly, on the critical issues of maintaining the regional peace and stability in the 
Middle East, protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Central Asian and 
the Caucasus countries, and upholding the international norms and liberal political and 
economic order, Turkey’s position is at minimum compatible with, and in most instances 
strongly supportive of, Western interests. Turkey fundamentally opposes a nuclear Iran 
and its stance on many regional issues from Iraq to Syria to Yemen is opposite to the 
Iranian stance. As a NATO member, Turkey was a strong supporter of the war in 
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Afghanistan. Ankara deployed around 1,750 Turkish troops and reconstruction teams as a 
part of the International Security Assistance Force and used Turkish aid to promote post-
conflict reconstruction and capacity building. Turkey wants peace and prosperity in Iran, 
Iraq, Syria, and Israel. To that end, Ankara made mediating efforts to resolve a series of 
conflicts, including those between Israel and Palestine, Syria and Israel, Syria and Iraq, 
Iran and the West, and Syria and the West.  
Even though Turkey tried to maintain a balanced foreign policy towards Russia 
and failed to strongly condemn Russia’s actions or fully participate in the sanctions 
because of its economic dependence on Moscow, Turkey also opposes Russian 
aggression in the region and wants to see a Russia that is respectful towards the existing 
international order. It strongly supports the Central Asian and the Caucasus countries’ 
territorial integrity and integration with the global community. Ankara facilitated the 
export of their energy resources to the West bypassing Russia and made efforts for 
peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and Ossetia, and 
Ukraine.  
6.1.	  Direction	  of	  Turkish	  Foreign	  Policy	  
	  
Chapter 3 introduced Charles Hermann’s simple framework for identifying 
foreign policy change.568 First is the shift in efforts and methods to achieve certain goals 
which he names adjustment changes. Second change is the program changes, which refer 
to qualitative changes in methodology and instruments of statecraft. Third is the 
redirection of goals and aspirations of the state’s foreign policy machinery which he calls 
problem/goal changes. Finally, the fourth change, international orientation change, is the 
most fundamental shift in foreign policy direction and it involves the redirection of 
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the actor’s entire orientation toward world affairs. Using this framework, I will 
summarize below the study’s findings on the direction of Turkey’s foreign policy. 
Turkey has been pursuing a more independent and diversified foreign policy 
 Turkish foreign policy has gone through a remarkable transformation in the last 
decade. As Turkey became more active, independent, and assertive, especially in the 
Middle East and the Eurasia region, it has experienced adjustment, program, and goal 
changes during this period. 
 Adjustment Changes: Turkish foreign policy has certainly experienced shifts in 
efforts and methods in its engagement with the neighboring countries. After the AKP 
came to power, Turkey pursued a more proactive diplomacy seeking greater economic 
integration with the Middle Eastern and Eurasian countries. Turkish leaders’ diplomatic 
engagement with these countries dramatically increased, exemplified by several high-
level visits a year, establishment of the High Level Cooperation Council mechanisms 
with countries ranging from Iran and Iraq to Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, and the signing 
of friendship and security treaties with countries as diverse as Russia, Syria, and Georgia. 
Turkey’s bilateral trade with twenty Middle Eastern countries increased from nearly $10 
billion in 2002 to around $47 billion in 2013 and its trade with Eurasian countries, 
including Russia, increased from nearly $7 billion in 2002 to around $45 billion in 2013. 
Then President Gul (2007-2014) carried out nearly 70 visits during his first three years in 
office, attended by a total of 2,670 businessmen, and created a business volume of around 
$20 billion. Turkey also reached several major energy deals with Iran, Iraq, Russia, and 
Azerbaijan during this period, significantly increasing its oil and gas imports from these 
countries.  
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Program Changes: Turkish policymakers made qualitative changes to Turkey’s 
foreign policy instruments and redefined the principles of Turkish foreign policy during 
this period. Turkey’s new foreign policy concept stressed a balanced approach, proactive 
diplomacy, and use of soft power, and deemphasized the previous focus on security. 
Ahmet Davutoglu, the architect of Turkey’s new foreign policy, sharply challenged the 
traditional security-based, realist school of Turkish foreign policy—which states nations 
are driven primarily by interests and threats posed by enemies—and embraced a more 
liberal understanding of foreign policy. The AKP made major efforts to improve ties with 
the Middle Eastern and Eurasian countries as an essential part of its policies to eliminate 
problems with neighbors and pursue a multidimensional foreign policy to achieve 
regional stability. With a diminished sense of insecurity resulting from the normalization 
of Turkey’s relations with most of its neighbors, Ankara took a less security-oriented 
approach to its former adversaries, including Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Russia, and pursued 
closer political, cultural, and especially economic cooperation with these countries.  
Goal Changes: Turkey’s vision for the region did not dramatically change with 
the rise of the AKP but it can be argued that Ankara’s goals and aspirations changed with 
its rising economic and soft power. Turkey’s new leaders envisioned a new role for 
Turkey at the center, not at the periphery, and a new regional order with politically stable 
and economically viable countries that have no conflict with Turkey. They desired to 
raise Turkey’s economic status to join the ranks of the top ten economies in the world and 
elevate Turkey’s status as a stable, prosperous, and influential regional player in an 
equally stable and prosperous region. 
To that end, Turkey sought to avoid conflicts and ease tension in the region and 
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resolve existing bilateral disputes with its neighbors. For example, under heavy pressure 
from the Turkish public, Ankara made substantial efforts to ward off the war on Iraq and 
in the end, the Turkish parliament voted in March 2003 to reject the US request to open a 
northern front in Turkey to launch its troops in Iraq. After the war, Ankara worked to 
facilitate the process of bringing together different factional groups in Iraq, contributing 
to political reconciliation and relative stability in the country. Turkey also made 
mediating efforts to resolve a series of conflicts, including those between Israel and 
Palestine, Syria and Israel, Iran and the West, Syria and the West, , Georgia and the 
Abkhazians, and Azerbaijan and Armenia.569  
Turkey still remains firmly in the Western alliance  
Turkish foreign policy changes since the AKP came to power provide evidence 
for adjustment, program, and goal changes, but there is insufficient evidence to support 
the argument for the redirection of Turkey’s orientation away from the West. There is no 
doubt that Turkey has been pursuing a more active and independent foreign policy in the 
Middle East and Eurasia since the AKP came to power. At times, its policies have been at 
odds with the interests of its Western allies, especially with that of Washington. 
However, as evidenced throughout the case study, when we take a closer look at the 
context beyond the media highlights, Turkey’s disagreements with the Western policies 
have mostly been over competing priorities and different approaches to regional 
challenges, rather than over a divergence of fundamental values and interests.  
In other words, the differences between the United States and Turkey regarding 
Iran, Iraq, Syria, Palestinian territories, ISIS, and Russia, are largely over tactics, not over 
strategic goals or vision. In a speech at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in February 2004, then Foreign Minister Gul 
defined the three main axis of the Turkish Foreign Policy. He said the relations with the 
Western world, Europe and Euro-Atlantic Institutions, come first. Second is Turkey’s 
relations with the Middle East, and third is the relations with the Eurasian world. Gul 
argued that Turkey’s active involvement in its region and multilateral relations with the 
countries in the Middle East is not an option to replace its connections with Europe and 
that the security and stability of Europe and the Middle East are complementary.570 
Speaking to Charlie Rose in a 2011 interview, then Prime Minister Erdogan defended 
Turkey’s presence in the Middle East and said “France, Germany, and the US are all 
there, why can’t we be there. It’s very logical for us to be there because we have common 
history, culture, and long borders with these countries.”571 
Turkey’s Western orientation is not only a consequence of longstanding collective 
defense engagements and foreign trade links with Europe and the US, but also a natural 
outcome of cultural connections, especially with Western Europe since the first 
modernization efforts of the Ottoman state began at the end of the eighteenth century.572 
For many Turks, joining the EU became synonymous with the final push toward realizing 
Ataturk’s dream of joining the contemporary civilization. For them, Turkey as a member 
of the EU would become economically prosperous, politically stable, and democratic.573 
According to a prominent Turkish scholar, Turkey has two main foreign policy 
objectives: to make Turkey an integral part of the EU and to proactively pursue the goal 
of helping to create an environment of security, stability, prosperity, friendship, and 
cooperation all around itself.574 
After the AKP came to power, Turkish government strongly supported the EU 
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membership and passed more political and economic reforms than any of its secularist 
predecessors to meet the EU criteria, earning Turkey EU candidate status in 2005. The 
second part of 2000s was not as productive, however, as both sides dragged their feet in 
making progress and the EU fatigue sapped Turkish public’s enthusiasm for the Union. 
The European leaders’ questioning of whether Turkey fits in the EU, their proposals short 
of membership, and the admission of Cyprus without the resolution of the conflict raised 
Turkish resentment at perceived EU double standard.  
Turkey and the US, for the most part, share common goals and values such as the 
rule of law, democracy, free market economy, regional stability, and promotion of peace 
and prosperity. However, the US-Turkish relations have never been smooth in the past; 
bilateral ties suffered when Turkey denied the US the use of American bases in Turkey to 
resupply the Israeli forces during the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and when the US sent the 
Johnson letter and imposed arms embargo on Turkey following the Turkey’s intervention 
in Cyprus in1974. Despite some tension in the past, however, the United States and 
Turkey have enjoyed a long-standing, tested friendship based on shared values and a 
common agenda for positive change on regional and global issues. The United States has 
staunchly defended Turkey’s interests against the Soviet threat during the Cold War, 
strongly advocated Turkey’s EU membership, and supported Turkey’s outreach into 
Central Asia and the Caucasus. When their approaches have diverged, such as in the 
dispute over UNSC actions against Iran during the summer of 2010, the ability of the two 
states to handle the fallout has paid dividends for an enhanced partnership going 
forward.575  
This study contributes to some of the debates surrounding the “Europeanist” and 
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“Atlanticist” foreign policy trends or the tension between pro-European and pro-
American forces by highlighting that Turkish foreign policy has been closer to the EU’s 
line on many foreign policy issues. Turkey had strong relations with the US beginning 
with the Cold War and their close relationship has been a source of concern for some 
countries within the EU, fearing that Turkey would be a second “Trojan horse” of the US, 
after the UK. The United States’ unilateral approach during the Iraq war brought Turkey 
and the EU closer together in their common multilateral approach. Many European 
countries, including France and Germany, also opposed the Iraq war, forcing the US to 
take a unilateral action against Iraq without the UN backing. Most Turks came to view 
the US as responsible for destabilizing its own backyard after the Iraq War and for the 
first time tipped the alliance in favor of Europe over the US both among the Turkish 
leadership and the public.  
Turkey and the EU hold similar viewpoints on the issues of Iraq’s future, Iran’s 
nuclear policies, transformation of the Middle East region, and the Israeli-Palestinian 
dispute. For example, Davutoglu met with the Palestinian leader Mashal twice in Syria 
and his second visit came as a result of then French President Sarkozy’s request for help 
from Erdogan. Both the EU and Turkey favor the revitalization of the peace process and 
believe Israel’s policy of expanding home construction in Gaza is detrimental to the 
peace process. According to Davutoglu, Turkey and the EU’s paths almost always 
converge: “Turkey seeks to establish peace, stability and security in the Middle East; to 
further integrate the Balkans with the Euro-Atlantic community; to bolster democracy 
and peaceful resolution of conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia; to contribute to 
enhanced energy supply and security of Europe; to strengthen security and stability in 
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Afghanistan and South Asia. So does the EU.” 576 
A Turkey that is more independent and more representative of the views of its 
people, but still remains within the Western framework and international order, can 
actually become more stable than the one that implements the Western policies against 
the opposition from its own people. The AKP, so far, has not gone to the either extreme 
by completely overturning Turkey’s political and cultural traditions like some of its 
predecessors did. That’s the sign of a normal state and is more stable than the one that 
tries hard to move closer to the West and risks creating an opposition that takes the 
country to the opposing extreme. Iran’s Shah regime before the Islamic revolution and 
Russia’s Yeltsin before the nationalist movement that allowed Putin’s ascendance 
provide some recent examples.  
A prominent Turkey scholar Larabee argues that Turkey’s greater engagement in 
the Middle East is a part of the gradual diversification of Turkish foreign policy since the 
end of the Cold War. Turkey is rediscovering the region of which it has historically been 
an integral part. Especially under the Ottomans, Turkey was the dominant power in the 
Middle East. Its Republican period, with an emphasis on noninvolvement in the Middle 
Eastern affairs, was an anomaly, and Turkey’s current activism is a return to a more 
traditional pattern.577  
Turkey scholars Gordon and Taspinar also argue that whereas the Islamist 
coalition government of the 1996-1997 sought to create an Islamic alliance with Muslim 
countries such as Libya, Iran, Malaysia, and Indonesia as an explicit alternative to the 
West, the AKP leaders today want to reach out to the East to complement their ties to the 
West, not replace them. Their vision, which builds on the approach of former President 
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Ozal, who began the liberalization movement in Turkey, is one in which Turkey 
rediscovers its imperial legacy and seeks a new national consensus within which the 
country’s multiple identities can coexist. In that sense, this new emphasis on the Ottoman 
legacy is not about Islamization but rather about counterbalancing what its proponents 
see as Kemalism’s obsession with Turkey’s Western identity. 578 The AKP represents 
moderate Muslims that are at peace with Turkey’s past, Islamic tradition, and secular 
nature, and do not face an opposition that demands the exact opposite of its major foreign 
and domestic policies. Currently, the opposition in Turkey does not advocate a radically 
different approach to Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and Eurasia.  
Policy	  Implications	  	  
	  
A new Turkey that is more active and assertive in the world affairs, as opposed to 
the old Turkey that is isolationist, neutral, and sometimes belligerent, can actually 
contribute to the global stability and prosperity. Turkey’s more self-confident and 
assertive stance in relations with regional states may actually improve Turkey’s image in 
the eyes of Western partners from a trouble-maker suffering tensions with most of its 
neighbors to a problem-solver contributing to peace and stability in the region.  
Turkey can become a stabilizing force in the region. Ankara can use its increasing 
influence in the Middle East and Eurasia to contribute to the resolution of regional 
conflicts. Turkey’s efforts for a peaceful solution in Iraq before the invasion and its 
initiatives for democratic rehabilitation of the country afterwards are often cited as 
Turkey’s meaningful contribution to the regional peace efforts. Turkey’s maintenance of 
an open dialogue with Hamas could actually help convince the organization to eventually 
meet the demands of the Middle East Quartet, which include recognizing Israel, 
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renouncing violence, and upholding all the international agreements between the 
Palestinian authority and Israel. Ankara might have some leverage in the resolution of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict because of its influence in Azerbaijan; it can also contribute 
to the efforts to find a peaceful resolution to Georgia’s Abkhazia problem. 
An annual poll of Turkey’s standing in the Middle East in 2012 indicate that the 
Middle Eastern people perceived Turkey more positively than any other country in the 
world, with a 78 percent rating, though Turkey’s popularity dropped a little bit after the 
Arab Spring and Turkey’s continuing support to the Muslim Brotherhood. Around 77 
percent of the Middle Easterners believed that Turkey contributes positively to regional 
peace compared to contributions from the EU, UN, Russia, the US, China or NATO in a 
decreasing order. Israel was perceived as the greatest threat to peace in the region with 47 
percent of the vote, followed by the US at 24 percent, and then Iran at 11 percent. The 
Middle Eastern public also perceived Turkey as a trusted interlocutor and 61 percent of 
the respondents saw Turkey as a model for the region.579  
However, Turkey’s efforts at mediation can bear fruit only if undertaken in 
tandem with the United States. It can play a useful role as a go-between for the West and 
actors such as Hamas, Iran, and Muslim Brotherhood. For that it has to maintain its value 
as an honest broker. If and when the US engages in a peace process in the Middle East, 
Turkey’s role will have value, but it will still be secondary.580 Furthermore, Turkey 
imports nearly all of its oil and natural gas supplies, up from 87 percent of oil in 2010 and 
98 percent of its natural gas supply in 2009,581 and most of this comes from Russia and 
Iran, creating a significant vulnerability restricting its freedom of action. 
Turkey is uniquely positioned to bridge the Eastern and Western values and help 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
259	  
spread international values of democracy, free market economy, and global civilization. 
Turkey has turned to the West in its modernization efforts since the birth of the Republic 
and the West is the epitome of democracy, human rights, and civilization for many Turks. 
At the same time, Turkey is the inheritor of the Ottoman Empire and feels a particular 
responsibility for relations between the East and the West. With its unique history and 
political culture, Turkey is well positioned to fill the chasm between the Eastern and 
Western traditions and political culture. Turkey never had a history of Western 
domination, occupation, or colonization. It voluntarily chose the western model of 
secularization and democracy; even though it was the state elites that initially decided to 
adopt the Western systems, foreign forces did not impose them on Turkey. Islam in 
Turkey is mainly cultural, not ideological or political, and even though the majority of 
Turkish people are religiously conservative, they are secular-minded and respect 
democracy and rule of law.  
To a significant degree, Turkey has succeeded in establishing the roots of 
secularism, namely the logic of state is superior to the logic of religion. Historians argue 
that the tradition of secularism is even older than the Republic itself; in the Ottoman 
Empire, religion through religious law did not dominate decision-making. Surveys show 
that the Turkish population is religious but not fundamentally religious, and the majority 
is opposed to religion playing a role in political life.582 The great majority of the 
population prefers to vote for parties with more moderate political affiliations and they 
reject any introduction of Islamic law.  
Despite the recent heavy-handed tendencies of President Erdogan—who said 
when he first came to power, “Islam is a religion, democracy is a way of ruling”583—
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Turkey has decades-long experience in democratic institutions and enjoys relatively free 
media presence; Turkish people have more voice than their counterparts in the Middle 
East or Eurasia. Turkey’s Gezi protests in 2014 involved a conglomerate of young Turks, 
including the leftists and environmentalists, who protested the destruction of a park for 
the construction of a grand mall, but it later turned into an anti-government protest with a 
heavy use of police force. These protests were more Paris in 1968, when student 
occupation protests against capitalism, consumerism, and traditional institutions turned 
into a countrywide social revolution, than the Tahrir Square protests in Egypt in 2011. It 
was not a Middle Eastern revolt against an oppressive regime that denied freedom and 
basic rights for its people. It was a European revolt where people demanded better quality 
of life and reacted to the authoritarian tilt in their representative government, possibly 
inspired by the Western values. 
Turkey’s geographic disposition and close historical and cultural ties across a vast 
landscape have endowed it with the potential to promote dialogue and interaction among 
civilizations. Turkey, together with Spain, launched the “Alliance of Civilizations” 
initiative in 2004, drawing over 140 participating countries and international institutions. 
It also launched in 2010 with Finland the “Friends of Mediation” group, which exists 
within the framework of the “Mediation for Peace initiative,” reaching 48 members. 
While being predominantly Sunni, Turkey has good relations with the Shiite countries 
such as Iran and the Shiite people such as the Azeris, and it enjoys the credibility to 
mediate between sectarian groups in Iraq and Lebanon, by its nature as neither an Arab 
nor an Israeli.584 Turkey can serve as a role model for Arab countries; its reengagement 
with the Middle East could strengthen the moderate and pragmatic Islamic elements in 
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the region, and serve as a counterbalance to Iran’s radical influence.  
The West and Turkey have common interest in facilitating the Middle Eastern 
countries’ peaceful transition to democracy. Seventy-five percent of the people surveyed 
in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia and Syria in 2009 viewed 
Turkey as a “model for the synthesis of Islam and democracy.”585 The Arab Awakening 
challenged Turkey’s policy of zero problems with neighbors and destabilized the region, 
but Turkey sought to support the people against embattled autocratic regimes of Tunisia, 
Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.586 When Turkey assumed the chairmanship of the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) at the 2004 OIC foreign ministers’ summit in 
Istanbul, it marked the first time the chairmanship was decided through an open election 
at the demand of Turkey. Ankara also established a transparent democratic process within 
the OIC and placed emphasis on such concepts as democratization, human rights, rule of 
law, good governance, accountability, transparency, and gender equality.587 
A democratic and secular Turkey can also contribute to the newly independent 
Central Asian and Caucasian states’ attempts toward integration with the Western world 
by promoting the Western-style institutions and norms in a region that is open to Iranian 
penetration and its brand of fundamentalist Islam. Over time, Turkish-generated calls for 
reform, political liberalization, and a tempering of regional confrontations in the Middle 
East will come from a credible, strong, and independent regional voice, which may 
ultimately facilitate changes that are in the long-term interests of the West.  
Turkey can contribute to global humanitarian efforts. With 228 missions abroad, 
Turkey has one of the largest diplomatic representations worldwide, complementing its 
ability to be a responsible global actor. Turkey contributes to peace through its 
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humanitarian, reconciliation, and mediation efforts and initiatives. It kept an open door 
policy for all Syrians and Iraqis fleeing violence in their countries and so far more than 
1.7 million Syrians have found shelters in Turkey. According to the Global Humanitarian 
Assistance Report, Turkey has become the third largest donor worldwide with its 1.6 
billion dollars of official aid; in terms of humanitarian aid-national income per capita 
ratio, Turkey ranks as the first country worldwide. Turkey took over the G-20 presidency 
in 2015 and is preparing to host the first-ever World Humanitarian Summit in 2016.  
Turkey can be a more valuable partner on global security and counterterrorism 
efforts. The AKP government’s proactivism in diplomacy has paved the way for Turkey 
to take a more active role in international organizations such as the UN and the OIC and 
establish relations not just in the Middle East and Eurasia but also in Africa and Latin 
America. Turkey participated in the Balkans UN Kosovo Force and UN Police Mission in 
Kosovo and the EU’s Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the EU-led Police 
Mission in Macedonia.588 Turkey also participated in peace-making and peace-enforcing 
operations in Somalia, Albania, and Georgia, and contributed to international observation 
groups on the Iran-Iraq border and later on the Iraq-Kuwait border.  
Turkey’s active political and economic engagement in the region increases 
Turkey’s stake in the regional stability and its willingness to contribute to the efforts 
aimed at rooting out religious terrorism in the region. Following the 9/11 attacks, when 
NATO invoked the Article 5—the collective defense clause of the Washington Treaty 
declaring the attacks against the US as attacks against all its members—Turkey was 
among the first countries to join the coalition forces to fight against terrorism. It 
permitted all American and coalition countries’ aircraft to use the Turkish airspace and 
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provided troops for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.589 
Turkey assumed the command of the ISAF II Afghanistan and contributed 1,400 troops 
between June 2002 and February 2003. Turkey assumed the command of ISAF IV 
between February and August 2005. It assisted with peacekeeping tasks in Afghanistan 
and sent ninety elite troops to support the training of the Northern Alliance to fight 
terrorism and assist with humanitarian efforts.590 Turkey also co-chairs along with the US 
the “Global Counter Terrorism Forum,” launched in 2011, and co-chairs with the EU the 
Horn of Africa region Working Group of the forum.591 
Turkey can be a key contributor to the Western energy security, which has gained 
more importance after the Russian aggression in Ukraine. Turkey can play an 
increasingly important role in facilitating energy trade between Central Asia, Caucasus 
and Europe as the EU looks toward the region to enhance its energy security especially 
after the Ukrainian crisis and increased Russian aggression.592 The EU has recently been 
pushing for an energy union and a single market for power and gas to facilitate better 
connections between member states and curb Russia’s dominant position. Turkmenistan 
and Azerbaijan as the source of energy and Georgia and Turkey as transit countries play a 
crucial role in reaching this goal. The EU, keen on lessening its dependence on Russia for 
energy supplies, met with the Azeri and Turkmen officials in May 2015 and reportedly 
reached a mutual understanding on the Southern gas corridor project, which would bring 
Turkmen gas to Europe across Caspian Sea to feed the European direction by 2019.593  
The European Commission president Jose Manuel Barroso stated in 2009 that 
energy security was “one of these cases where we can show to the European public 
opinion how important Turkey is for the EU.”594 Foreign ministers of Sweden and Italy 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
264	  
argued in an article that Turkey was a key actor in the realm of energy security and 
argued for Turkey’s EU accession.595 The enlargement commissioner, Olli Rehn went so 
far as to say, “the EU and Turkey share essential strategic interests in security, economy 
and dialogue of civilizations. That is one of the reasons why the EU decided to open 
negotiations with Turkey.596  
	  
6.2.	  Drivers	  of	  Turkish	  Foreign	  Policy	  
	  
A closer examination of Turkish foreign policy during this period reveals that 
international factors such as the end of the Cold War, disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
the collapse of the bipolar world order, prospects for Turkey’s EU membership, and the 
recent Arab Spring had profound impact on Turkish foreign policy. However, this study 
assesses that its it the domestic factors—Turkey’s economic interests, new foreign policy 
elite and their vision, and Turkish public opinion—that have been the main factors behind 
Turkey’s foreign policy transformation during the last decade. 
6.2.1.	  Main	  International	  Factors	  
	  
1)	  The	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  war and the collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated an 
existential threat to Turkey and ushered in a new thinking in Ankara that Turkey no 
longer needed protection from the Western security umbrella, namely the NATO. Turkey 
began to view Russia less as an adversary and more like a business partner and Turkish-
Russian rapprochement began to take shape. The altered polarity of the international 
system and Turkey’s increased military and economic capabilities allowed Turkey to act 
more independently from the United States and its Western allies. At the same time, the 
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collapse of the Soviet Union opened the door for Turkey to the Caucasus and Central 
Asia. The emergence of independent republics rendered Turkey as one of the important 
players in the region, more so for the Caucasus, where it previously had only a marginal 
influence and no active involvement. Turkey’s growing political, security, and economic 
outreach to the region during the AKP coincided with Russia’s increasingly aggressive 
approach to the regional issues to keep the former Soviet Union countries in its orbit. 
2)	  The	  European	  Union’s Luxembourg Summit decision in 1997 not to grant 
candidate status to Turkey is often cited as an important factor in Turkey’s search for 
alternatives in the East, forging closer ties with Russia and the Middle East. Turkey’s 
closer relations with Russia during the 2003-2006 and 2009-2010 periods coincide with 
Turkey’s relatively cooler relations with the West, suggesting the trends in Turkey’s 
relations with the US and the EU at the international level continued to exert a 
considerable degree of influence on the evolution of Turkey’s relations with Russia.597 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates said, if the country appears to be moving eastward, it is 
“in no small part because it was pushed by some in Europe refusing to give Turkey the 
kind of organic link to the West that Turkey sought.”598 More importantly, however, the 
prospects for EU membership provided an impetus for Turkish policymakers in pushing 
forward political and economic reforms which transformed domestic political institutions, 
including the foreign policymaking institutions, and eventually contributed to the EU 
decision to grant Turkey the candidacy in 2005.  
Europeanization has impacted Turkey’s foreign policy approach with less 
emphasis on military security and balance of power-driven hard power and more 
emphasis on the use of civilian instruments such as international law, diplomacy, and soft 
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power. The AKP won in 2002 by adopting an aggressively pro-EU political platform and 
building on the efforts begun under the previous government, the AKP government 
passed an impressive series of liberal reforms with a commitment to a democratic reform 
process guided by the EU’s “Copenhagen Criteria” for membership. Admittedly, 
reduction in the military’s power suited the AKP’s interest but the reforms made Turkey 
more democratic by increasing the civilian control of the government policies. The 
Turkish Grand National Assembly passed no fewer than seven comprehensive legislative 
reform packages and a variety of major constitutional amendments under the auspices of 
two AKP governments. 
The role of the traditional central players in Turkish foreign policy-making, 
particularly that of the Turkish armed forces, has decreased. Turkey’s mixed civilian-
military state security courts were abolished, an entirely new penal code was established, 
and death penalty was banned. Amendments to the anti-terror law made it more difficult 
to prosecute citizens based on speech alone. The AKP-dominated parliament amended 
Articles 76 and 78 of the constitution, making it more difficult to ban political parties and 
politicians from the political arena. Military representatives were removed from Turkey’s 
Council of Higher Education and High Audio-Visual Board established after the military 
coup of 1980. It expanded the scope of individual freedoms by granting some rights to 
citizens with Kurdish origin, such as broadcasting in Kurdish and learning Kurdish 
through the private institutions that teach Kurdish language. The EU also contributed to 
the process of increasing NGO influence on foreign policy issues by giving funds to 
NGO-prepared projects and supporting the wider democratization project in Turkey. 
In addition to its indirect impact on Turkish foreign policy by inducing reforms 
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that changed the domestic political institutions, the prospect of EU membership also had 
a direct influence in softening the Turkish position and nudging its policy towards a line 
closer to that of the EU. Turkey’s non-interventionist policy in Iraq and its decision not to 
allow the transfer of US soldiers to Iraq took into account the EU’s position on the Iraq 
war and the requirements to meet the membership criteria. Major EU countries such as 
France and Germany had opposed the war. Turkey also took into consideration that the 
transfer of 62,000 US troops would require extra measures and re-imposition of 
emergency rule in the southeast Turkey, which would conflict with the EU agenda and 
jeopardize the overall democratization and peaceful development process for the country. 
While the longstanding Turkish-Greek hostility began to improve after the 
“earthquake diplomacy” conducted in 1999 with an increasing rapprochement in the 
fields of tourism, civil society, and trade between the two countries, Turkish foreign 
policy regarding the Cyprus issue took a more accommodative position. Ankara 
abandoned its confrontationist attitude before the referendum on the UN backed Annan 
Plan. That Turkish Cypriots supported a “yes” vote, in contrast to the Greek Cypriots’ 
“no” vote in the referendum, was a turning point in Turkey’s approach towards the 
Cyprus issue.599 
The EU candidature also had a positive impact on the Turkish economy and the 
stabilization of the economy strengthens Turkey’s foreign policy priorities. The business 
community, which has close connections with the European business circles, has 
advocated a more dovish position on foreign policy issues. The EU prioritizes 
economics-based options in foreign policy and believes that an increasing economic 
interdependency with other countries leads to moderation in foreign policy.600 Ankara 
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also acknowledges that the same democratization and Europeanization processes that 
have helped Turkey to achieve its remarkable economic and political developments in the 
last decade help create spillover commercial and diplomatic effects into its relations with 
its Middle Eastern and Eurasian neighbors.  
3)	  The	  Arab	  spring has seriously challenged Turkey’s new foreign policy vision 
and dented its appeal in the Middle East, creating a dilemma between stability and 
democracy. Ankara was stuck between many competing principles and desires between 
working with regional “realities,” and siding with the “forces of history,” and between 
maintaining good working relations with all regional states by limiting western military 
intervention into regional affairs and demonstrating to Washington that Ankara’s 
approach to problems can be effective in solving regional issues.601 Turkey chose to 
support the people’s power and sought to play a role in spreading freedom and securing 
stability, which complicated its balanced policy in the Middle East.  
For example, in Syria, despite its initial hesitation, Turkey chose to stay on the 
side of its Western allies and the international consensus in condemning Assad because it 
shares the Western vision for a stable and prosperous region. Having placed its entire 
stakes in the opposition, Ankara’s policy went even further than the Western stance; it 
demanded a regime change and facilitated heavier arming of the Syrian opposition with 
external weapons sources, which alienated many Turkish fans in the Middle East. 
Erdogan’s popularity also took a hit when his government adamantly stood by the elected 
Morsi Government that created some instability in Egypt despite the Western acceptance 
of the new government that overthrew it.  
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6.2.2.	  Main	  Domestic	  Factors	  
 1.	  Economic	  Interests	  
	  
This study finds that Turkey’s economic interests are one of the most important 
drivers of its foreign policy during this period. The AKP came to power with a claim of 
representing the groups who were outside the political, economic, and cultural elite that 
had dominated Turkey since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Considering that 
these Anatolian Tigers—who were export-oriented and profited from the increased role 
of economics in foreign policymaking—constitute the core of the AKP constituency, it 
became an important foreign policy goal for the AKP to liberalize and create new 
markets in which the export-oriented Anatolian firms could do business. Then Foreign 
Minister Davutoglu acknowledged in a 2011 interview that the business community in 
Turkey has become “one of the driving forces of foreign policy.”602 
Turkey’s foreign policy activism was simultaneously accompanied and reinforced 
by a rapid expansion of Turkey’s external trade and investment flows into the Middle 
Eastern region, providing new markets for Turkey’s increasingly politically active 
entrepreneurial class and resulting in an impressive growth for Turkey, which tripled its 
GDP in nominal US dollar terms in the past decade. Ankara’s foreign policy in the 
Eurasia region satisfies its goal of quenching its ever-increasing thirst for energy and 
exploring new venues for growing Turkish entrepreneurs. Turkey’s trade with the Middle 
East increased by nearly 900 percent and its trade with Russia increased by around 700 
percent during this period. Turkish businesses make up the majority of construction 
sector in the Middle East; when its indirect contribution is taken into account, 
construction sector accounts for close to 30 percent of Turkey’s GDP and creates 
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employment for nearly 2 million people.603 Despite the diplomatic fallout, Ankara has 
maintained robust economic relationship with Tel Aviv and the bilateral trade continued 
to rise even after the flotilla incident.  
Turkey’s energy needs to support its growing economy had a major influence on 
Ankara’s foreign policy choices. Turkey and Russia have been on the opposite sides 
regarding many international conflicts before and after the AKP came to power, 
including the conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Syria, Iran, the Azeri-Armenian frozen 
conflict, and the Ukrainian crisis, however, the energy and trade links between Ankara 
and Moscow have forced both countries to keep their geopolitical competition and 
political conflicts on a manageable level. With a trade volume of nearly $40 billion, 
rivaled only by the EU as a bloc, neither Turkey nor Russia wants to antagonize each 
other despite their diverging interests about emerging political crises in the region. 
Turkey, after the EU, was Gazprom’s second-largest market and Russia is Turkey’s most 
reliable energy supplier and single largest supplier of natural gas. In 2012, Russia 
provided 10 percent of its oil and 56 percent of its natural gas. Considering Turkey’s 
energy dependence on Russia and their future joint projects, both countries have strong 
incentives to maintain stable political relations.  
Similarly, even though Ankara and Tehran are on the opposing sides on major 
conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, Turkey’s energy dependence on Iran ensures that 
Turkey has a strong stake in preventing relations with Iran from deteriorating too badly. 
Iran, in 2012, provided 35 percent of Turkey’s oil and 18 percent of its natural gas, which 
raised the bilateral trade volume to $22 billion in 2012 from around $1 billion in 2002. 
And Turkey is likely to see the fastest medium-to long-term growth in energy demand 
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among the IEA member countries and its energy use is expected to double over the next 
decade. 
 Policy	  Implications	  
	  
Turkey’s economic interests drive many of its foreign policy decisions and 
maintaining the high economic growth achieved in the last decade is a must for Turkey’s 
electorally savvy policymakers. Increasing trade and investment with Turkey and 
anchoring it firmly in the Western economic alliances—such as the EU and the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership—could nudge Turkey’s foreign policy 
behavior towards a line that is more accommodative to the Western interests.  
The European Union Membership: The EU’s 2005 decision to formally start 
accession talks with Turkey not only transformed Turkey’s political and economic 
institutions, paving way for a more democratic and peaceful Turkey, but it also gave 
hopes to the people in the Middle East that a Muslim country could join the EU and that 
Turkey’s EU entry could help them modernize and live in peace with the West.604 A 
stable, Western-oriented, liberal Turkey on a clear path toward EU membership would 
serve as a growing market for Western goods and a potential contributor to the labor 
forces Europe will need. 605 Turkey already has a Customs Union with the EU countries 
and the EU membership would institutionalize Turkey’s trade and investment ties with 
the EU through free movement of goods, capital, and labor.  
However, according to a 2013 EU status report, membership talks with Turkey 
have stalemated since 2012 because of the difficulties in reaching a solution to the 
conflict in Cyprus, Turkish government’s recent anti-democratic measures, transparent 
objection of major EU members to Turkey’s acceptance, the crisis in the 
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Eurozone, and the political tension due to Turkey’s refusal to recognize the Armenian 
suffering. France, Greece, and Cyprus closed several chapters of the accession criteria, 
Germany began floating the idea of “Privileged Partnership” short of membership, and 
the political discourse among the right-wing European politicians began to hurt the 
national pride of the Turks who also began to lose enthusiasm for the membership.606 
Statements like the one uttered by the French President Sarkozy that Turkey is “not a 
European country” and that EU membership for Turkey would “kill the very idea of 
European integration,” have so far been counterproductive.607 
Turkey feels deep resentment towards Cyprus’ accession to the EU without 
resolving the conflict in the island and Cyprus’ opposition to Turkey’s accession as an 
EU member. Cyprus had seemed to pursue a peaceful settlement of the dispute in the 
island before the accession and support the UN’s Annan Plan just before its EU accession 
in May 2004. Greece prevented any concrete demand from other countries for the 
resolution of the problem before the accession with the threat to veto eastern 
enlargement. When Cyprus felt secure in its membership, the Greek Cypriot leadership 
opposed the plan and the EU Commissioner of enlargement Gunter Verheugen declared 
that he had been deceived and the attitude of the Cypriot administration was just opposite 
of its former stance.608  
Furthermore, the AKP government took domestic political risks and reversed the 
long-standing Turkish policy by pressing the Turkish Cypriots to accept a political 
compromise on the island, which it hoped, would enhance Turkey’s chances of joining 
the EU. When the referendum failed, the government had to defend its policy against 
charges at home that it sold out its Turkish brethren while getting little in return. The 
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AKP government made another concession in 2005 to extend its Customs Union with the 
EU to the newest EU members, including Cyprus, as a precondition to start accession 
negotiations with Brussels. However, in 2006, Cyprus tried to stop negotiations with 
Turkey and got the EU to agree to partial suspensions of accession negotiations. 
The waning of the EU’s influence on Turkish policies coincided with the 
democratic backsliding in Turkey. Ankara’s crackdown on anti-government protests in 
June 2013, which left five people dead, prompted a postponement of the EU decision on 
renewing talks until November 2013. Erdogan’s complaints about the EU’s ambivalent 
attitude towards Turkey by stating that “if you do not want Turkey, come out and say it 
openly. Don’t put us off” is a response to the yearning for an “honorable” stance vis-à-vis 
the EU among the Turkish public, nationalist groups, and civil and military elites. 609 
Turks perceived that the EU excluded Turkey not because of rational reasons but because 
Turkey belongs to a different culture and religion, accusing the EU of following “racist” 
policies.610 According to the German Marshall Fund’s 2010 Transatlantic Trends survey, 
the level of Turkish respondents who are still enthusiastic about EU membership dropped 
to 38 percent from 73 percent in 2004. 
Because of the lack of commitment from the EU and waning enthusiasm among 
the Turkish public, Turkish leaders were able to push the EU down on its agenda with 
impunity. However, greater political and economic engagement with Ankara on the 
membership can revitalize the dragging process. The recent signs, including increased 
interest among the Turkish public for the EU and the agreement to expand the Customs 
Union between Turkey and the EU provide some encouraging signs.  
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Turkey’s inclusion in the 
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TTIP—higher level free trade agreement between the US and the EU—or signing a 
parallel free trade agreement with the US would serve as a crucial step to anchor Turkey 
firmly in the Western alliance. Prominent Turkish scholar Kemal Kirisci argued in a 
Brookings paper that Turkey’s involvement in TTIP would not only benefit the economy 
of both sides but also help consolidate and strengthen Turkey’s democracy through a 
continued expansion of the principles of accountability, transparency, and rule of law.611 
As a part of the National Export Initiative, Turkey is one of the six next-tier 
markets to which the US hopes to increase exports. Turkey’s active entrepreneurial sector 
makes it an ideal partner country for commercial initiatives and a free trade agreement 
between the two countries—expanding on the 1990 Bilateral Investment Treaty and the 
1999 Turkey-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement—would be mutually 
beneficial.612 US businesses could also benefit from partnering with Turkish companies 
that have more experience in the Middle East and Eurasia region. 613 Erdogan wrote a 
personal letter on the subject to President Obama and Davutoglu brought up the issue 
with Secretary of State John Kerry during the latter’s visit to Turkey in March 2013. A 
series of governmental and civil society actors have also been advocating for the US and 
the EU support for the idea.  
According to Kirisci, Turkey’s exclusion from the TTIP while maintaining a 
Customs Union with the EU would damage Turkey’s economic interests. The EU’s 
common commercial policy that Turkey must adhere to stipulated that every time the EU 
signs a new free trade agreement with a third party, Turkey must launch its own initiative 
to conclude a similar agreement with that country. Otherwise, goods from these third 
parties would enter Turkey via the EU without reciprocal preferential access being 
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granted for Turkish goods. That means, if the TTIP comes into force without Turkey’s 
inclusion in one way or another, the US products would be able to enter the Turkish 
market freely without duties, while Turkey would continue to face duties and other 
limitations, especially in the form of non-tariff barriers in the American market.614 
Kirisci further argues that the exclusion of Turkey from this new emerging 
international structure, composed of TTIP and TPP—Trans-Pacific Partnership or a free 
trade agreement with WTO-plus standards with 11 East Asian and Pacific countries, 
excluding China–risks pushing Turkey into the arms of those countries that challenge the 
Western economic order, such as Russia and China. If Turkey becomes a partner in TTIP 
or alternatively signs a parallel free trade agreement with the US, it would create a win-
win situation for all involved parties and also greatly benefit Turkey’s economic 
development and democratization process. 
2.	  New	  Foreign	  Policy	  Elite	  and	  Their	  Vision	  	  
	  
Turkey’s remarkable transformation in the last decade would not have been 
possible without the institutional framework of a single-party government that enjoyed a 
parliamentary majority and ushered in political stability and strong economic growth. 
That institutional stability prepared a fertile ground for Turkish foreign policymakers to 
adopt a new, visionary approach to policymaking. In November 2002, the AKP 
governing elite emerged from the election institutionally strong with its majority 
hovering around two-thirds mark and making constitutional reforms a possibility. Its 
formation of a single party government promised greater coherence in the office and 
stability in the country.  
Thanks to the EU-inspired democratic transformation, Turkish 
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foreign policymaking moved from a military-dominated, closed-door process to involve 
more debates among the public and decision making by the elected civilian leaders. That 
process resulted in a less security-oriented and more liberal approach to the Middle East 
and Eurasia that emphasizes soft power, peaceful reconciliation, and greater economic 
interdependence and takes into account Turkish people’s sensitivities towards people 
with whom they share similar history, religion, and geography.  
Ironically, many Kemalists, who once were the Western-oriented clique, have 
now turned against the West because of their suspicion of the AKP’s agenda. The 
military, which already had concerns about the EU’s minority rights agenda vis-à-vis the 
Kurds, became unwilling to embrace Turkey’s EU agenda while the AKP passed more 
pro-EU legal reforms than most of the previous secularist governments in Turkish history 
in its first three years in government.615 As a result, the challenge to Turkey’s Western 
orientation came from not the Islamist politicians but from the secularist establishment 
that claimed the AKP was pursuing a hidden Islamic agenda and blamed the US and the 
EU for supporting it. The Western praise of Turkey as a “moderate Islamic country” only 
exacerbated the fears of the secularists who do not want their country to be an experiment 
in “moderate Islamization.”616  
The institutional changes in the foreign policymaking were possible with coming 
to power of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul, and Ahmet Davutoglu, who 
spearheaded Turkey’s foreign policy through different government positions during the 
AKP years. These leaders strongly believed Turkey has a historical responsibility for the 
well being of the nations in the former Ottoman territories and hoped to increase 
Turkey’s regional influence, leading to criticisms that the AKP has a neo-Ottoman 
	   	   	  




Ahmet Davutoglu is the main architect behind Turkey’s new foreign policy 
concept. Davutoglu’s foreign policy vision, which stretches from pragmatic to 
ideological, had a profound impact on Turkey’s recent activism in the Middle East and 
Eurasia. Davutoglu argued that Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central 
Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country and it can simultaneously 
exercise influence in all these regions and claim a global strategic role. His new 
diplomatic approach aims to enable Turkey not to be merely a “bridge” but a “central” 
country in the region. That requires Ankara to pursue a proactive and preemptive peace 
diplomacy by mediating between Israel and Syria, Sunnis and the Shiites in Iraq and 
contributing to reconciliation efforts in Lebanon and Palestine.  
Davutoglu’s “zero problems with neighbors” principle, which aims to eliminate 
the perception of a country “surrounded by enemies” that had permeated the Turkish 
psychology, and his foreign policy doctrine that advocates the necessity of pursuing a 
multidimensional foreign policy shaped Turkey’s relations with the Middle Eastern and 
Eurasian countries. Turkey embraced multidimensional foreign policy concept to balance 
its relations with Russia and the West and maintain its critical economic ties to Moscow. 
Turkey’s value-based foreign policy was a major determinant of its support for the people 
in the Arab spring, namely in Tunisia, Egypt, and later in Syria. His “rhythmic 
diplomacy” calls for a more active involvement in all international organizations as 
evidenced in its non-permanent membership of the UNSC, membership in the G-20, and 
participation in the African Union, Gulf Cooperation Council, Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation, and the Arab League.617 
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Davutoglu’s policy also envisions creating economic interdependence with the 
surrounding countries, which has been instrumental in Turkey’s pursuit of economic 
relations with the Middle Eastern and Eurasian countries. By establishing 
interdependence in the region through free movement of goods and people, Davutoglu’s 
expectation is not only the creation of a venue for Turkey’s exports and business 
activities but also the achievement of regional peace.618619 Ankara pursued a proactive 
diplomacy in its outreach to Central Asia and the Caucasus to increase Turkey’s soft 
power in the region, reduce tension, and contribute to regional peace, stability, and 
economic prosperity. 
However, it’s worth noting that AKP’s policies are not simply the product of a 
few new AKP leaders; they tap into deeper roots in Turkish geopolitics. Turkey’s 
democratically elected leaders such as Turgut Ozal had pursued similar goals of 
liberalizing the country and increasing outreach to the neighboring Middle Eastern and 
Eurasian countries in the past. The AKP has significantly accelerated these efforts and 
established the outlines and future direction of Turkish foreign policy for a long time to 
come. Almost all parties in Turkey support the expansion of Turkish economic interests 
into the Middle East, as well as into Asia, Africa, and Latin America, particularly in view 
of the EU’s reluctance to accept Turkey into the EU.620 Even if the AKP loses ground in 
the future, any successor party is unlikely to depart sharply from most of the principles 
set by the party, particularly on the new dimensions of the foreign policy that include the 
Middle East and Eurasia. 621 
Policy	  Implications	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Turkish leadership’s actions in the last decade demonstrate Ankara’s desire to 
assert some independence and end Turkey’s subservient position to the Western 
countries. With an economy that is the 6th largest economy in Europe and the 16th largest 
in the world and with an army that is the second largest land army in NATO after the US, 
an increasingly confident Turkey seeks to have a say in regional affairs. Turkey’s 
economic and political ties with China, Russia, Brazil, and Japan indicate that Turkey is 
not only active in the former Ottoman territories or in the Muslim countries but vies for a 
bigger role in the region as well as a greater say in the international affairs.  
As a result, Turkey seeks more equal partnership from the US and the EU 
countries and expects the US to acknowledge the “new Turkey” with its diverse set of 
aspirations, interests, and policies that may not always align with those of the US. 
Disagreements will arise but Turkey has shown that it has no interest in jeopardizing its 
strong ties with the EU and the US. Stephen Hardley, a former US national security 
adviser said, Turkey’s dramatic changes in the last decade make it ripe for a stronger 
collaboration with the United States, but the terms of the relationship need to be changed 
in order to create a new framework for cooperation that would let the countries “meet as 
equals.” The Turks want to claim more central places in the emerging system of 
international relations and not likely to agree to an inferior status that Brussels might 
want to offer them. Most Turks feel they are not getting the respect they deserve from the 
West, particularly from Europe and the United States,622 and Turkish leaders want their 
Western counterparts to respect their redlines in relation to the Kurdish issue, Armenian 
issue, and the Cyprus issue.  
Despite the alarm bells played by some policy wonks that Turkey has become 
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Islamized with the AKP’s coming to power, prominent Turkey scholars Gordon and 
Taspinar argue that the threat to Turkey’s Western orientation today is not so much 
Islamization but growing nationalism and frustration with the United States and 
Europe.623 A majority of Turks still want to see their country firmly anchored in the 
West, but their patience is wearing thin because of what they perceive to be Western 
double standards and neglect of Turkish national security interests on matters such as the 
Kurdish, Armenian, and the Cyprus issues.624 The Kemalists believe the AKP 
government is too soft on the Kurdish separatists and the Cyprus issue, which encourages 
even a harder line from the AKP toward the problem.625 
Turkey wants to see the US as an ally who will help Ankara fight the PKK, 
Turkey’s number one domestic security threat, not as an adversary who will place arms 
embargo on Turkey. In the mid-1990s, Turkey became the first NATO country to buy 
arms, rifles, and helicopters from Russia because the Western nations refused to sell 
weapons that could be used against its Kurdish rebels.626 Gordon and Taspinar argue that 
there are ways to minimize the Turkish perception that Americans and Europeans do not 
take Turkish interests into account. They would include exercising the Western leverage 
over the Iraqi Kurds to rein in the forces threatening Turkey’s security, promoting a 
mutually beneficial bargain between Turkey and the Kurds of Iraq, or at the very least 
expressing an understanding and respect for Turkey’s sensitivity towards the Kurdish 
issue. Statements like that of the US commander in charge of northern Iraq who, when 
asked about why Turkey considers the PKK such a serious threat, said “I have no idea. 
You’ll have to ask Turkey,” could reflect as the US indifference to cross-border terrorist 
attacks the Turks have suffered. It also contributes to the Turkish people’s feeling that 
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their leaders must act unilaterally and more independently to protect their own national 
interests.627 
The Armenian issue has also been the sticking point in Turkey’s relations with the 
West and the Western governments’ recognition of the Armenian suffering in 1915 as 
genocide has further alienated and angered Turkey, undermining efforts to promote 
reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia and exacerbating Turkish nationalism. Even 
liberal Turks, who acknowledge that atrocities were committed, have trouble 
understanding why foreign legislatures should be determining how to characterize the 
actions of their Ottoman predecessors 100 years ago. This is an issue that ultimately 
needs Turkey to face up to its past, but showing sensitivity towards this thorny issue, 
encouraging the resolution of the relevant Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and assuring that 
Turkey’s acknowledgment need not trigger Armenian territorial and financial demands 
for compensation would be steps in the right direction, according to Gordon and 
Taspinar.628  
Turkish leaders, who are sensitive toward the Western attitude on this issue, are 
reportedly linking Turkey’s purchase of a multi billion-dollar air-defense system to 
whether the bidder countries recognize the “Armenian genocide.” Even though Turkey 
denied that there was a political subtext to its decision to give the Chinese company the 
contract in the face of pressure from its NATO allies, Ankara did not finalize its decision 
over the missile defense system winner before the centennial anniversary of the 1915 
incidents so that it could see the US and French positions on the genocide claims before 
awarding a sizeable contract to a bidder from these countries.629  
The third sensitive issue that requires constructive dialogue and support is the 
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Cyprus issue. Turkish leaders still remember the Johnson letter and the US arms embargo 
after Turkey’s 1974 intervention in Cyprus. Turks believe that their politically difficult 
efforts to promote a political settlement on the island were not reciprocated by the Greek 
Cypriots, and that Europe and the US have not lived up to their promises to reward the 
Turkish Cypriots for their willingness to compromise while the Greek Cypriots were 
rewarded with EU membership. Greek Cypriots feel secure in their status as full members 
of the EU and might see little reason for compromise, but the West, especially the EU, 
which has some leverage over both parties, can nudge them closer to reach a political 
settlement, similar to the Annan Plan that failed. That would benefit both sides and 
contribute to the regional peace and stability.630 
President Obama’s major foreign policy priorities, which included a declarative 
document titled “Restoring the Strategic Partnership with Turkey” where “a close 
relationship with a stable, democratic, Western-oriented Republic of Turkey” was defined 
as “an important US national interest,”631 was an encouraging sign. Turkish feelings 
about the US improved following Washington’s intelligence cooperation contributing to 
the capture of the PKK leader in 1999 and its agreement in 2008 to support Turkish 
military action against the PKK in Iraq.632 Turkey appreciated the US support for 
Turkey’s EU membership and for the oil and gas pipelines from the Caucasus to Europe 
via Turkey, such as the BTC and BTE. President Obama’s visit to Turkey in April 2009 
on his first overseas trip after the elections, his efforts to revise the Bush legacy in US-
Turkey relations, and his use of the term “model partnership” in describing Turkish-
American relations generated a lot of goodwill in Ankara’s eyes.633 Despite the rhetoric, 
the Turks probably appreciated Obama’s decision not to use the word “genocide” in his 
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speech for the centennial commemoration, unlike some of his European counterparts. 
 3.	  Turkish	  Public	  Opinion	  
	  
In the 1990s, the role of the Turkish public opinion was marginal and the Turkish 
people did not show much interest in foreign policy. However, the AKP’s wide-ranging 
EU reform program implemented in 2003 and 2004 gave more power to the Turkish 
public that came to matter more in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy. Turkish 
public’s opinion played an important role in Turkish policymakers’ efforts at forging 
closer political and economic ties with the Middle Eastern and Eurasian countries. 
Turkish people have increasingly become a proponent of a more independent and active 
foreign policy in the region, reflected in the government’s foreign policy activism. In a 
Transatlantic Survey by the German Marshall Fund in 2004, 75 percent of the Turkish 
respondents said Turkey should take an active part in world affairs.  
Turkish people naturally show sympathy for causes reflective of the Turkish 
population. Davutoglu said in a 2010 Foreign Policy article: “There are more Bosnians in 
Turkey than in Bosnia-Herzogovina, more Albanians than in Kosovo, more Chechens 
than in Chechnya, more Abkhazians than in the Abkhaz region in Georgia, and a 
significant number of Azeris and Georgians,” noting the effect of these conflicts on 
domestic politics in Turkey. Davutoglu argued that Turkey experiences regional tensions 
at home and faces public demands to pursue an active foreign policy to secure the peace 
and security of these communities so its foreign policy is shaped by the priorities of its 
citizens.634 
There is little serious public criticism of AKP’s policy toward Israel because 
Israeli policies are broadly unpopular with the general public that sympathize more 
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with the Palestinians. There are strong elements of nationalism on the part of both the 
Nationalist Movement Party and the People’s Republican Party, main opposition parties 
that are similarly unsympathetic to Israel, making it quite unlikely that any post-AKP 
government in Turkey would significantly reverse the current foreign policy.635 In the 
2004 transatlantic survey, when asked about Turkish people’s feeling toward certain 
countries with 100 being very warm, Turks gave 52 for Palestinians, 34 for Iran in 
contrast to 28 for the US and 13 for Israel. In 2008, this number only fell to 44 for 
Palestinians and 32 for Iran but 14 for the US and 8 for Israel. 
At the same time, new obstacles to the EU accession, perceived injustice in 
Cyprus, growing global recognition of the “Armenian genocide,” the Western sympathy 
for Kurdish nationalist aspirations, and several high-profile incidents that hurt the Turks’ 
national identity are all major factors forcing the Turks to question the value of their 
longstanding pro-Western geostrategic commitments.636 Growing nationalism and 
frustration with the United States and Europe is evident in the broad anti-Westernism in 
Turkish society. According to a poll conducted by the German Marshall Fund in 2006, 81 
percent of Turks disapproved and only 7 percent approved of President Bush’s handling 
of international policies. According to another poll conducted by the Pew Charitable 
Trusts in 2006, only 12 percent of Turks viewed the US positively. Anti-Americanism 
among the public, which increased after the invasion of Iraq, sympathy toward the 
Palestinians and consideration of Iraq, Iran, and Syria as non-enemies translated into an 
approach to the Middle East that has sometimes conflicted with that of Washington.637	  
The opinion polls, the day before the crucial parliamentary vote, showed 95 percent of 
the population was against a war in Iraq. On 1 March 2003, the day of voting, around 
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45,000 people demonstrated against a war on the streets of Ankara.  
 Policy	  Implications  
	  
Unfortunately, the rise of the impact of public opinion in Turkey rose at the same 
time with the rising anti-US sentiments in public opinion, which is too high for a country 
that has been a staunch US ally for decades. Part of the reason for the anti-Americanism 
in the early 2000s was the perception that the US was not helping Turkey enough to 
eliminate the PKK activities in northern Iraq. Turks heavily criticized the US policies for 
creating an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq that facilitated the PKK terrorist 
operations against Turkey638 and the unfounded perception that the US sided with the 
Kurds in Iraq at the expense of the Turkish security concerns deepened.639 Increasingly 
nationalist streaks in Turkish society, evidenced by the rising popularity of the 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and flourishing of nationalist movies, exacerbate this 
situation.  
Because the electorate’s opinion has a substantial impact on foreign policy, 
showing sensitivities to the issues that are redlines for the majority of Turks, including 
the Kurdish, Cyprus, and the Armenian issue, would go a long way in minimizing anti-
Westernism in Turkey. A long-time Turkey observer Ilnur Cevik claims that Erdoğan, 
when he was a prime minister, kept a close watch over the pulse of the voters through 
weekly opinion polls. He would see how the voters reacted to controversial issues and if 
they were to the detriment of the government, he would not hesitate to abruptly abandon 
his stance. That partially explains the escalation in Erdogan’s erratic and harsh rhetoric 
against Israel or the West prior to elections.  
Improving the US image in Turkey also requires an understanding of how 
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Turkish people can easily be influenced by stories that are sensationalized in Turkish 
media and hurt their national pride and insult their sense of identity. The 2003 capture of 
eleven Turkish Special Forces soldiers by the US forces in Iraq, and their transportation 
in hoods in front of the cameras caused a national outcry against the US for injuring 
national pride given the sacred importance of the strength and dignity of the soldier in 
Turkish society. Some Turkish papers made reference to the 1964 crisis in Cyprus and 
Johnson’s letter of threat to remove the NATO support if Turkey militarily intervened in 
Cyprus.  
Another example of an innocently minor issue causing such disproportionate 
response would be President Obama’s picture speaking on the phone with a bat in his 
right hand with a caption that reads: “President Obama talks on the phone with Prime 
Minister Erdogan of Turkey in the Oval Office, 2012.” Turkish politicians and columnists 
immediately began to comment on its symbolic meaning. The members of the opposition 
Republican People’s Party suggested the photo showed that Erdogan received orders 
from the US. Some recalled Roosevelt’s foreign policy idiom of the era, “speak softly 
and carry a big stick,” and some others called it an implicit insult to Turkey and its 
citizens with many images circulating in social media in reaction. 
Turkey’s future trends look positive, however. As the violence in the Middle East 
persists and Russia remains embroiled in the Ukrainian crisis, Turkish people seem to 
realize that their future is within the Western framework. Recently, both Turkey’s trade 
with the West and the public opinion toward the West have been on a positive trajectory. 
Turkey’s exports to the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, have dropped 
dramatically. For example, Turkish exports to Egypt and Iran fell by 10 and 61 percent 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
287	  
respectively between 2012 and 2014 and the exports to the Arab world dropped by 5 
percent. Similarly, Turkey’s exports to Russia and Ukraine between 2013 and 2014 fell 
by 15 and 21 percent, respectively. Given the chaos reigning in Turkey’s neighborhood, 
these trends are likely to continue in the near future. Meanwhile, however, exports to the 
recession-stricken EU increased by 9 percent and to the US by 13 percent during the 
same period. These numbers are likely to increase following the EU’s decision to expand 
its Customs Union with Turkey in May 2015.640 
Following a serious drop in interest for EU membership in late 2000s, Turkish 
people’s enthusiasm for the EU seems to be increasing. When asked about whether the 
EU would be a good thing or bad thing in 2014 according to the German Marshall Fund’s 
poll, 53 percent, up from 43 percent in 2010, said it would be a good thing while 29 
percent, down from 35 percent in 2010, thought it would be a bad thing. When asked 
about why, 29 percent of the Turks said it would be good because the EU strengthened 
the EU countries’ economies, compared to only 16 percent of those from the big EU 10 
countries that agreed with the statement.  
According to the Transatlantic Survey in 2014, 28 percent of the Turks said it 
should work closely with the EU on international matters, up from 20 percent in 2008; 10 
percent said it should work closely with the US, up from 3 percent in 2008, 14 percent 
said it should work closely with the Middle Eastern countries, down from 20 percent in 
2010. These results are nearly back to the 2008 figures. Those who wanted Turkey to act 
alone also dropped from 48 percent in 2008 to 33 percent in 2014. On the question of 
whether NATO is essential to the country’s security, 49 percent of the Turks think it’s 
still essential, up from 30 percent in 2010. 
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6.3.	  Concluding	  Remarks	  
	  
In upholding the hypothesis B, which argues that Turkey’s foreign policy actions 
represent a significant shift in autonomy but not a fundamental reorientation, this 
dissertation highlights that it’s unhelpful to view Turkey in “hypothesis A” terms as a 
country experiencing reorientation of its foreign policy in favor of a completely 
autonomous power that tries to limit the Western influence in these regions. Turkey is not 
lost, yet; labeling Turkey as “lost to the East,” “abandoning the West,” or worse as an 
adversary could actually become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
Turkey is not Iran. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution that ended the close 
alliance with the US during the Shah period, Iran completely reoriented the country’s 
direction by acting like a total adversary to the US and pursuing policies that are 
completely against the Western interests. Iran supported regional terrorist networks, 
including Hizballah, which the US lists as a terrorist organization, and sought to create 
instability in the region to increase its influence. To spread its brand of Islam and raise its 
Shia profile in the Muslim world, it has intervened in regional conflicts in Syria and 
Yemen, inflaming conflicts and contributing to instability. Turkey on the other hand 
cooperates closely with the West to root out terrorism in the region and pursues active 
diplomacy to mediate between parties for the resolution of conflicts and to create 
economic interdependence for regional peace and stability. Turkey tries to stay above the 
sectarian divide and strives to promote democratic and secular values in the Middle East 
and Eurasia region. Turkey’s leader criticizes Israeli policies but the Iranian leader vows 
to eradicate Israel from the map of the world.  
Turkey is not Russia. After the Second World War, Turkey adopted a long-term 
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multi-faceted strategy of integrating into the European “core”; it became a NATO 
member and was put on the waiting list for joining the EU. Russia, on the contrary, till 
early 1990s regarded the NATO as the main threat to its national security and tried to 
compete with the EU by promoting its own integration project in Eastern Europe. Turkey 
constitutes a natural geographical extension of Europe, major underutilized repositories 
of human capital, and investment opportunities that could give a boost to the stagnant EU 
economies and serve as a buffer to the unstable southern EU borders. While Turkey seeks 
to become an EU member with the help of the US, Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine 
demonstrate that it seeks to challenge the US and the EU.  
Turkey is not opposing the international order created by the West or breaking the 
international rule of law by acting aggressively. Both Turkey and Russia may want to 
pursue a sphere of influence in the region but Russia is trying to bring its former colonies 
into its orbit with disregard to their sovereignty and territorial integrity. On the other 
hand, Turkey is contributing to the regional order and stability by making efforts to 
resolve disputes and by attracting other countries to build economic interdependence 
through its soft power and respect for their sovereignty. Turkey’s initiatives to create a 
free trade area with the Middle Eastern countries or to establish regional forums to 
enhance cooperation—unlike Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union or China’s Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization—are not intended to limit the influence of the Western 
countries and institutions. 
Turkey is more like France. Its more nationalist, independent, self-confident and 
defiant strategic orientation is a Turkish variant of Gaullism, in the words of a Turkey 
scholar Taspinar.641 Turkish Gaullism means increasingly acting on its own in search of 
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full sovereignty, greater influence, and most importantly Turkish national pride. France 
sought a nuclear deterrent, pursued realpolitik, and left the NATO military structure 
under Charles de Gaulle. France was the first country to initiate the rapprochement with 
China when the West shunned the country for its massacre of peaceful students protests 
in Tiananmen. France opposed the US invasion of Iraq, along with Germany, and voted 
against it in the UNSC, forcing the US to wage the war unilaterally without the UN 
backing. It opposed the harsher sanctions against Russia after the Ukraine crisis and it 
only cancelled its arms exports to Russia after heavy pressure from the US and the EU. 
Turkey can disagree with the approaches of Washington and Brussels, just like 
France, but it is an ally, not an adversary. Turkey’s move toward being a “normal” power 
that pursues its own interests in ways sometimes frustrated the US and the EU, but it 
generally behaves in a way that is consistent with multilateral norms. Turkish autonomy 
has certainly increased, but Ankara generally operates within the bounds acceptable to 
the West and its move toward “normal” autonomy should not be perceived as a threat. 
Perhaps the bigger worry for the West is not Turkey’s reorientation but its recent 
restrictions on freedom and democracy and their implications for Turkey’s stability. 
Maintenance of a democratic Turkey, which was once hailed as a model for the Central 
Asian republics and the Islamic world, has important implications not just for Turkey but 
for the people yearning for freedom and democracy in the surrounding region beset by 
authoritarianism and violence.  
Despite the impressive array of political and economic reforms passed during the 
AKP’s first two terms that increased the rights of the Kurdish minority and improved the 
lives of millions of people, the Turkish government is increasingly being criticized over 
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its breach of freedom of expression and the rule of law. When the protests broke out in 
2013 over the construction of a mall, which would demolish the Gezi Park in Central 
Istanbul, the police used heavy-handed tactics to suppress the protests, resulting in five 
fatalities. Instead of calming down the situation, Erdogan inflamed the protests by 
belittling the protestors and their demands. The government also became more aggressive 
towards media, which were already weak by the Western standards, by jailing journalists 
and censoring the media, most recently banning Twitter and Youtube. The government’s 
order to revoke licenses and cancel deals with groups associated with Mr. Gulen, the 
religious scholar who fell out of the AKP’s favor, and charges against the military 
officers, the AKP’s archrivals, on the grounds of conspiring to stage a coup raise 
questions about the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary in the country. 
President Erdogan’s majoritarian view of democracy led to growing concerns 
among a significant minority of Turks about his increasingly divisive leadership. He has 
done more than any previous leader to resolve the country’s Kurdish conflict and his 
populist triumph moved Turkish politics from the domain of elites and empowered the 
heartland’s devout Muslims and conservative entrepreneurs. His party ended the 
dominance of the Turkish military, which toppled four elected governments since 1960, 
and his proposals to change the 1982 Constitution, reminiscent of the military coup, and 
establish a more representative Constitutional court, not dominated by the old secular 
elite, are not necessarily anti-democratic. However, while catering to the majority of the 
Turks who voted for him, he was accused of ignoring the voice of the other half, 
increasing fears that Turkey could become more polarized and descend into instability in 
an already unstable region. 
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Turkey’s electorate probably punished Erdogan’s authoritarian leanings in the 
June 2015 parliamentary elections by ending the AKP’s 13-year single-party rule, 
complicating President Erdogan’s plans to get a two-thirds majority to boost his 
presidential powers. However, the AKP, which won 40.8 percent of the vote and the 258 
out of 550 seats in the parliament, is still the dominant party in the country and its 
electoral appeal is likely to remain for many years to come because the central 
component of the regime—the conservative entrepreneurial class and the pious majority 
that were neglected by its secular predecessors—continue to support the AKP’s growth-
inducing economic policies and social policies. 
It will be interesting to watch how Turkey’s foreign policy would unfold if its 
internal politics gradually returns to a period of authoritarianism like the one under the 
military’s dominance. A good indicator of which direction Turkey is heading could be the 
course of women’s rights in Turkey. If Turkey, which gave the right to vote to women 
before many of the European countries and lectured the Muslim countries at the 
Organization of the Islamic Cooperation about gender equality, begins to restrict the 
women’s rights beyond the limits acceptable to most Turkish women, there is a very 
good reason to worry. 
The AKP also needs to realize—the recent parliamentary elections could serve as 
a wake up call—that its power is limited as 13 years have passed and the party may 
gradually be losing some of its vitality and vision. The economy slowed to 2.8 percent 
growth in 2014 after averaging 5 percent in the last decade. The AKP may now have 
peaked in its decade-long strong performance and the corruption allegations have 
tarnished the party’s image. Erdogan’s blustering, at times erratic, style has recently 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
293	  
started winning him more enemies.642 Turkey does not enjoy a deeply-rooted geo-cultural 
sphere of influence based on sectarian solidarity like Iran, it does not speak the language 
of the Middle Eastern region, and it does not champion a religious ideology that would 
help spread its influence like Saudi Arabia. The only power that will pave the way for the 
Turkish sphere of influence in the region will be its own democratic and economic 
appeal,643 strengthening of which would suit the long term interests of Turkey as well as 
its Western allies.  
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